Prosecution for first-degree burglary based on a claim that the evidence did not establish an “intent to commit a crime within the building.” In the evening of September 21, 2004, the police responded to a report of a prowler from the resident of a ground-level apartment. The complainant alleged that she saw a man walk by her apartment window several times and look into the windows of her apartment and of a neighbor’s apartment and watched the man “look into her open bedroom window, which did not have a screen, reach inside, and open the curtain.” The police apprehended Munger, who matched the description of the individual who she saw “peer in her window and reach inside.”

         Munger subsequently admitted that he reached into the open window and moved the curtain and pled guilty to first-degree burglary. “He argued that the burglary statute requires an intent to commit a crime within the building, but the factual basis for his plea established only ‘window peeping,’ a crime that occurred outside the building.” Minnesota Statutes section 609.582, subd. 1, provides that “[w]hoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building,” commits first-degree burglary if “(a) the building is a dwelling and another person, not an accomplice, is present in it when the burglar enters or at any time while the burglar is in the building.” First-degree burglary is punishable by twenty years in prison or by payment of a fine of not more than $35,000. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the intrusion of any part of the actor’s person into the building, including the intrusion of a hand to open a window, constitutes the requisite entry. Must Munger possess the intent to commit an offense within the building to be guilty of burglary under Minnesota law? Does it make sense to hold Munger guilty of burglary based on the facts of this case? See Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2008).

         Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2008).

         The salient language in the burglary statute is: "[w]hoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building," commits burglary. Using normal rules of grammatical construction, the plain language of the burglary statute formulates two separate and distinct means, signified by the disjunctive conjunction "or" and separated by a comma, by which a person can violate the statute. "[I]n the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature's use of the word 'or,' we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied." The two clauses are clear and unambiguous. The plain language of the first-degree burglary statute does not require that a person entering a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime intend that the crime be committed within the building entered.
      Munger suggests situations, under our reading of the statute, in which a burglary might occur simply by passing through a building while intending to commit some minor offense so far attenuated from the building in time and place as to lead to results clearly unintended by the legislature. We presume "that the legislature does not intend . . . absurd or unreasonable results." Concern about the lack of a connection between the nonconsensual entry into a building and the intended crime is not implicated here. The factual basis for Munger's plea established hat he reached into the residence to move the curtain and that he did so simultaneously to surreptitiously gaze, stare, or peep through the window with intent to interfere with the privacy of the resident.
     We would note that as originally enacted in the 1963 Criminal Code, the burglary statute provided that "[w]hoever enters a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession, with intent to commit a crime therein, commits burglary." In 1982, the word "therein" was replaced with "in it." The 1983 recodification of the burglary law, which delineated degrees of burglary, did not include the words "in it," providing instead that "[w]hoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime commits burglary." In 1988, the legislature added the second clause of the current first-degree burglary offense: "or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building." The legislature also added similar language to the second-, third-, and fourth-degree burglary offenses. Consequently, we are mindful of the potential impact our decision may have with regard to the lesser degrees of burglary. Nevertheless, "where the language of the statute is clear, the court is bound to give effect thereto."
     We therefore hold that the plain statutory language for the offense of first-degree burglary which proscribes nonconsensual entry into a building with intent to commit a crime does not also require that the intent be to commit a crime within the building entered.

         Defendant was charged with third-degree criminal trespass for throwing rocks at a house. She was found guilty. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a charge for third-degree criminal trespass because a person must enter onto the property to be guilty of trespass. Kentucky law provides that a “person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.” Kentucky Revised Statute 511.080. In affirming the conviction of D.E., the circuit court judge explained that “[a]n individual could simply avoid all criminal trespassing charges by assembling a long pole that would allow the individual to reach onto another person’s property while the individual remained on his own or public property.” See D.E. v. Commonwealth, 271 S.W.3d 539 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

