Were all 15 male customers and the male bartender accomplices to the sexual attack?

The men in the bar witnessed and encouraged the rape. Their sharing of the intent to rape the victim may be inferred from their shouts of support. This encouragement satisfies the actus reus of accessoryship. There is no requirement that the prosecution demonstrate that the men actually assisted the rape the woman who entered the bar. They are guilty as principles and at common law would be considered principles in the second degree.

As a prosecutor, would you charge Manes as an accomplice to the murders? To the suicides? What if Harris and Klebold arrived at the school armed with weapons and ammunition provided by Manes but used other weapons to kill? What if they left the weapons and ammunition provided by Manes at home?

Manes purchased a semiautomatic handgun for Harris and several months later sold him one hundred rounds of ammunition. There is no indication that he was informed of Harris and Dylan Klebald’s plans to shoot the students at Columbine High School and Manes therefore cannot be held to have shared their intent to attack the students. Manes’ also cannot be convicted as an accessory before the fact under a “knowing” standard since he was not informed of the impending attack.

Is McCoy guilty of sexual assault?

 

On 23 September 2002, C.B. was working the evening shift as the assistant manager of a McDonald’s at Long Leaf Mall in Wilmington. On her crew during the shift were defendant Leon McCoy (McCoy) and Andre Randall (Randall), who frequently worked together on the same shift. C.B. closed the lobby and locked the doors at 10:00 that night, though the drive-thru window remained open until 11:00. Ordinarily McCoy took out the trash, however on that night Randall took it out, and, contrary to policy, failed to notify C.B. that he was doing so. The manager should have opened and shut the locked door for Randall, however Randall simply turned the deadbolt in a way that kept the door ajar. It was through this open door that an armed assailant entered at around 11:30, as McCoy was mopping the hallway and C.B. was preparing the night deposit. The assailant went into the office and put a gun to the side of C.B.’s head. He wore a green ski mask, but she could tell it was a black male who was about her height. He demanded the deposit money, and also took C.B.’s personal cash. He demanded a bag for the cash. McCoy, who was lying on the floor outside the office, went to the front near the service counter and got a bag. Though there were several silent alarms in this area, McCoy did not activate any of them.

Once he bagged the money, the robber told C.B. to undress. As she was unbuttoning her shirt, he said it was taking too long and he told her to just drop her pants and underwear. He then demanded that she spread her labia apart. He stooped down to inspect her genitals, and used the barrel of his gun to pull her labia further apart. He noticed that she had a tampon inserted, and told her that she was “lucky”. The assailant then departed with the money. After the assailant left, McCoy went to the front of the store and hit a silent alarm.

McCoy and Randall often rode to work together. At trial, Randall testified that: He saw no one outside as he took out the trash that night, but he did see a white Mitsubishi Galant in the parking lot. Defendant Keith Lamar Bellamy (Bellamy) owned a burgundy Honda automobile, but at the time of the robbery he was driving his cousin’s 1995 white Mitsubishi Galant. Bellamy and McCoy knew each other and were friends. Randall knew Bellamy from seeing him around the neighborhood and from playing basketball with him. McCoy was having financial problems before the robbery. McCoy lived in a boarding house and at times would be late with his rent and get locked out of his room. McCoy was upset about his work hours being cut because he was not going to have enough money to pay his rent. A few weeks before the robbery, Randall learned that McCoy was contemplating robbing the McDonald’s. A couple of days before the robbery, having been locked out of his room for non-payment, McCoy spoke more specifically about robbing the McDonald’s to get money to pay his rent. McCoy was looking for Bellamy to help him commit the robbery. He told Randall not to interfere with the robbery. A couple of days or so before the robbery, McCoy left work early. Around 11:30 p.m. that night, Randall saw McCoy and Bellamy in the parking lot in the burgundy Honda. Randall believed the robbery was supposed to have taken place that night, but was called off because of police presence in the area. When Randall took the trash out on the night of the robbery and saw the white Galant in the parking lot, he knew it was Bellamy. Upon reentering the restaurant, Randall encountered a person wearing a green mask. The person pointed a gun at Randall’s head and told him to get down on the floor. Randall recognized the robber’s voice as Bellamy’s.

