Orr v. Orr

440 U.S. 268

Case Year: 1979

Case Ruling: 6-3, Reversed and Remanded

Opinion Justice: Brennan

FACTS

On February 26, 1974, a final decree of divorce was entered by an Alabama court dissolving the marriage of William and Lillian Orr. William was to pay Lillian $1,240 per month alimony for the rest of her life or until she remarried. In July 1976 Lillian began contempt proceedings against her former husband on the grounds that he had fallen behind in his alimony payments. He defended himself by claiming that the state alimony statute was unconstitutional. It was defective, according to his argument, because it allowed for wives to obtain alimony judgments against husbands, but did not permit husbands to receive alimony from wives. This Equal Protection Clause claim was denied by the Alabama trial court, and William was ordered to pay $5,524 in back alimony and attorney's fees. The Alabama appeals courts affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

 

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

 

In authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands, but not on wives, the Alabama statutory scheme "provides that different treatment be accorded . . . on the basis of . . . sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause," Reed v. Reed (1971). The fact that the classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny. Craig v. Boren (1976). "To withstand scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause, " 'classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' " We shall, therefore, examine the three governmental objectives that might arguably be served by Alabama's statutory scheme.

Appellant views the Alabama alimony statutes as effectively announcing the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role, and as seeking for their objective the reinforcement of that model among the State's citizens. We agree, as he urges, that prior cases settle that this purpose cannot sustain the statutes. Stanton v. Stanton (1975) held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials," can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. "No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." If the statute is to survive constitutional attack, therefore, it must be validated on some other basis.

The opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals suggests other purposes that the statute may serve. Its opinion states that the Alabama statutes were "designed" for "the wife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance." This may be read as asserting either of two legislative objectives. One is a legislative purpose to provide help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need. The other is a goal of compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce. We concede, of course, that assisting needy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective. We have also recognized "[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women . . . as . . . an important governmental objective." It only remains, therefore, to determine whether the classification at issue here is "substantially related to achievement of those objectives."

Ordinarily, we would begin the analysis of the "needy spouse" objective by considering whether sex is a sufficiently "accurate proxy" for dependency to establish that the gender classification rests " 'upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' " Similarly, we would initially approach the "compensation" rationale by asking whether women had in fact been significantly discriminated against tin the sphere to which the statute applied a sex-based classification, leaving the sexes "not similarly situated with respect to opportunities" in that sphere.

But in this case, even if sex were a reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage did discriminate against women, these factors still would "not adequately justify the salient features of" Alabama's statutory scheme. Under the statute, individualized hearings at which the parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur. There is no reason, therefore, to use sex as a proxy for need. Needy males could be helped along with needy females with little if any additional burden on the State. In such circumstances, not even an administrative-convenience rationale exists to justify operating by generalization or proxy. Similarly, since individualized hearings can determine which women were in fact discriminated against vis-à-vis their husbands, as well as which family units defied the stereotype, and left the husband dependent on the wife, Alabama's alleged compensatory purpose may be effectuated without placing burdens solely on husbands. Progress toward fulfilling such a purpose would not be hampered, and it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men and women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex. "Thus, the gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it, the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated to the women the statute aids," and the effort to help those women would not in any way be compromised.

Moreover, use of a gender classification actually produces perverse results in this case. As compared to a gender-neutral law placing alimony obligations on the spouse able to pay, the present Alabama statutes give an advantage only to the financially secure wife whose husband is in need. Although such a wife might have to pay alimony under a gender-neutral statute, the present statutes exempt her from that obligation. Thus, "[t]he [wives] who benefit from the disparate treatment are those who were . . . nondependent on their husbands." They are precisely those who are not "needy spouses" and who are "least likely to have been victims of . . . discrimination" by the institution of marriage. A gender-based classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny.

Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the "proper place" of women and their need for special protection. Thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. Where, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. And this is doubly so where the choice made by the State appears to redound—if only indirectly—to the benefit of those without need for special solicitude.

Having found Alabama's alimony statutes unconstitutional, we reverse the judgment below and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, WITH WHOM THE CHIEF JUSTICE JOINS, DISSENTING.

In Alabama only wives may be awarded alimony upon divorce. In ... its opinion, the Court holds that Alabama's alimony statutes may be challenged in this Court by a divorced male who has never sought alimony, who is demonstrably not entitled to alimony even if he had, and who contractually bound himself to pay alimony to his former wife and did so without objection for over two years. I think the Court's eagerness to invalidate Alabama's statutes has led it to deal too casually with the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. III of the Constitution.

The architects of our constitutional form of government, to assure that courts exercising the "judicial power of the United States" would not trench upon the authority committed to the other branches of government, consciously limited the Judicial Branch's "right of expounding the Constitution" to "cases of a Judiciary Nature" -- that is, to actual "cases" and "controversies" between genuinely adverse parties. Central to this Art. III limitation on federal judicial power is the concept of standing. The standing inquiry focuses on the party before the Court, asking whether he has "`such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Warth v. Seldin (1975)....

... Alabama's alimony statutes in effect create two gender classifications: that between needy wives, who can be awarded alimony under the statutes, and needy husbands, who cannot; and that between financially secure husbands, who can be required to pay alimony under the statutes, and financially secure wives, who cannot. Appellant Orr's standing to raise his equal protection claim must therefore be analyzed in terms of both of these classifications.

This Court has long held that in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Art. III standing, a party claiming that a statute unconstitutionally withholds a particular benefit must be in line to receive the benefit if the suit is successful....

It is undisputed that the parties now before us are "a needy wife who qualifies for alimony and a husband who has the property and earnings from which alimony can be paid." Under the statute pertinent to the Orrs' divorce, alimony may be awarded against the husband only "[i]f the wife has no separate estate or if it be insufficient for her maintenance." At the time of their divorce, Mr. Orr made no claim that he was not in a position to contribute to his needy wife's support, much less that she should be required to pay alimony to him. On the contrary, the amount of alimony awarded by the Alabama trial court was agreed to by the parties, and appellant has never sought a reduction in his alimony obligation on the ground of changed financial circumstances. On these facts, it is clear that appellant is not in a position to benefit from a sex-neutral alimony statute. His standing to raise the constitutional question in this case, therefore, cannot be founded on a claim that he would, but for his sex, be entitled to an award of alimony from his wife under the Alabama statutes....

Article III courts are not commissioned to roam at large, gratuitously righting perceived wrongs and vindicating claimed rights. They must await the suit of one whose advocacy is inspired by a "personal stake" in victory. The Framers' wise insistence that those who invoke the power of a federal court personally stand to profit from its exercise ensures that constitutional issues are not decided in advance of necessity and that the complaining party stand in the shoes of those whose rights he champions. Obedience to the rules of standing -- the "threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention" -- is of crucial importance to constitutional adjudication in this Court, for when the parties leave these halls, what is done cannot be undone except by constitutional amendment.

...I do not think the Court, in deciding the merits of appellant's constitutional claim, has exercised the self-restraint that Art. III requires in this case. I would therefore dismiss Mr. Orr's appeal....