Answers to “You Decide” Boxes

4.1. Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Crim.App.)

Did Brown involuntarily fire the shot that killed Caraballo? What is your opinion?

Issue

Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of murder, pursuant to V.T.C.A. Penal Code Section 19.02, alleged to have been committed on or about July 17, 1992, in Fort Bend County. In June of 1994, in the 268th Judicial District Court of Fort Bend County, appellant was found guilty by a jury. The court assessed punishment at imprisonment for 12 years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The conviction and sentence were reversed by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals We granted the State’s sole ground for review which asks us to determine whether the District Court was correct in holding that the trial court should have submitted jury instructions on voluntary conduct.

Facts

The record reflects that on the evening of July 17, 1992, appellant was drinking beer and talking with friends in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Appellant was involved in an altercation with James McLean, an individual with whom he had an encounter one week prior, in which McLean and some other individuals had beaten appellant. Appellant testified that following the altercation on the day in question, he obtained a .25 caliber handgun in order to protect himself and his friends from McLean and his associates, who were known to possess and discharge firearms in the vicinity of the apartment complex. Appellant, who is right-handed, testified that he held the handgun in his left hand because of a debilitating injury to his right hand. Appellant testified that during the course of the events in question, the handgun accidentally fired when he was bumped from behind by another person, Coleman, while raising the handgun. Coleman testified that he bumped appellant and the handgun fired. Appellant testified that the shot that fatally wounded the victim, Joseph Caraballo, an acquaintance and associate of appellant, was fired accidentally. Caraballo was not one of the individuals who posed a threat to Brown.

Reasoning

Appellant testified at trial that the handgun in his possession accidentally discharged after he was bumped from behind by Ryan Coleman. Coleman also testified at trial that his bumping appellant precipitated the discharge of the gun and that idiosyncrasies of the handgun may have also allowed its discharge.

Section 6.01(a) of the Texas Penal Code states that a person commits an offense only if he engages in voluntary conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession. Only if the evidence raises reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily engaged in the conduct charged should the jury be instructed to acquit. “Voluntariness,” within the meaning of Section 6.01(a) refers only to one’s physical bodily movements. While the defense of accident is no longer present in the penal code, this Court has long held that homicide that is not the result of voluntary conduct is not to be criminally punished.

Holding

We hold that if the admitted evidence raises the issue of the conduct of the actor not being voluntary, then the jury shall be charged, when requested, on the issue of voluntariness. The trial court did not grant appellant’s request and the court of appeals correctly reversed the trial court. We hereby affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Prince, J. dissenting

I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to affirm the court of appeals because I do not believe that article 6.01(a) constitutes a defense and, therefore, appellant was not entitled to an affirmative defensive jury instruction regarding the voluntariness of his act.

Because the Legislature expressed an intent to model our Code after the Model Penal Code, we may also look to the Model Code for guidance. The comparable American Law Institute Model Penal Code as well as its commentaries offer more guidance on this issue than the Texas Code. In relevant part, the Model Penal Code section explains:

The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:

(a) a reflex or convulsion;

(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;

(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;

(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.

Although a voluntary act is an absolute requirement for criminal liability, it does not follow that every act up to the moment that the harm is caused must be voluntary. This concept is best demonstrated by an example: A who is subject to frequent fainting spells voluntarily drives a car; while driving he faints, loses control of the vehicle and injures a pedestrian; A would be criminally responsible. Here, A’s voluntary act consists of driving the car, and if the necessary mental state can be established as of the time he entered the car, it is enough to find A guilty of a crime.

Section 6.01(a) functions as a statutory failsafe. Due process guarantees that criminal liability be predicated on at least one voluntary act. In all criminal prosecutions the State must prove that the defendant committed at least one voluntary act—voluntary conduct is an implied element of every crime. Because it is an implied element, the State is not required to allege it in the charging instrument. For most offenses, proof of a voluntary act, although a separate component, is achieved by proving the other elements of the offense.