Detective Overman of the Wilmington Police Department arrived at McDonald’s about 12:20 a.m. McCoy told him that he could not identify the perpetrator’s voice. He said the robber pointed the gun directly at him and ordered him to lie down immediately when the robber entered the restaurant. The assertion that McCoy was immediately ordered to the floor was contradicted by videotapes, which showed the office, hall, and kitchen area of the McDonald’s during the robbery.

Randall and McCoy left McDonald’s together, before 1:58 a.m. According to Randall, McCoy asked Randall to take him to where Bellamy lived, and used Randall’s cell phone to call Bellamy’s residence but no one answered. Phone records showed a call from Randall’s phone to that residence at 1:58 a.m. McCoy said he needed to find Bellamy, and directed Randall to drop him off at a location where he thought Bellamy might be located. Randall testified that within a few days of the robbery, McCoy offered him $ 400 not to say anything to the police about the robbery and his role in it. He attempted to hand the money to Randall, but Randall refused.

Defendants were tried before a jury in New Hanover County Superior Court, and were found guilty of all charges on 15 August 2003. Bellamy was convicted of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree sexual offense. The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively, and resulted in a total active prison sentence of 439 months to 546 months. McCoy was convicted of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and one count of first-degree sexual offense, which were consolidated for judgment, resulting in an active prison term of 307 months to 378 months.

 

Reasoning

As to the convictions for first-degree sexual offense, we find that there was sufficient evidence of penetration for that charge to be submitted to the jury. N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-27.4(a)(2)a provides: “A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the first-degree if the person engages in a sexual act: With another person by force and against the will of the other person, and: Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon …” “Sexual act [can be defined as] the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal opening of another person’s body.”

Defendants argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient on the element of penetration to allow this charge to be submitted to the jury. We disagree.

C.B. testified at trial that the assailant ordered her to drop her pants and underwear at gunpoint and asked her to spread open her labia so he could inspect her vagina. The assailant then used the barrel of his gun to separate her labia. C.B. further testified that she “felt the gun up against my private area right where the tampon would be entered.” She clarified this statement by adding: “He didn’t shove the … barrel of the gun directly into me. However, I did feel the barrel of the gun, the force of it in the vicinity of the area where you would put the tampon in.” She further clarified that she felt the barrel of the gun on the inside of her labia.

Our Supreme Court has held that in the context of rape, evidence that the defendant entered the labia is sufficient to prove the element of penetration. We find no reason to establish a different standard for sexual offense. We hold that all of the evidence in the instant case shows that Bellamy used the barrel of his gun to spread the labia of C.B. This evidence supported the element of penetration for the first-degree sexual offense. The trial court properly denied the motions of the defendants to dismiss this charge, on this basis.

In McCoy’s first argument, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree sexual offense. At trial, the State proceeded against McCoy on this charge under a theory of acting concert. The State’s theory at trial was that Bellamy was the masked gunman who actually robbed the McDonald’s, and who perpetrated the sexual assault on C.B., but that McCoy was his inside help, and that they planned the robbery together. As a party to the robbery, the State contends that McCoy is liable as a principal under the theory of acting in concert for Bellamy’s sexual assault on C.B.

The law of acting in concert in North Carolina is as follows: If “two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose … or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.”

In the instant case, the State did not argue at trial, and does not argue on appeal, that the sexual assault was done “in pursuance of the common purpose” of the robbery with a dangerous weapon. The record is completely devoid of evidence that the defendants discussed any potential sexual assault prior to the robbery. The State argues that the sexual assault was “a natural or probable consequence thereof.” Whether a sexual assault is a natural or probable consequence of a robbery with a dangerous weapon of a fast food restaurant is a question of first impression in North Carolina.