         D.E was charged with third-degree criminal trespass and third-degree criminal mischief for throwing rocks at a house. She was found guilty of both charges. Her conviction was affirmed by the circuit court and this Court granted discretionary review. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a charge for third-degree criminal trespass as there was no evidence presented at trial that she entered the property at issue and that a person must enter onto the property to be guilty of trespass. The Commonwealth responds that even if she did not enter the property, the rocks she threw did and this is sufficient. We find that there was no evidence of criminal trespass in this case and therefore the conviction for this charge is reversed.
      A juvenile petition was filed against D.E., as well as other youths, which charged them with criminal trespass and criminal mischief. The petition alleged that the children threw rocks at a house and caused damage to the siding. During trial in the district court, the Commonwealth relied on the testimony of the owner of the house and her son. Neither testified that D.E. had entered onto the property. D.E. testified that she threw rocks at the house, but denied hitting it and causing damage. Counsel for D.E. moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the end of the defense's case. Both motions were denied.
      D.E. was found guilty of both charges, and her sentence was probated by the court. The court found that the throwing of the rocks constituted the trespass. D.E. then appealed to the circuit court which affirmed the conviction on the grounds that even though there was no evidence that D.E. herself entered the property, she controlled the rocks which did enter the property, and thus, was guilty of trespass.
     A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises." Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 511.080(1). D.E. argues that the statute requires a person to enter the property because it says a "person is guilty" and uses the pronoun "he." In affirming the conviction of D.E. on the trespass charge and denying D.E.'s argument that the person must enter onto the property, the circuit court used an illustration. It stated that:

         [a]n individual could simply avoid all criminal trespassing charges by assembling a long pole that would allow the individual to reach onto another person's property while the individual remained on his own or public property. Presumably, this individual could wreak all manner of mischief with this pole and they could not be charged with criminal trespass provided that only the pole intruded into the victim's property and the individual did not physically intrude into the victim's property.              

     While this is a compelling analysis, it overlooks the argument put forth by D.E. D.E. argues that the person using the pole in the court's illustration could be guilty of other crimes, such as criminal mischief. In other words, the Commonwealth has other criminal avenues to pursue when a person uses objects to cause damage on another person's land.

Our research into this case revealed that there has been no Kentucky criminal case law dealing with objects being used for criminal trespass. We did, however, find an Attorney General's Opinion which we found persuasive. In OAG 82-262, 1982 Ky. AG LEXIS 392, a question is posed to the Kentucky Attorney General about whether a hunter who releases dogs onto another's property can face criminal liability. The Attorney General opined that there can be no criminal liability for the dog's trespass. One part of the opinion states that criminal trespass requires entry by a person. It then notes that the Kentucky Penal Code defines a person as "a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government, or a governmental authority." KRS 500.080(12). A dog fits into none of those categories.
     We find this opinion persuasive. If one cannot be held criminally liable for a dog's trespass, then the same can be said for a rock. "Where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction or interpretation, and the statute must be given its effect as written. An unambiguous statute must be applied without resort to any outside aids." States that a person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon another's premises. A person must enter onto the property to be found guilty of criminal trespass. As stated above, there were other charges that could be brought in this case when D.E. threw a rock onto another person's property. In fact, D.E. was charged with third-degree criminal mischief and found guilty. Criminal mischief was an appropriate charge under the circumstances; however, criminal trespass was not.
Since the decisions of the lower courts were based on the rock D.E. threw entering onto the land and that there was no evidence that D.E. herself entered onto the land, we reverse the conviction for third-degree criminal trespass.

         On the evening of June 3, 1994, the defendant, Roy D. Nelson, entered the basement of Angela Nelson's house and poured gasoline on the floor. As he walked up the stairs to the residential portion of the house, the defendant lit a cigarette which ignited the gasoline fumes causing an explosion that rocked the brick house from its foundation as well as a fire. The defendant was admitted to the hospital later that evening where he was treated for first, second, and third degree burns he sustained in the explosion and fire. A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson “. . . [w]hen any person, including firefighters and law enforcement officials, suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion.” State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270 (Tenn. 2000).