In the present case, proof of the elements of the offense also establishes the necessary voluntary conduct. Proof of the culpable mental state for the offense of murder, intentionally or knowingly, and the fact that the defendant voluntarily aimed a loaded gun at another human being, insured that the jury found appellant’s conduct to be sufficiently voluntary. Appellant, however, did request the inclusion of a voluntary conduct instruction in the jury charge. Under the facts of this case, appellant was not entitled to this instruction. The trial court properly denied his request.

Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988 (Ind. App. 1998)

A crime requires a voluntary act that is a “conscious choice.” The defendant was entitled to present expert witnesses who would have testified that a patient suffering from TIA might be “totally unaware of [her] surroundings and yet repeatedly go through the common tasks that we’ve done a thousand times, enabling her to work through the tasks by without the awareness of what [she’s] doing.” As a result, TIA is relevant to determine whether Reed “voluntarily committed theft.” The impact of TIA is similar to automatism or sleep walking.

4.2. People v. Martino, 970 N.E.2d 123 (2012 Ill. App.)

Martino claims that his breaking of Keenon’s arm was an involuntary act and that he may not be held criminally liable for a battery. Do you agree?

Presiding Justice JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

On November 8, 2008, defendant, Thomas F. Martino, and his wife, Carmen Keenon, got into an argument, and, when police responded, they observed defendant on top of Keenon on the stair landing outside of the couple’s apartment. The officers ordered defendant to get off Keenon, defendant refused to comply with the officers’ orders, the officers tased defendant, and defendant fell on Keenon’s arm, breaking it. Defendant was taken into custody and never posted bond. Subsequently, defendant was charged with, among other things, aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery (see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a), 12-4 (West 2008)). In both of these counts defendant was charged with knowingly causing great bodily harm to Keenon when he broke her arm. The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery, aggravated battery, unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2008)), and two counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2008)). The aggravated battery conviction merged into the conviction of aggravated domestic battery, and defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms totaling 180 days in jail and 4 years of probation. In fashioning the sentence, the court ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees. Included in these fines and fees were multiple Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fines, document storage fees, court automation fees, circuit court clerk fees, court security fees, County Jail Medical Costs Fund fees, court finance fees, State’s Attorney’s assessments, drug court/mental health court fines, and Children’s Advocacy Center fines, as well as a single anti-crime program fine. Although the court gave defendant credit against his sentence for the time he served in presentencing custody, the court did not give defendant credit against his fines for the time he served in custody. On appeal, defendant claims that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated domestic battery, that he is entitled to a credit against his fines of $5 for each day he served in presentencing custody, that various fines and fees may not be imposed on every conviction, and that his Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fines must be reduced to comply with the statute. For the reasons that follow, we reverse defendant’s conviction of and sentence for aggravated domestic battery, award defendant credit against his fines for the time he served in presentencing custody, vacate some of the fines and fees imposed, and reduce defendant’s Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fines.

Defendant and Keenon, who lived in a second-floor apartment in downtown Wheaton, went out for drinks and dinner in downtown Wheaton. At around midnight, the couple was walking home when defendant fell into a pile of leaves. Keenon testified that defendant did not fall into the leaves because he was intoxicated. Rather, Keenon believed that defendant was playing around, enjoying the last nice fall day of the year.

When Keenon was unable to get defendant out of the pile of leaves, she threw her wedding ring at him and walked home. A neighbor saw defendant in the leaves and helped defendant walk back to the couple’s apartment. After the neighbor left, Keenon asked defendant if he picked up her wedding ring before he came home. Defendant, who was angry at Keenon for throwing her ring, grabbed Keenon by the throat and shoved her down the stairs outside of the couple’s apartment. Keenon landed on the first small landing of the stairs, with her head resting on the first stair leading up to the couple’s apartment. As she lay in this position, defendant, who was on top of her, began using a great amount of force to choke her. Keenon, who believed that she was going to die, threw up as defendant was choking her.

