SAGE Journal Articles
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Article 1: Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (2015). Campaign money, congress, and perceptions of corruption. American Politics Research. doi:10.1177/1532673X15594232
Abstract: Many Americans think campaign money has a corrupting influence on Congress. Yet how they think about money in politics is a relatively unexplored topic. This article investigates how the public reasons about campaign money and corruption. Our survey experiments demonstrate that attitudes about campaign money are structured by partisan interest and are also driven by information about sources of campaign money and the amount spent (particularly for large independent expenditures made possible by Citizens United), the method of delivery, and about what the money is spent on. Mass perceptions about corruption of Congress, furthermore, may reflect aversion to negative campaigns as well as attitudes about campaign financiers having undue influence over representatives. These findings not only provide a more nuanced picture of attitudes about campaign money but also have consequences for how we assess reform proposals relating to money and politics.
Article 2: Greer, S. (2013). Structural adjustment comes to Europe: Lessons for the Eurozone from the conditionality debates. Global Social Policy. doi:10.1177/1468018113511473
Abstract: This article argues that the Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs) that came with loans to peripheral Eurozone members Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and now Cyprus, are very similar to the loans with conditionality, also known as Structural Adjustment Programs, that international financial institutions used as a policy tool in the 1980s and 1990s. It defines structural adjustment programs and then shows how Eurozone rules plus the EAPs resemble them. It then canvasses the literature evaluating structural adjustment in the developing world in order to formulate expectations for its performance in Europe. The conclusions from the large literature on structural adjustment policies suggest that the EAPs will: be badly implemented; be neutral or bad for growth; be bad for equity and the poor; have unpredictable policy consequences; and will allow incumbent elites to preserve their positions. Preliminary evidence from the four peripheral countries confirms that the same problems are afflicting EAPs.