Goldman v. Weinberger

475 U.S. 503

Case Year: 1986

Case Ruling: 5-4, Affirmed

Opinion Justice: Burger

FACTS

In 1973 S. Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew and an ordained rabbi, received an armed forces scholarship to study clinical psychology at Chicago's Loyola University. By September 1977 he had completed the program and entered the service as a captain in the Air Force. Soon after, he was stationed at March Air Force Base (AFB) in Riverside, California, as a clinical psychologist in the base hospital.

From the time Goldman began his service, he wore a yarmulke (skull cap) while in and out of uniform. Orthodox Judaism requires its adherents to keep their heads covered at all times. For the first three and a half years of his stint at March AFB, no one objected to or even questioned his right to wear the yarmulke. But on May 8, 1981, the hospital commander Col. Joseph Gregory told Goldman that the yarmulke violated Air Force Dress Code Regulation (AFR) 35-10, a 190-page regulation "that describes in minute detail all of the various items of apparel that constitute the Air Force Uniform." Relevant here is that 35-10 gives military commanders the discretion to permit individuals to wear religious apparel in certain locations, and it states that a member of the Air Force has the "right, within limits, to express individuality through his or her appearance. However, the image of a disciplined service member who can be relied on to do his or her job excludes the extreme, the unusual, and the fad." Under his reading of 35-10, and despite Goldman's arguments about the free exercise of religion, Gregory concluded that Goldman could no longer wear the yarmulke indoors while in uniform anywhere on the base except the hospital.

Goldman refused to heed Gregory's request and, two weeks later, contacted Air Force attorneys. They tried to resolve the matter through negotiations with March AFB personnel but failed. After negotiations broke down, Gregory revised his order to Goldman: on June 23, 1981, Goldman was told that he could no longer wear his yarmulke anywhere on the base, including the hospital. The very next day, Gregory sent Goldman a formal reprimand threatening him with court-martial. Gregory also told Goldman that he was withdrawing a positive recommendation on Goldman's application to stay in the military another year.

At this point, Goldman brought suit against the secretary of defense, arguing that the Air Force regulation violated his First Amendment free exercise rights. A U.S. district court agreed, but a panel of judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. When Goldman asked for an en banc hearing, the appellate court denied the request above the dissents of only three judges: Kenneth Starr and future Supreme Court justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia. Starr, who would later serve as solicitor general and special counsel in the investigation of alleged improprieties during the Clinton presidency, said, "The treatment of Dr. Goldman seems to me patently unconscionable." Ginsburg and Scalia wrote in dissent:

S. Simcha Goldman ... has long served his country as an Air Force officer with honor and devotion. A military commander has now declared intolerable the yarmulke Dr. Goldman has worn without incident throughout his several years of military service. At the least, the declaration suggests "callous indifference" to Dr. Goldman's faith, and it runs counter to "the best of our traditions" to "accommodate the public service to the spiritual needs [of our people]." ... Braunfeld v. Brown (Stewart, J., dissenting) (commenting on state laws exposing Orthodox Jews to a "cruel choice" between "his religious faith and his economic survival").... I believe that the court en banc should measure the command suddenly and lately championed by the military against the restraint imposed even on an armed forces commander by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

With the court of appeals' rejection, Goldman's attorneys, several of whom worked for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, brought the case to the Supreme Court. There, they argued that Goldman's conduct was of a non-intrusive nature that "interferes with no one else, does not harm the public health, and imposes no burden on accommodation." They were attempting to show that Goldman's behavior was markedly different from activities the Court had struck down in Reynolds v. United States (1879) (polygamy) and Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) (solicitation by children in violation of child labor laws). They also maintained that the Air Force lacked any overriding governmental interest that would justify such a major intrusion into Goldman's religious practice; after all, he had worn the yarmulke for three and a half years with no effect on the national defense.