The police were called, and, when they arrived, they ordered defendant to get off of Keenon, who was asking for help and crying. Defendant, who was no longer choking Keenon, explained to the police that Keenon was throwing up and that he was trying to help her. The police ordered defendant to get off of Keenon, telling him that they would help her. Defendant replied, in a combative tone, “[Y]ou ain’t going to fucking do anything.” The police again told defendant to get off of Keenon and come down the stairs and that, if he did not comply, he would be tased. After the police repeated these orders several more times and began moving up the stairs toward defendant, defendant stood up, moved to the front of the landing, and “squared off” against the police in a way that indicated that he wanted to fight. Defendant then took “an aggressive stance,” clenching his fists and placing his hands down at his sides. While standing in this position, defendant yelled at the police, “Come on.”

At this point, one of the officers tased defendant. Defendant dropped to the ground, having lost control of his muscles because of being tased. Defendant fell backward on top of Keenon, who had not moved since the police arrived. When defendant fell, Keenon heard a “crunch.” Although Keenon did not initially feel any pain in her arm when defendant landed on her, she learned later that defendant broke her elbow when he fell on it.

At the close of the State’s case, defendant moved for a directed finding, arguing, among other things, that he should not be found guilty of battering Keenon, because Keenon’s arm was broken as a result of his involuntary act of collapsing on Keenon after the police tased him. The trial court denied the motion.

After the trial court ruled on defendant’s motion for a directed finding, defendant rested. The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts, and defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant. In imposing the sentence, the court gave defendant credit against his sentence for the time he served in presentencing custody, but the court did not give defendant credit against his fines for that time. Additionally, the court imposed four document storage fees, four court automation fees, four circuit clerk fees, four court security fees, four County Jail Medical Costs Fund fees, four court finance fees, four State’s Attorney’s assessments, four Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fines, four drug court/mental health court fines, and four Children’s Advocacy Center fines, as well as an anti-crime program fine. When the court imposed the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fines, it calculated the amounts of those fines as if no other fines were imposed. See 725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2008). Defendant never argued that any of the fines or fees imposed was incorrect or that he was entitled to credit against his fines for the time he served in presentencing custody. This timely appeal followed.

Every offense is comprised of both a voluntary act and a mental state. A defendant who commits a voluntary act is held accountable for his act, but a defendant is not criminally liable for an involuntary act. Involuntary acts are those that “occur as bodily movements which are not controlled by the conscious mind.” Examples of involuntary acts include those acts performed while a defendant is convulsing, sleeping, unconscious, under hypnosis, or seizuring. Acts that result from a reflex or that “are not a product of the effort or determination of [the defendant], either conscious or habitual,” are also considered involuntary acts for which the defendant cannot be held accountable. Here, defendant was convicted pursuant to section 12-3.3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2008)), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person who, in committing a domestic battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated domestic battery.” Thus, a defendant can be guilty of aggravated domestic battery only if his voluntary act “causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement.”

Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s voluntary act resulted in Keenon’s broken arm. Specifically, although the evidence revealed that defendant defied the police and that, because of this defiance, the police tased him, the evidence also established that the tasing of defendant rendered defendant incapable of controlling his muscles. Because defendant was incapable of controlling his muscles, his act of falling on Keenon and breaking her arm was an involuntary act for which he cannot be held accountable. Accordingly, we determine that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated domestic battery.

4.3. United States v. Black, 116 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1997)

Black appealed and claimed that he was unable to control his sexual urges and that he was being punished for his status as a pedophile and/or ephebophile. Do you agree with Black? Will his appeal be successful?

(Cummings, J.)

