Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida

517 U.S. 4

Case Year: 1996

Case Ruling: 5-4, Affirmed

Opinion Justice: Rehnquist

FACTS

On March 27, 1996, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. On the surface the case may appear to be relatively minor: An Indian tribe, wishing to gain state permission to start reservation gambling, is taking its case to court. Yet much more than that is involved. At stake are questions of congressional power to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, state immunity from lawsuits, conflicting constitutional provisions, and the appropriate balance of power between national and state governments. Also involved is the issue of stare decisis: When should precedent be followed, and when may it be abandoned?

In 1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in order to control gambling on Indian reservations. The act was passed pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress authority to “regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.” Among other things, the act provides that Class III gambling (slot machines, casinos, dog racing, lotteries, etc.) is lawful only if (1) it takes place in a state that allows such gambling, (2) it is authorized by a valid tribal ordinance, and (3) it is conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact. The law further provides that, upon the request of a tribe, the state must negotiate such a tribal-state compact “in good faith.” If the tribe does not believe the state is negotiating in such terms, it may sue the state in federal court.

In 1991 the Seminole Tribe contacted Florida governor Lawton Chiles, requesting the initiation of negotiations to establish a tribal-state compact allowing Class III gambling on its reservation. The state agreed to discuss poker and similar games allowable under state law; however, it refused to negotiate with respect to machine- or computer-assisted games or any form of casino gambling, since such activities were not permitted under Florida law.

The tribe filed suit in federal court alleging a failure by the state to negotiate in good faith. The state moved to dismiss the suit, citing the Eleventh Amendment, which bars states from being sued in federal court without their permission. The district court refused to dismiss the suit, citing the case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas (1989), which held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar federal lawsuits against states if they were authorized by Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed, holding that Congress lacked the authority, under its power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, to make an exception to the immunity from lawsuits granted to the states by the Eleventh Amendment. The Seminole tribe requested Supreme Court review of that ruling.

 

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Petitioner sought our review of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and we granted certiorari, in order to consider [the question]: Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause? ...

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms.” Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak (1991). That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana (1890) has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that “‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.’” [ Hans], quoting The Federalist No. 81 [Hamilton]. For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States “was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”Hans.

Here, petitioner has sued the State of Florida and it is undisputed that Florida has not consented to the suit. Petitioner nevertheless contends that its suit is not barred by state sovereign immunity....

... [O]ur inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States’ immunity from suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate? Previously, in conducting that inquiry, we have found authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution. In Fitzpatrick [ v. Bitzer (1976)], we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution. We noted that sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the States and that sec. 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” We held that through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.

In only one other case has congressional abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity been upheld. InPennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989), a plurality of the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, stating that the power to regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages.” Union Gas....

In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity, petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court’s conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress’ power under the Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to consider whether that clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.

Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union Gas and contends that “[t]here is no principled basis for finding that congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce Clause.” ... Contending that the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Government with “the duty of protect[ing]” the tribes from “local ill feeling” and “the people of the States,” United States v. Kagama (1886), petitioner argues that the abrogation power is necessary “to protect the tribes from state action denying federally guaranteed rights.”

Respondents dispute the petitioner’s analogy between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. They note that we have recognized that “the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989), and from that they argue that the two provisions are “wholly dissimilar.” Respondents contend that the Interstate Commerce Clause grants the power of abrogation only because Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete” without that “necessary” power. The Indian Commerce Clause is distinguishable, respondents contend, because it gives Congress complete authority over the Indian tribes. Therefore, the abrogation power is not “necessary” to the Congress’ exercise of its power under the Indian Commerce Clause....

Both parties make their arguments from the plurality decision in Union Gas....

... We agree with the petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.

Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce Clause grants the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity. Instead, they contend that if we find the rationale of the Union Gas plurality to extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, then “Union Gas should be reconsidered and overruled.” Generally, the principle of stare decisis, and the interests that it serves, viz., “the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, ... reliance on judicial decisions, and ... the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” Payne v. Tennessee(1991), counsel strongly against reconsideration of our precedent. Nevertheless, we always have treated stare decisis as a “principle of policy,” Helvering v. Hallock (1940), and not as an “inexorable command,” Payne. “[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’” Id. (quotingSmith v. Allwright [1944]). Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been “particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’” Payne (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. [1932] [Brandeis, J., dissenting]).

The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an expressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court. We have already seen that Justice Brennan’s opinion received the support of only three other Justices.... Since it was issued, Union Gas has created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured decision.

The plurality’s rationale also deviated sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in Hans. It was well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the Amendment itself is clear enough on this point. ... And our decisions since Hans had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amendment reflects “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III,” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman (1984). As the dissent in Union Gas recognized, the plurality’s conclusion--that Congress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III--”contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction.” Union Gas.

Never before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it had seemed fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Marbury v. Madison (1803). The plurality’s citation of prior decisions for support was based upon what we believe to be a misreading of precedent....

In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure from established law. Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality. The case involved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered only by constitutional amendment or revision by this Court. Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the plurality’s rationale depart from our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.

The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision in Union Gas, but nonetheless would find congressional power to abrogate in this case. Contending that our decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for “attend[ing]” to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions.... For over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated understanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment....

In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner’s suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction....

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal court. The Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of petitioner’s suit is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

JUSTICE STEVENS, DISSENTING.

This case is about power--the power of the Congress of the United States to create a private federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right. In Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), the entire Court--including Justice Iredell whose dissent provided the blueprint for the Eleventh Amendment--assumed that Congress had such power. In Hans v. Louisiana (1890)--a case the Court purports to follow today--the Court again assumed that Congress had such power. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring), the Court squarely held that Congress has such power. In a series of cases beginning with Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon(1985), the Court formulated a special “clear statement rule” to determine whether specific Acts of Congress contained an effective exercise of that power. Nevertheless, in a sharp break with the past, today the Court holds that with the narrow and illogical exception of statutes enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no such power.

The importance of the majority’s decision to overrule the Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The majority’s opinion does not simply preclude Congress from establishing the rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a State’s good faith negotiations over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.

There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, however, over whether Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued. Congress’ authority in that regard is clear....

JUSTICE SOUTER, WITH WHOM JUSTICE GINSBURG AND JUSTICE BREYER JOIN, DISSENTING.

In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court today holds for the first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a federal right. Although the Court invokes the Eleventh Amendment as authority for this proposition, the only sense in which that amendment might be claimed as pertinent here was tolerantly phrased by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). There, he explained how it has come about that we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified in 1795, the other (so-called) invented by the Court nearly a century later in Hans v. Louisiana (1890). Justice Stevens saw in that second Eleventh Amendment no bar to the exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in providing for suits on a federal question by individuals against a State, and I can only say that after my own canvass of the matter I believe he was entirely correct in that view.... His position, of course, was also the holding in Union Gas, which the Court now overrules and repudiates.

The fault I find with the majority today is not in its decision to reexamine Union Gas, for the Court in that case produced no majority for a single rationale supporting congressional authority. Instead, I part company from the Court because I am convinced that its decision is fundamentally mistaken, and for that reason I respectfully dissent....

There is an even more fundamental ... principle, however, that the Court abandons today. John Marshall recognized it over a century and a half ago in the very context of state sovereign immunity in federal question cases:

“The jurisdiction of the Court, then, being extended by the letter of the constitution to all cases arising under it, or under the laws of the United States, it follows that those who would withdraw any case of this description from that jurisdiction, must sustain the exemption they claim on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers have employed.” Cohens v. Virginia.

Because neither text, precedent, nor history supports the majority’s abdication of our responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to us in Article III, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.