The government's response was that "[t]here can be no serious doubt that uniform dress and appearance standards serve the military interest in maintaining discipline, morale, and esprit de corps" and that enforcement of the dress code "is a necessary means to the undeniably critical ends of molding soldiers into an effective fighting force." According to the government, wearing a yarmulke may be a non-intrusive religious practice for civilians but "in the military, the smallest departure from the uniform dress code is an occasion for comment. It sets the wearer apart from his fellow soldiers and serves as a public assertion of individuality in a context in which cohesion and group identify are essential." The government also urged the justices to consider what might happen if they allowed Goldman to wear his yarmulke: other individuals could request exemptions to wear turbans, dreadlocks, a kum-kum (a red dot on the forehead worn by Hindus), and so forth.

 

JUSTICE REHNQUIST DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Petitioner S. Simcha Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution permits him to wear a yarmulke while in uniform, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel.... We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question, and now affirm....

Petitioner argues that AFR 35-10, as applied to him, prohibits religiously motivated conduct and should therefore be analyzed under the standard enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner (1963).... But we have repeatedly held that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society."... "[T]he military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life" ... in order to prepare for and perform its vital role....

Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society. The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.... The essence of military service "is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service."...

These aspects of military life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.... But "within the military community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community."... In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.... Not only are courts "ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have," ... but the military authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy. "[J]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged."...

The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during peacetime as during war because its personnel must be ready to provide an effective defense on a moment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in advance of trouble. We have acknowledged that "[t]he inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection."...

To this end, the Air Force promulgated AFR 35-10, a 190-page document, which states that "Air Force members will wear the Air Force uniform while performing their military duties, except when authorized to wear civilian clothes on duty."...

Petitioner Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires the Air Force to make an exception to its uniform dress requirements for religious apparel unless the accouterments create a "clear danger" of undermining discipline and esprit de corps. He asserts that in general, visible but "unobtrusive" apparel will not create such a danger and must therefore be accommodated. He argues that the Air Force failed to prove that a specific exception for his practice of wearing an unobtrusive yarmulke would threaten discipline. He contends that the Air Force's assertion to the contrary is mere ipse dixit, with no support from actual experience or a scientific study in the record, and is contradicted by expert testimony that religious exceptions to AFR 35-10 are in fact desirable and will increase morale by making the Air Force a more humane place.

But whether or not expert witnesses may feel that religious exceptions to AFR 35-10 are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment. Quite obviously, to the extent the regulations do not permit the wearing of religious apparel such as a yarmulke, a practice described by petitioner as silent devotion akin to prayer, military life may be more objectionable for petitioner and probably others. But the First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations. The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity. The First Amendment therefore does not prohibit them from being applied to petitioner even though their effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, WITH WHOM JUSTICE MARSHALL JOINS, DISSENTING.

Simcha Goldman invokes this Court's protection of his First Amendment right to fulfill one of the traditional religious obligations of a male Orthodox Jew--to cover his head before an omnipresent God. The Court's response to Goldman's request is to abdicate its role as principal expositor of the Constitution and protector of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsupported assertions of military necessity. I dissent....

Dr. Goldman has asserted a substantial First Amendment claim, which is entitled to meaningful review by this Court. The Court, however, evades its responsibility by eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that interfere with the fundamental constitutional rights of service personnel. Our cases have acknowledged that in order to protect our treasured liberties, the military must be able to command service members to sacrifice a great many of the individual freedoms they enjoyed in the civilian community and to endure certain limitations on the freedoms they retain.... Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, we have steadfastly maintained that "`our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.'"... And, while we have hesitated, due to our lack of expertise concerning military affairs and our respect for the delegated authority of a coordinate branch, to strike down restrictions on individual liberties which could reasonably be justified as necessary to the military's vital function, ... we have never abdicated our obligation of judicial review....

Today the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment rights a subrational-basis standard--absolute, uncritical "deference to the professional judgment of military authorities."... If a branch of the military declares one of its rules sufficiently important to outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that the Court will accept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.

A deferential standard of review, however, need not, and should not, mean that the Court must credit arguments that defy common sense. When a military service burdens the free exercise rights of its members in the name of necessity, it must provide, as an initial matter and at a minimum, a credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely to interfere with the proffered military interest. Unabashed ipse dixit cannot outweigh a constitutional right.