After receiving information from a private citizen, the Federal Bureau of Investigation looked into the transmission of child pornography by computer through America Online (AOL), a commercial computer service located in Vienna, Virginia. Its electronic message bulletin board enables subscribers to send messages to each other and attach files containing pictures. A grand jury subpoena was served on AOL for its records associated with a user who identified himself on the bulletin board as “B FOX 332.” AOL’s records revealed that the account belonged to Bruce Black. At the time, Black was living in an apartment in Champaign, Illinois, and was employed by the Prairielands Counsel of the Boy Scouts of America. A search warrant was executed on AOL, yielding subscriber information and detailed billing records for defendant’s account, which had been activated 146 times from January 1, 1995 to June 16, 1995. The records revealed both distribution and receipt of files by defendant. On five occasions he was the originator of several child pornography files on to the AOL system (i.e., he was the AOL subscriber who first “uploaded” the image on to the system), on six other occasions he received such files, and on two other occasions he distributed such files by forwarding the images he received to another AOL subscriber. In August 1995, FBI agents went to Black’s apartment to execute their search warrant, but Black himself consented to the search, which resulted in the seizure of seven three-ring binders containing numerous printed photographs of child pornography showing minors engaging in sexually explicit acts. Besides the binders in his bedroom, the FBI agents found a personal computer system with a printer and 350 computer diskettes. A Board-certified pediatrician, Dr. Kathleen Buetow, examined some of the pictures of male children found in Black’s residence and stated that 20 of the 40 images she reviewed were of pre-pubescent children. Black consented to be interviewed by the FBI agents and admitted that he owned the personal computer system, was a subscriber to AOL and ordinarily used the screen name B FOX 332. He admitted that he regularly received and occasionally disseminated images via computer depicting children in sexually explicit conduct. He referred to this material as “child pornography” or “kiddie porn” and said he had retained everything he received and kept most of it in the ring binder albums stored in his bedroom. Black’s motion to dismiss the indictment was denied and at another hearing regarding subsequent motions, Black stated that he was not offering an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. Section 17.

On June 3, 1996, the government and Black entered into three stipulations. The first agreed that Black “was a pedophile and/or ephebophile [sexually attracted to young men]” and that “the receipt, collection and distribution of child pornography was a pathological symptom of the defendant’s pedophilia and/or ephebophilia.” The second was that Black “did not receive, collect or distribute child pornography for commercial purposes or monetary gain” and that he “did not trade child pornography on a numerically equal basis with other individuals who received, collected or distributed child pornography.” The third provided that “the graphic images of child pornography charged in the indictment were received or distributed by the defendant … [and had] traveled in interstate commerce.” On the same date, the parties entered into a plea agreement under which the defendant entered a plea of guilty to all nine counts of the indictment. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the government sought a five-point increase in Black’s offense level pursuant to Sentencing Guideline Section 2G2.2(b)(2) due to his distribution of child pornography. Black objected to the enhancement, and the district court agreed that it should not apply because of the absence of pecuniary gain. Thereafter Black was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment plus three years of supervised release.

Black’s prosecution was not in violation of the Eighth Amendment Black argues that his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252 is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because he is a pedophile or ephebophile. Relying on Robinson v. California, and Justice White’s concurrence in Powell v. Texas, Black maintains that he has been convicted based on his status as a pedophile or ephebophile. However, the indictment does not criminalize him in that capacity but simply charges him for his conduct of receiving, possessing and distributing child pornography that traveled in interstate commerce. Thus Robinson is simply inapposite on its face because the statutes involved here do not criminalize the statuses of pedophile or ephebophile. Black is not raising an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. Section 17 but claims that he is immune from prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252 because as a pedophile or ephebophile he is compelled to collect, receive and distribute child pornography. A similar argument was rejected with respect to public intoxication in Powell v. Texas. In Powell, the defendant argued that under the Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, his conviction for public intoxication was barred by the Eighth Amendment because it effectively criminalized his status as a chronic alcoholic. A majority of the justices concluded that Robinson did not control the outcome of the case because Powell was subject to criminal sanctions “not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion.” (“Powell showed nothing more than that he was to some degree compelled to drink and that he was drunk at the time of his arrest. He made no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in question.”) (White, J., concurring). Similarly, although Black may have shown—indeed it is stipulated—that he is a pedophile and/or ephebophile and that his receipt, distribution and possession of child pornography “was a pathological symptom of [his] pedophilia and/or ephebophilia,” he did not show that this charged conduct was involuntary or uncontrollable. Indeed, many of the psychological reports contained in the record indicate that defendant could control his impulses to access child pornography. In particular, a summary report prepared by the government’s expert, following a 4-hour-45-minute interview with defendant notes, that statements made by Mr. Black in the course of his evaluation indicate that he was able to appreciate the nature and quality and the wrongfulness of his acts, relative to involvement with child pornography. History provided by Mr. Black also indicates that he did not suffer a reduced mental capacity from the presence of a mental disorder that interfered with his knowingly, purposely, and voluntarily committing the alleged offenses. History provided by Mr. Black also indicates he was able to resist sexually deviant urges and impulses related to his involvement in the child pornography activities.

