Chapter 10 discusses the constitutional foundation of the right to counsel from the so-called “Scottsboro Boys” case of nine African American men charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for raping two White women on a train in the Powell v. Alabama (1932) case excerpt (pp. 287–291) to the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) and the three primary methods for the appointment of counsel (pp. 288–293). The significance of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is explained through the “deliberate elicitation rule” (pp. 294–295). An examination of the differences of the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments with special emphasis on the finer details of invoking the right to counsel illustrated in the Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) case excerpt (pp. 296–298), as well as a 14-day legal break in custody for law enforcement to reattempt interrogation pursuant to Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) (p. 298). Venue is explored more thoroughly after its introduction in Chapter 2 in the MO v. Baumruk (2002) case excerpt (pp. 299–301). The right to self-representation is explored through hearing transcripts in the Dylann Roof hate crime death penalty case (pp. 302–308), so, too, the 2018 case of McCoy v. Louisiana recognizing a defendant’s autonomy in making certain decisions at trial (pp. 309–310). The chapter closes with a summary of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause case law (pp. 311–313) distinguishing between testimonial evidence requiring confrontation at trial and non-testimonial evidence that may be admissible without confrontation by the defendant at trial.