         STATE v. NELSON, 23 S.W.3d 270 (Tenn. 2000)

OPINION

         BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, BIRCH, and HOLDER, JJ. joined.

         This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant my be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

         On the evening of June 3, 1994, the defendant, Roy D. Nelson, entered the basement of Angela Nelson's house and poured gasoline on the floor.^[1] As he walked up the stairs to the residential portion of the house, the defendant lit a cigarette which ignited the gasoline fumes causing an explosion that rocked the brick house from its foundation as well as a fire. The defendant was admitted to the hospital later that evening where he was treated for first, second, and third degree burns he sustained in the explosion and fire.

         The defendant was indicted and convicted for aggravated arson on the grounds that he suffered serious bodily injury, thus triggering application of the aggravated arson statute. The defendant appealed arguing that the aggravated arson statute applies only when some individual other than the arsonist sustains a serious bodily injury. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, *271 and we granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal on this issue.^[2]

DISCUSSION

         When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court must not apply a construction apart from the words of the statute. See Fletcher v. State, 9 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tenn.1999). The aggravated arson statute at issue in this case provides:

         A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson as defined in § 39-14-301 or XX-XX-XXX . . . [w]hen any person, including firefighters and law enforcement officials, suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion.

         Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). The criminal code further defines "person" to include "the singular and plural and means and includes any individual." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(27) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the aggravated arson statute includes not only victims of aggravated arson but also the perpetrator of the act of arson.

         The defendant asserts, however, that the language and history of section -302(a)(2) is ambiguous, and that if the General Assembly intended for the aggravated arson statute to apply where the arsonist is injured, it would have clearly stated so. For this argument, the defendant relies on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(a) (1997) which makes it a criminal offense to intentionally prevent or obstruct a law enforcement officer "from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the defendant." We do not agree, however, from this statutory language that magic words like "including the defendant" must be explicitly incorporated into all statutes to impose criminal liability for aggravated offenses. By broadly defining "person" in section -106(a)(27), the General Assembly has already established the scope of "person" to include defendants. Consequently, the extra statutory language suggested by the defendant is redundant. Thus, whether or not "including the defendant" was written explicitly into section—602(a), defendants would be implicitly included pursuant to the statutory definition of "person."

         We note that if the General Assembly intended to limit the class of persons for which convictions for aggravated offenses may be had it could have done so. Indeed, throughout the criminal code, the General Assembly has limited application of aggravated offense statutes to situations involving "victims" or individuals other than the defendant.^[3] Because the General Assembly has not seen fit to limit section -302(a)(2) to persons other than the defendant as it has done in so many other sections of the criminal code, we are not inclined to depart from the plain language of the statute.

         The defendant, though, argues that "any person" cannot be so broad as to include the defendant because any defendant in a structure destroyed by arson automatically commits aggravated arson simply by his or her presence in the structure. Compare Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(1) (1997) (providing that aggravated arson occurs when one or more persons is present in the structure that is the target of arson). The defendant also contends that the General Assembly could not have been concerned with injury to the arsonist. We disagree. The Court of Criminal Appeals astutely observed that "[m]ore so than the other offenses in the criminal code which are aggravated by some level of bodily injury, arson as a general proposition creates a dangerous exigency which has the potential to endanger [not only the criminal, but also] any targeted individual, *272 members of the public, and rescue personnel." The presence of an arsonist in a building that he or she has targeted or an arsonist who is injured during the course of an arson inevitably requires the assistance of rescue personnel, and it is well within the province of the General Assembly to impose a heightened penalty for the risk to which these public servants are exposed.

CONCLUSION

         We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

         Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Roy D. Nelson.

          A group of homeless persons erected a structure for overnight sleeping. The sidewalls consisted of unmovable fences. The remaining two walls consisted of carpets draped over clotheslines that extended between the two fences. The entrance was covered by shower curtains and blankets and the shelter was covered by a 30-by-50-foot tarp. Occupants slept in sleeping bags or on mattresses. Electricity was supplied by an extension cord that was connected to a light socket at a nearby subway station. Does a fire initiated by Fox against the structure constitute arson against a building under New York law? See People v. Fox, 771 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).

