Chapter 9 examines the police/citizen encounter and the law protecting citizens during custodial interrogations. A brief history of the evolution of the Miranda rights is examined to give the student a perspective on the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections (pp. 257–258); the Inbau and Reid interrogation techniques commonly used by law enforcement to entice guilty suspects to confess (pp. 259–262); the Miranda v. Arizona (1966) decision and the giving and waiving of Miranda warnings (pp. 263–265); the Florida v. Powell (2010) case excerpt confirming that officers meet constitutional requirements if they only give suspects the “gist” of Miranda warnings (pp. 265–266); an examination of the custody requirement including the High Court’s decision in Howes v. Fields (2012) holding long-time prisoners are not in custody by virtue of their incarceration status (pp. 267–270). Making the Courtroom Connection highlights the recent High Court decisions requiring one to “speak up” to invoke their right to remain silent and for counsel appear counterintuitive, particularly when most criminal defendants do not have the advanced social or reasoning skills to protect themselves when the adversarial process begins (p. 271). The chapter explores the special Miranda issues with juveniles and trickery and deceit during an interrogation (pp. 271–272); invoking and waiving Miranda rights, and a brief discussion of the difference between the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (pp. 272–276). The prohibition against double interviewing without the benefit of Miranda warnings is illustrated in the case excerpt of Missouri v. Seibert (2004) (pp. 278–279); the exceptions to the giving of Miranda are listed (pp. 279–280), including exceptions to the exclusionary rule when evidence remains admissible despite a Miranda violation, such as physical evidence in the United States v. Patane (2004) case excerpt (pp. 280–281). The chapter ends with the inevitable discovery and independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule and the possible collateral uses of statements if excluded by operation of a Miranda violation (may be admissible) or if the statement was coerced or taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment (not admissible) (pp. 282–283).