In the present case, the Air Force asserts that its interests in discipline and uniformity would be undermined by an exception to the dress code permitting observant male Orthodox Jews to wear yarmulkes. The Court simply restates these assertions without offering any explanation how the exception Dr. Goldman requests reasonably could interfere with the Air Force's interests. Had the Court given actual consideration to Goldman's claim, it would have been compelled to decide in his favor.

The Government maintains in its brief that discipline is jeopardized whenever exceptions to military regulations are granted....

The contention that the discipline of the Armed Forces will be subverted if Orthodox Jews are allowed to wear yarmulkes with their uniforms surpasses belief. It lacks support in the record of this case, and the Air Force offers no basis for it as a general proposition. While the perilous slope permits the services arbitrarily to refuse exceptions requested to satisfy mere personal preferences, before the Air Force may burden free exercise rights it must advance, at the very least, a rational reason for doing so....

The Government also argues that the services have an important interest in uniform dress, because such dress establishes the preeminence of group identity, thus fostering esprit de corps and loyalty to the service that transcends individual bonds. In its brief, the Government characterizes the yarmulke as an assertion of individuality and as a badge of religious and ethnic identity, strongly suggesting that, as such, it could drive a wedge of divisiveness between members of the services.

...[T]he purported interests of the Air Force in complete uniformity of dress and in elimination of individuality or visible identification with any group other than itself are belied by the service's own regulations. The dress code expressly abjures the need for total uniformity:

... "Appearance in uniform is an important part of this image.... Neither the Air Force nor the public expects absolute uniformity of appearance. Each member has the right, within limits, to express individuality through his or her appearance. However, the image of a disciplined service member who can be relied on to do his or her job excludes the extreme, the unusual, and the fad." AFR 35-10.

It cannot be seriously contended that a serviceman in a yarmulke presents so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an image that public confidence in his ability to perform his duties will be destroyed. Under the Air Force's own standards, then, Dr. Goldman should have and could have been granted an exception to wear his yarmulke.... Finally, the Air Force argues that while Dr. Goldman describes his yarmulke as an "unobtrusive" addition to his uniform, obtrusiveness is a purely relative, standardless judgment. The Government notes that while a yarmulke might not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor dreadlocks to a Rastafarian. If the Court were to require the Air Force to permit yarmulkes, the service must also allow all of these other forms of dress and grooming.

The Government dangles before the Court a classic parade of horribles, the specter of a brightly-colored, "rag-tag band of soldiers." Although turbans, saffron robes, and dreadlocks are not before us in this case and must each be evaluated against the reasons a service branch offers for prohibiting personnel from wearing them while in uniform, a reviewing court could legitimately give deference to dress and grooming rules that have a reasoned basis in, for example, functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional appearance.... It is the lack of any reasoned basis for prohibiting yarmulkes that is so striking here.

Furthermore, contrary to its intimations, the Air Force has available to it a familiar standard for determining whether a particular style of yarmulke is consistent with a polished, professional military appearance--the "neat and conservative" standard by which the service judges jewelry.... No rational reason exists why yarmulkes cannot be judged by the same criterion. Indeed, at argument Dr. Goldman declared himself willing to wear whatever style and color yarmulke the Air Force believes best comports with its uniform....

The Court and the military services have presented patriotic Orthodox Jews with a painful dilemma--the choice between fulfilling a religious obligation and serving their country. Should the draft be reinstated, compulsion will replace choice. Although the pain the services inflict on Orthodox Jewish servicemen is clearly the result of insensitivity rather than design, it is unworthy of our military because it is unnecessary. The Court and the military have refused these servicemen their constitutional rights; we must hope that Congress will correct this wrong.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, DISSENTING.

I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but for reasons somewhat different from those respectively enunciated by JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. I feel that the Air Force is justified in considering not only the costs of allowing Captain Goldman to cover his head indoors, but also the cumulative costs of accommodating constitutionally indistinguishable requests for religious exemptions. Because, however, the Government has failed to make any meaningful showing that either set of costs is significant, I dissent from the Court's rejection of Goldman's claim.