Another report indicates that Black confined his computer access to child pornography to periods when his roommate was away from the apartment. Simply put, Black did not show that his child pornography offenses were involuntary and uncontrollable because he is a pedophile or ephebophile. We note in this regard that we have carefully reviewed all of the psychiatric and psychological literature excerpts that Black has submitted to the Court and find no basis in this literature for concluding that Black’s charged conduct was involuntary or otherwise uncontrollable.

4.4. State v. Cash. Cash had no duty to assist Sherrice Iverson

Should David Cash be held criminally liable for a failure to rescue Sherrice Iverson?

There was no status, contract, statute and Cash did not assume a duty or create the peril. On the other hand, it might be argued that Cash assumed a duty when he entered the bathroom and attempted to get Strohmeyer’s attention.

4.5. State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa, 2003)

Was Bash guilty of possession of a controlled substance?

Issue

Patricia Bash appealed from her conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana. She contended among other things that the district court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction of the charge. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction?

Facts

On January 17, 2001, six Spirit Lake police officers executed a search warrant at an apartment shared by the defendant, her husband Kevin, and her three sons. The search warrant indicated that the officers were looking for, among other things, controlled substances and a safety deposit box. The defendant, her husband, and their son Ty were home at the time the officers entered the apartment. The officers immediately arrested Kevin on an outstanding warrant and removed him from the residence.

One of the officers read the search warrant to the defendant whereupon, according to the officer, the defendant said she could “show [him] where the stuff is.” The officer testified that he believed the defendant was referring to “any illegal drugs or contraband that may be in the residence.” After reading the defendant her Miranda rights, the officer followed the defendant into the master bedroom and she told him, “it’s on his nightstand in a cardboard box, that it’s Kevin’s stuff, that is his bong … sitting on the floor next to the bed.”

The defendant’s version was somewhat different from the officer’s testimony. She testified she heard officers talking about a lock box they were looking for in the residence. When officers asked her if there was “anything in the house they should know about,” she responded, “If there is anything here, it would be on Kevin’s side of the bed.” She pointed towards his nightstand which was on the left side of the bed. The officer then arrested her and read her Miranda rights to her.

On Kevin’s nightstand the officers found a cardboard box bearing the word “Friscos.” Inside the box, they found a green plant material later identified as 1.37 grams of marijuana. The defendant testified she did not know what was in the box until after the officers opened it. However, she admitted that she knew there had been marijuana in the house, in the box, in the past.

The defendant also directed the officers to the lock box, which contained a marriage certificate, birth certificates, insurance papers, and the key to the box.

The state charged the defendant with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of Iowa Code Section 124.401 (5)(Supp. 1999). Later, the defendant moved to dismiss, contending the State would be unable to prove she exercised dominion and control over the controlled substance. Following the State’s resistance, the district court denied the defendant’s motion. The district court sentenced the defendant to a thirty-day suspended sentence with credit for time served and imposed a $250 fine and a $75 surcharge.

Following the defendant’s appeal, we transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted the defendant’s application for further review.

Reasoning

Unlawful possession of a controlled substance requires proof that the defendant: (1) exercised dominion and control over the contraband, (2) had knowledge of its presence, and (3) had knowledge that the material was a controlled substance. Proof of opportunity of access to the place where contraband is found will not, without more, support a finding of unlawful possession.