People v. Fox, 771 N.Y.S. 2d 156 (N.Y. App. 2004)

         Appeal by the defendant from a judgment . . . convicting him of murder in the second degree, arson in the second degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Facts

         The charges herein stem from an April 27, 2000, fire initiated at a structure erected by a group of homeless people for overnight lodging, located on 65th Street and Fourth Avenue, under the Gowanus Expressway overpass, in Brooklyn. The structure’s two side walls consisted of two parallel existing fixed and unmovable fences. The remaining two walls consisted of carpets draped over a clothesline that extended between the two fences. A piece of plywood provided additional support to one side of the structure and buttressed it against strong winds. The entrance was covered by shower curtains and blankets, and the entire shelter was covered by a 30-by-50-foot blue tarp. The residents slept in sleeping bags or on mattresses, which were laid on carpeting on the ground. Electricity was supplied by an extension cord that was connected to a light socket at a nearby subway station. During the winter months, electric and kerosene space heaters were utilized to warm the structure. The central issue on appeal is whether the structure constituted a “building” within the meaning of Penal Law section 150.15, which could be the subject of the crime of arson in the second degree.

Reasoning

         The term “building” is broadly defined in Penal Law section 150.00(1) to include its “ordinary meaning” as well as “any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein.” It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that a court’s function is to “attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used.” . . .

         The “ordinary meaning” of the term “building” has been alternatively defined as “a constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently, covering a space of land, usually covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling” . . . “a structure with a roof and walls” . . . and “[a] structure or edifice inclosing a space within its walls and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof.” . . . The term generally, though not always, implies the idea of a habitat for a person’s permanent use or an erection connected with his or her permanent use. . . .

Holding

         At the time of the incident, a number of the shelter’s residents, including, apparently, the decedent, had been utilizing the structure for overnight lodging for several months. Moreover, it contained substantial indicia of a permanent or long-term habitat (e.g., incorporation of the two fixed fences, a roof, plywood, carpeting, and diverted electrical service). Therefore, we conclude, consistent with the legislative intent of the statute, that the structure satisfied the statutory definition of a building either because it had been utilized for overnight lodging or because it fits within the “ordinary meaning” of the term.

Questions for Discussion

1. How does the appellate court define “building”? Do you agree with the court’s determination that the structure constitutes a building?

2. What facts are crucial to the court’s conclusion that the structure is a building?

3. Why was the defendant held liable for murder? Do you believe that a crime directed against the homeless should be punished more severely, less severely, or no differently than any other criminal offense?

          Anthony LeRoy Wallace’s wife of two months, Arlissa Pointer Wallace, caught him smoking crack cocaine, called him a crack head, and told him to leave the house she had bought six or seven years before the marriage. The property inside the home originally belonged to Arlissa. Arlissa kept the house in her name, although Wallace apparently acquired some interest in the house based on his contribution to the mortgage payments following their marriage. Anthony reacted angrily and began tearing up the house and property within the home and caused over $9,000 of damage to the house and to over $6,000 of damage to the furniture and furnishings. Anthony claims that he cannot be held criminally liable for vandalizing his own marital property. See People v. Wallace, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

People v. Wallace, 19 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Cal. App. 2004), Opinion by: Gomes, J.

         One summer evening in Fresno, Anthony LeRoy Wallace’s wife of two months, Arlissa Pointer Wallace, caught him smoking crack cocaine, called him a crack head, and told him to leave the house she had bought six or seven years before the marriage and had refinanced shortly after the marriage. Although she had kept the house in her name, Wallace presumably had acquired a small community property interest through mortgage payments with community property funds [community property is property in the marriage in which both parties possess a financial interest].