The State asserts that any sexual assault perpetrated in the course of any robbery with a dangerous weapon is a natural or probable consequence thereof. Clearly, a murder committed during the course of a robbery with a dangerous weapon is normally a natural or probable consequence of that robbery with a dangerous weapon. Conversely, a murder to conceal a previous arson might not be such a consequence. The question is one of foreseeability: if one takes the property of another at the point of a loaded gun, the violent use of that gun is a foreseeable consequence. Some jurisdictions have determined that whether a consequence of a robbery with a dangerous weapon was natural or probable is judged by an objective standard. See People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 518, 531, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323, 331 (1993) (“the issue does not turn on the defendant’s subjective state of mind, but depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the” principal crime).

We decline to adopt a per se rule that any sexual assault committed during the course of a robbery is a natural or probable consequence of a planned crime. Rather, this determination must be made on a case by case basis, upon the specific facts and circumstances presented. The issue in the instant case is whether the sex offense Bellamy committed was a natural or probable consequence of the robbery with a dangerous weapon of the McDonald’s.

Concerning the foreseeability of robbery turning into a sexual offense, the California Court of Appeals has stated that robbery is a crime that can be committed in widely varying circumstances. It can be committed in a public place, such as on a street or in a market, or it can be committed in a place of isolation, such as in the victim’s home. It can be committed in an instant, such as in a forcible purse snatching, or it can be committed over a prolonged period of time in which the victim is held hostage. During hostage-type robberies in isolated locations, sexual abuse of victims is all too common. “When robbers enter the home, the scene is all too often set for other and more dreadful crimes such as that committed on [the victim] in this case. In the home, the victims are particularly weak and vulnerable and the robber is correspondingly secure. The result is all too often the infliction of other crimes on the helpless victim. Rapes consummated during the robbery of a bank or supermarket appear to be a rarity, but rapes in the course of a residential robbery occur with depressing frequency.”

In the Nguyen case, the California Court of Appeals held that though in general a sexual assault in the course of a robbery of a business would not be foreseeable, on particular facts it could be. Specifically, they held that a sexual assault was a natural or probable consequence of a robbery.

The defendants and their cohorts chose to commit robberies in businesses with a sexual aura, both from the types of services they held themselves out as providing and from the strong suspicion repeatedly expressed by the participants at the trial, that they were actually engaged in prostitution. The businesses were arranged much like a residence, with separate rooms furnished as bedrooms might be. The businesses operated behind locked doors, which both added to their sexual aura and gave the robbers security against intrusion or discovery by outsiders. The robbers went to the businesses in sufficient numbers to easily overcome any potential resistance and to maintain control over the victims for as long as they desired.

We agree that in certain factual circumstances a sexual assault in the course of a robbery of a business may be a natural or probable circumstance, but that it is less likely to be so than in the context of a robbery taking place in a home.

In the instant case, Bellamy entered McDonald’s at around 11:30 at night. Though that particular McDonald’s was closed (the interior closed at 10:00 p.m. and the drive-thru closed at 11:00 p.m.), in light of the fact that many McDonald’s stay open later than 11:30 p.m., it would not be unusual for prospective customers to arrive at or after 11:30. The very public nature of a fast food restaurant creates a significant risk that the masked gunman or the employees lying on the floor inside might be noticed by someone outside. This is a fact of which McCoy, as an employee, would have been well aware. McCoy was also aware that there were security cameras in the store recording events during the robbery, and that there were silent alarms which other employees might have activated before Bellamy obtained control of the employees. In light of these facts, a reasonable person in McCoy’s position would expect Bellamy to get in and out of the restaurant as quickly as possible to avoid capture or recognition.

 

Holding

On these facts, and in this kind of a public business, we cannot find that a reasonable person in McCoy’s position would have foreseen that Bellamy would take the time to deviate from the planned robbery to commit this type of bizarre sexual assault on C.B. It was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this sexual assault was a natural and probable result of the robbery with a dangerous weapon, and it has failed to meet this burden. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the first-degree sexual offense charge against McCoy. We reverse judgment on the conviction and remand McCoy’s case to the trial court for resentencing on a single count of robbery with a dangerous weapon.

