Wayman v. Southward

23 U.S. 1

Case Year: 1825

Case Ruling: 7-0

Opinion Justice: Marshall

FACTS

Wayman v. Southard (1825) was the Court’s first major ruling on the delegation of domestic powers. This dispute, unlike most in this area, involved a congressional grant of lawmaking authority to the courts, not the executive. The justices had to determine whether a section of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which gave the courts power to “make and establish all necessary laws” for the conduct of judicial business, constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and, as such, an unconstitutional delegation of power.

Writing for the Court in Wayman, Chief Justice John Marshall responded pragmatically. He sought to balance the letter of the Constitution with the practical concerns facing Congress when he formulated the following standard: the legislature must itself “entirely” regulate “important subjects”; but for “those of less interest,” it can enact a general provision and authorize “those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.” Put simply, Marshall established a different set of rules for the delegation of power, varying by the importance of the subject under regulation. Applying this standard to the delegation of power contained in the Judiciary Act, he found that Congress could grant courts authority to promulgate their own rules.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT, AND, AFTER STATING THE CASE, PROCEEDED AS FOLLOWS:

... Congress has expressly enabled the Courts to regulate their practice.... The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. enacts, “That all the said Courts shall have power” “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said Courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States;” and the 7th section of the act, “in addition to the act, entitled, an act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States,” (act of 1793, ch. 22. s. 7.) details more at large the powers conferred by the 17th section of the Judiciary Act. These sections give the Court full power over all matters of practice; and it is not reasonable to suppose that the Process Act was intended solely for the same object. The language is different; and the two sections last mentioned have no reference to State laws.

It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. Without going farther for examples, we will take that, the legality of which the counsel for the defendants admit. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act, and the 7th section of the additional act, empower the Courts respectively to regulate their practice. It certainly will not be contended, that this might not be done by Congress. The Courts, for example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended, that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.

The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details. To determine the character of the power given to the Courts by the Process Act, we must inquire into its extent....

The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily....

This opinion renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions adjourned in this case. If the laws do not apply to the Federal Courts, no question concerning their constitutionality can arise in those Courts.