         Instead of leaving, however, Wallace began tearing up the house. Frightened, Pointer kept her distance from him as she opened the living room curtains in the hope that a neighbor might see and call the police. He kept breaking things. Twice she dialed 911, but twice she hung up, fearing things would get much worse if he knew she had called. He left before the police arrived. She told a police officer that the only thing he had not broken in the house was his own stereo and that everything else in the house belonged to her. A couple of hours later, alerted by a neighbor to “incredible pounding, very, very loud noise” from the house, police officers found Wallace inside the house breaking things again. Only after he challenged three armed and uniformed officers to fight did they subdue him with a taser and arrest him.

         At trial, an expert witness testified to over $9,000 of damage to the house and to over $6,000 of damage to the furniture and furnishings. A jury found Wallace guilty of felony vandalism and of two misdemeanors—being under the influence and resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (“resisting”)—and found two assault with a deadly weapon priors true as both serious felony priors and prison term priors. . . . The court sentenced him to a 25-to-life term for felony vandalism, a consecutive term of one year on each of his two prison term priors, and time served on each of his two misdemeanors.

Issue

         Wallace argues that as a matter of law, he cannot be guilty of vandalizing either community property or his spouse’s separate property inside the marital home. In the published portion of our opinion, we will reject his argument and embrace the emerging rule imposing criminal liability on a spouse for intentionally causing harm to property in which the other spouse has an interest . . . whether the harm occurs outside or inside the marital home. . . .

         The question before us is whether a spouse can be guilty of vandalizing community property and the other spouse’s separate property inside the marital home. Wallace asks us to answer that question in the negative on the basis of “the common law rule that a person’s home is his or her castle” and the language in the vandalism statute that a vandal can deface, damage, or destroy only property that is “not his or her own.” The Attorney General asks us to answer that question in the affirmative, arguing that vandalism is not a crime that threatens property rights only in a particular place, that the criminal law protects each owner’s interest in community property against nonconsensual damage by the other, and that Pointer’s separate property suffered most of the harm anyway.

         Section 594, subdivision (a) provides that: “Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. (2) Damages. (3) Destroys.”

Reasoning

         In People v. Kahanic, 241 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. App. 1987), we held that the vandalism statute applies to community property on the rationale that the “essence of the crime is in the physical acts against the ownership interest of another, even though that ownership is less than exclusive”. . . However, Wallace argues that with the vandalism in Kahanic occurring outside the marital home, the case is inapposite to the issue here whether “the common law rule that a person’s home is his or her castle” precludes criminal liability for vandalizing property in one’s own home. He analogizes that issue to the question whether a person can burglarize his or her own home and notes the California Supreme Court relied on the common law rule to hold that the burglary statute applies only to “a person who has no right to be in the building.” . . . [H]e argues that as one can neither burgle nor trespass in one’s own home, neither can one vandalize property in one’s own home.

         Wallace’s argument ignores three key differences between vandalism, on the one hand, and burglary and trespass, on the other. First, one can commit vandalism anywhere, but one can commit burglary and trespass only by entering into a specific place. Second, one cannot commit vandalism without defacing, damaging, or destroying property, but one can commit burglary and trespass without harming any property at all. Third, the harm that vandalism by a spouse necessarily inflicts to community property or to the other spouse’s separate property ousts the other spouse of his or her ownership interest in a way that neither burglary nor trespass necessarily does. Together, those differences foil Wallace’s endeavor to broaden to vandalism the rule that applies to burglary and trespass.

Holding

         On the question before us, we broaden our holding in Kahanic to embrace the emerging rule imposing criminal liability on a spouse for intentionally causing harm to property in which the other spouse has an interest, whether the property is individual or marital, whether the harm occurs outside or inside the marital home. “[W]hen a husband destroys property that he owns jointly with his wife, not only does he destroy his property, which he may have a right to destroy, but he simultaneously destroys his wife’s undivided one hundred percent interest in the property, which he does not have a right to destroy” . . . Accordingly, we answer in the affirmative the question before us and hold that a spouse can be guilty of vandalizing community property and the other spouse’s separate property inside the marital home.