 

Questions for Discussion

1. What is the issue in Bellamy?

2. List criminal offenses that would be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the robbery.

3. Can you think of any factual circumstances in which a first-degree sexual offense would be a natural and foreseeable consequence of a robbery?

4. Why not hold McCoy liable for all criminal offenses that were committed during the robbery?

Do you agree that Williams possessed the required criminal intent to be held liable for Evans’s and Samantha’s murders? For Joshua’s murder?

Williams was a principle to the crime. In the language of the common law she was an accessory before the fact in that she visited Debra to determine what time she worked and when she expected to be at home. She also represented prior to the murders that she was pregnant and went so far as to permit her sister to give her a baby shower. She told her probation officer in the initial portion of November that she had given birth to a baby named Elijah. Williams was liable as a common law principle She met with Ward and Caffey prior to going to Debra’s house and knew that they were going over to Debra’s house to “teach her a lesson.” Debra’s death was a foreseeable consequence of this confrontation, although the defense attorney might dispute this assertion.

Williams admitted standing next to Caffey as he cut open Debra’s stomach and medical testimony indicated that at least two people would have been required to remove the child. She also admitted resuscitating Elijah. Williams also was liable for assisting in Joshua’s kidnapping and murder. Williams also was liable as an accessory after the fact when she disposed of the sheet in which Joshua was wrapped and told people that she had given birth to Elijah

Would you convict Charlotte of being an accessory after the fact to Xavier’s statutory rape?

Mississippi law requires a parent to consent in order for a child to have an abortion or else the girl must file a petition in court. Though the law in Alabama where the abortion was procured may be somewhat different, there has been no suggestion that the defendant’s agreement was unnecessary. Minors have a constitutional right to abortion, but that right can be restricted in certain ways. This conviction’s interpretation of the crime of being an accessory after the fact could be seen as criminalizing the assistance a mother may legally give a daughter to abort a pregnancy, provided she gives that assistance with the intent of hiding a rape. The evidence in the record fully supports that this defendant consistently failed her daughter in responding to the initial incidents of sexual abuse by Xavier Sherron and also in the response to the rape that led to pregnancy. If not for other members of the family, the crime may have remained undetected and, worst horror of all, the abuse may have continued. However, the sole acts for which Sherron was prosecuted were those connected with her giving the assistance that her daughter had to receive from one of her parents if she was to be permitted an abortion without a court order. The question is whether prosecuting a parent for such activity unduly burdens the daughter’s recognized constitutional right.

In order to establish that Charlotte Sherron was an accessory after the fact to the statutory rape of Jane, the prosecution had to prove: (1) Xavier Sherron committed a completed felony; (2) Charlotte Sherron concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted him when she knew he had committed a felony; and (3) Charlotte Sherron rendered such assistance or aid with the intent to enable Xavier Sherron to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment after he committed that felony. Xavier Sherron’s felony conviction and twenty-seven-year sentence are not disputed. The issues here are the second and third elements of accessory after the fact.

To prove the second element of accessory after the fact, the prosecution had to prove that Charlotte Sherron “concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted” her husband and that she knew he had committed a felony. Miss. Code Ann. 97-1-5. There are no statutory definitions for the words “conceal,” “receive,” “aid,” or “assist.” We therefore construe them according to their common meanings. The word “conceal” means “[t]o hide, secrete, or withhold from the knowledge of others.” “Aid” means “[t]o support, help, assist or strengthen.” “Assist” means “[t]o contribute effort in the complete accomplishment of an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those engaged.” Finally, “receive” means “[t]o take into possession and control; accept custody of; collect.” These commonly understood words support that a defendant is guilty when she acts to prevent discovery and prosecution of a felony.

The evidence supported that Sherron “concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted” her husband when she took Jane to Tuscaloosa for an abortion. The prosecution alleged that Charlotte Sherron committed these acts with the intent to conceal the fact that Xavier Sherron committed statutory rape. Sherron alleges that those acts were not personal assistance to the husband but to the child. She only “wanted to respect her daughter’s wishes and wanted to free her daughter of the burden of raising her stepfather’s child.” We find these arguments actually involve the issue of intent. The acts themselves suffice under the statutory language. We now turn to intent.