In her motion for judgment of acquittal, the defendant argued: “We know from the State v. Atkinson case and other cases of a similar nature on constructive possession that mere proximity to contraband is insufficient to meet the State’s burden.

Here, the facts are very similar (to those in Atkinson). We have the premises shared by these two people, the married persons, and contraband found in that location. It is undisputed that it was Kevin Bash that was the target of their investigation, undisputed that these were Kevin Bash’s effects, not the defendant’s effects, wherein the contraband was found.

There is no evidence that the State has brought forward to show that my client had any dominion or control, any ownership or proprietary interest in the contraband that was found, and we cannot infer that dominion and control where the defendant is not in the exclusive possession of the premises. These were premises shared by her and her husband. And the State then has to come forward with some evidence that shows that she had that dominion and control. They have not provided any evidence of the dominion and control element as required.”

As in the district court, the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge here is to the first element of the crime charged: dominion and control. Possession can be either actual or constructive. Actual possession occurs when the controlled substance is found on the defendant’s person. Constructive possession occurs when the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and has the authority or right to maintain control of it. It is undisputed here that the defendant did not have actual possession of the marijuana because the officers did not find the controlled substance on her person. We are left with whether the defendant had constructive possession.

At the time of this incident, it is undisputed that the premises were shared by the defendant, her husband, and their children. Under these circumstances, knowledge of the presence of the marijuana and the authority or right to maintain control of it, that is, constructive possession, could not be inferred by the jury from the defendant’s joint control of the premises, but had to be established by other proof. Such proof could include incriminating statements made by the defendant, incriminating actions of the defendant upon the police’s discovery of the controlled substance among or near the defendant’s personal belongings, the defendant’s fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled substance, and any other circumstances linking the defendant to the controlled substance.

In her motion for judgment of acquittal, the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge did not include her lack of knowledge of the presence of the marijuana. Rather, as her argument on the motion indicates, such challenge only included the authority or right to maintain control of the marijuana. On this point, the State relies heavily on the following testimony from the defendant:

Q. Now, could you have—was there any legal reason that would prevent you from taking that box and disposing of it?

A. It wasn’t mine.

Q. I understand that. But is there—it’s proper that you generally regard it as your husband’s?

A. Correct.

Q. But you shared that apartment with him?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, is there any legal reason why you could not have picked up that box and taken it and removed it from the house?

A. It was not mine.

Q. Could you have taken the contents of that box and flushed it down the toilet? A. No. It was not mine.

Q. Okay. Physically, would you have been able to do that?

A. Physically, yes.

The State argues that the defendant’s admission that she could physically have flushed the marijuana down the toilet is proof that she had the authority or right to maintain control of the marijuana. This position is at odds with what we said in State v. Atkinson: “While it seems anomalous to look at a defendant’s ‘right’ to control illegal drugs in order to establish possession, that concept basically distinguishes a defendant’s raw physical ability to exercise control over contraband simply because of the defendant’s proximity to it and the type of rights that can be considered constructive possession.”

Thus, the authority or right to maintain control includes something more than the “raw physical ability” to exercise control over the controlled substance. The defendant must have some proprietary interest or an immediate right to control or reduce the controlled substance to the defendant’s possession. No such proof was produced here. The State seems to concede, as it must, that the box containing marijuana was located on the husband’s side of the bed with his personal effects. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant shared any ownership of the box or the marijuana in it or had any right to control either item.

Holding

Accordingly, we conclude the State failed to prove the defendant had dominion and control over the marijuana and thus failed to prove constructive possession of it. We therefore vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for dismissal.

Questions for Discussion

1. What are the elements that the prosecutor was required to establish Patricia of narcotics possession?

2. What factors does the court consider in determining whether a defendant had constructive possession of contraband?

3. Why did the Iowa Supreme Court overturn Patricia’s conviction?

4. Do you agree with the court decision?