The State had to prove that Sherron intended to enable her husband “to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment” after he committed statutory rape. Whether an accused had a specific intent is a question of fact for the jury. The jury makes its determination based on the facts shown in each case. “Unless one expresses [her] intent, the only method by which intent may be proven is by showing the acts of the person involved at the time in question, and by showing the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Sherron argues there is not sufficient evidence that she intended to shield her husband from punishment for statutory rape and her intent was solely to help her daughter. According to the State, a reasonable juror could conclude that regardless of what else she had in mind, Sherron also intended to hide her husband’s awful offense. Among the circumstances relevant that the jury had to consider as to intent were these: (a) Sherron did not report her husband’s crime; (b) Sherron helped her daughter end a pregnancy caused by statutory rape; and (c) Sherron continued to allow her husband to live with her and her children because they relied on his income. In support of her mother, Jane indicated that Charlotte Sherron was afraid of Xavier Sherron. Jane testified that he was violent with her mother and that she once saw him choke her. Jane also testified that Xavier Sherron once threw a pot of grease against the wall during an argument with her mother. Xavier Sherron also pushed the defendant onto a couch and bit her breasts. Jane testified that, on occasion, he slammed flower pots on the floor and threw figurines at her mother. Jane’s grandmother, Ms. Howard, supported in her testimony that the defendant was afraid of her husband.

In the defense view, the intent for the assistance on the abortion was one to aid the minor child. It is further argued that failure to report the statutory rape was solely a function of Xavier Sherron’s intimidating nature. However, the defendant admitted to other considerations. Sherron stated, “Uncle Greg, Rosa Mostella and George Sherron told [her] not to tell the police or [Ms. Howard] because [she] would lose [her] kids, and George did not want his brother going to jail.” Sherron also explained that she allowed her husband to continue to live with her because she needed his monthly disability check. She also said that she did not report the crime because she did not know how she would pay her bills.

This evidence constitutes circumstantial proof that one of Sherron’s intents was to keep the crime of rape from being exposed. In addition, she likely had an intent to keep her young daughter from giving birth to a child who was fathered by rape. Quite simply and logically, the defendant could have operated with mixed purposes when she assisted in her daughter’s abortion. This abortion was received in Alabama. For purposes of evaluating the legal effect of the assistance in obtaining an abortion, we nonetheless look to Mississippi law since our legislature, in criminalizing conduct such as being an accessory after-the-fact, must take into account the rights granted under other Mississippi statutes. A minor who has become pregnant due to sexual intercourse with a stepfather has the right to an abortion if her mother alone consents. Absent the parental consent, a court would have had to consider whether to permit the abortion. The rape victim in this case testified that she never had any doubt that she wanted an abortion. The defendant also testified that she did not wish for her daughter to bear a child fathered by rape. There is no argument that there was anything illegal under Mississippi law in Jane’s having this abortion.

This mother’s assistance on the abortion could well be found to have had two intents behind it, one to support her daughter and the other to support her husband in preventing his crime from being exposed. When an act is done with multiple intents, it may be criminalized if one of the intents is an element of the relevant offense. In a prosecution for a conspiracy illegally to influence a federal election, the defendant alleged that he was more concerned about affecting some of the contests simultaneously being decided for local office.

We find no error in the jury’s evaluation of the conflicting evidence of intent and decision that Sherron acted to conceal Xavier Sherron’s crime when she took Jane to get an abortion.

Should Tomaino’s conviction be overturned? Could he constitutionally be sentenced to prison? Consider whether this statute differs from the legislative enactment in Koczwara.

The relevant Ohio law, C.C. 2907.31, provides that “no person with knowledge of its character or content, shall recklessly … sell … to a juvenile any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to juveniles.” Ohio argues that Tomaino, the owner of VIP Video, may be held vicariously, criminally liable for the actions of the clerk in selling prohibited material to Mark Frybarger, age seventeen or for failing to supervise the activities of the clerks who sold the videos. The appellate court ruled that the text of the statute did not impose liability on an individual who fails to supervise employees and who fails to take affirmative steps to keep juveniles from entering the store and purchasing videos. It is “undisputed that the clerk furnished the video to the minor and that the appellant was not present.” The Ohio appellate court concluded that “[b]ecause we find that a plain reading of the disseminating matter harmful to juveniles statues requires personal action by a defendant unless the issue of aiding and abetting is submitted, and does not by its term impose vicarious … liability, the jury was not correctly instructed in this case.” There was no personal participation by the accused Tomaino.

Should parents be held responsible for the “misbehavior of a child”?

Issue

This is a challenge to the constitutionality of the City of Trenton’s “parent responsibility ordinance.” The attack centers on the ordinance’s presumption that a parent (as defined by the ordinance) is responsible for the misbehavior of a child who twice within one year is adjudged guilty of acts defined as violations of the public peace. The acts so defined include adjudications for delinquency and of the status of being a juvenile in need of supervision (JINS). See N.J.S.A. 2A:4-44 (defining delinquency) and N.J.S.A. 2A:4-45 (defining JINS offenses). A parent convicted under the ordinance may be fined up to $ 500.

Facts

Plaintiff was cited in a sworn complaint for violation of the ordinance. The complaint recited that her son, age 13, “was convicted a second time within a one year period of a violation of the public peace by the Mercer County Juvenile Court.” The trial judge upheld the validity of the ordinance and its attendant presumption.

Reasoning

The term “presumption” is used in the law to express a variety of concepts. Basically, however, the effect of a presumption is this: proof of fact B (the proved fact) establishes a presumption of the truth of fact A (the presumed fact). The present case graphically illustrates the effect of a presumption. The fact of two public peace convictions on the minor’s part within a year (the proved fact) establishes a rebuttable presumption that the violations stemmed from active or passive parental fault (the presumed fact).

The relatively widespread existence of presumptions in our law is attributable to a variety of factors involving considerations of policy, fairness and convenience. However, as one distinguished writer observed, most presumptions have arisen from the belief that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it.

The establishment of presumptions favorable to the government in criminal cases raises delicate issues of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. While such presumptions are not constitutionally prohibited, they must possess certain qualities of trustworthiness. In general, inquiry as to whether a particular presumption is up to constitutional requirements focuses on the degree to which the presumed fact tends, in reality, to flow from the established fact.

In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court concluded that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as “irrational” or “arbitrary,” and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.

The precise question before this court is whether we may state with “substantial assurance” that a minor’s second public peace adjudication was “more likely than not” the result of passive or active wrongdoing on the part of the minor’s parent or parents.

The roots of juvenile misconduct are complex and imperfectly understood. If there is consensus at all in the field, it is on the proposition that children growing up in urban poverty areas are those most likely to be identified as juvenile delinquents. The City of Trenton provides us with nothing which would support a finding that parental influence is an overriding cause of juvenile misconduct. Certainly, there has been demonstrated no basis for a court to take judicial notice of such a proposition. Nor can it be said to be self-evident. Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that there is any calculus of probabilities which would compel such a conclusion.

By contrast, plaintiff provides a representative sampling of prevailing expert opinion, research and analysis tending to support the conclusion that parental actions are but a single factor in the interaction of forces producing juvenile misconduct. The family is just one of the numerous interrelated forces, including schools, housing, recreation, community life, employment and the juvenile justice system itself which influence a juvenile toward or away from a life of delinquency. At least one author has noted that where ordinances similar to the one here challenged are enacted, the delinquency rate remains unchanged.

Holding

We are satisfied that the Trenton ordinance does not comport with due process. The fact of two public peace adjudications within one year does not make it “more likely than not” that the second was the result of parental action or inaction. The presumed fact in the Trenton ordinance (parental responsibility for delinquent acts of the child) does not flow naturally from the proved fact (a second adjudication within one year). While Euripides reminds us that the gods often visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, we are not yet prepared to say that the converse ought to be so.