The Government concedes that Goldman wears his yarmulke out of sincere religious conviction. For Goldman, as for many other Jews, "a yarmulke is an expression of respect for God ... intended to keep the wearer aware of God's presence."... If the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment means anything, it must mean that an individual's desire to follow his or her faith is not simply another personal preference, to be accommodated by government when convenience allows. Indeed, this Court has read the Clause, I believe correctly, to require that "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). In general, government "may justify an inroad on religious liberty [only] by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." ... Sherbert v. Verner (1963). The clear import of Sherbert ... is that this showing must be made even when the inroad results from the "evenhanded" application of a facially neutral requirement. "Rules are rules" is not by itself a sufficient justification for infringing religious liberty.

Nor may free exercise rights be compromised simply because the military says they must be. To be sure, application of the First Amendment to members of the Armed Services must take into account "the different character of the military community and of the military mission."... As JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR point out, however, military personnel do not forfeit their constitutional rights as a price of enlistment. Except as otherwise required by "interests of the highest order," soldiers as well as civilians are entitled to follow the dictates of their faiths.

In my view, this case does not require us to determine the extent to which the ordinary test for inroads on religious freedom must be modified in the military context, because the Air Force has failed to produce even a minimally credible explanation for its refusal to allow Goldman to keep his head covered indoors. I agree with the Court that deference is due the considered judgment of military professionals that, as a general matter, standardized dress serves to promote discipline and esprit de corps. But Goldman's modest supplement to the Air Force uniform clearly poses by itself no threat to the Nation's military readiness. Indeed, the District Court specifically found that Goldman has worn a yarmulke on base for years without any adverse effect on his performance, any disruption of operations at the base, or any complaints from other personnel....

The Air Force argues that it has no way of distinguishing fairly between Goldman's request for an exemption and the potential requests of others whose religious practices may conflict with the appearance code, perhaps in more conspicuous ways....

The problem with this argument, it seems to me, is not doctrinal but empirical. The Air Force simply has not shown any reason to fear that a significant number of enlisted personnel and officers would request religious exemptions that could not be denied on neutral grounds such as safety, let alone that granting these requests would noticeably impair the overall image of the service.... The Air Force contends that the potential for such disruption was demonstrated at trial through the introduction of an Army publication discussing the beliefs and practices of a variety of religious denominations, some of which have traditions or requirements involving attire. But that publication provides no indication whatsoever as to how many soldiers belong to the denominations it describes, or as to how many are likely to seek religious exemptions from the dress code. In these circumstances, deference seems unwarranted. Reasoned military judgments, of course, are entitled to respect, but the military has failed to show that this particular judgment with respect to Captain Goldman is a reasoned one. If, in the future, the Air Force is besieged with requests for religious exemptions from the dress code, and those requests cannot be distinguished on functional grounds from Goldman's, the service may be able to argue credibly that circumstances warrant a flat rule against any visible religious apparel. That, however, would be a case different from the one at hand.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, WITH WHOM JUSTICE MARSHALL JOINS, DISSENTING.

... I believe that the Court should attempt to articulate and apply an appropriate standard for a free exercise claim in the military context, and should examine Captain Goldman's claim in light of that standard.

Like the Court today in this case involving the military, the Court in the past has had some difficulty, even in the civilian context, in articulating a clear standard for evaluating free exercise claims that result from the application of general state laws burdening religious conduct. In Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div. (1981), the Court required the States to demonstrate that their challenged policies were "the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest" in order to deprive claimants of unemployment benefits when the refusal to work was based on sincere religious beliefs.... In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) the Court noted that "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion" in deciding that the Amish were exempt from a State's requirement that children attend school through the age of 16. In United States v. Lee (1982) the Court stated that "[t]he State may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest," and held that the Amish could not exempt themselves from the Social Security system on religious grounds....

These tests, though similar, are not identical. One can, however, glean at least two consistent themes from this Court's precedents. First, when the government attempts to deny a free exercise claim, it must show that an unusually important interest is at stake, whether that interest is denominated "compelling," "of the highest order," or "overriding." Second, the government must show that granting the requested exemption will do substantial harm to that interest, whether by showing that the means adopted is the "least restrictive" or "essential," or that the interest will not "otherwise be served." These two requirements are entirely sensible in the context of the assertion of a free exercise claim. First, because the government is attempting to override an interest specifically protected by the Bill of Rights, the government must show that the opposing interest it asserts is of special importance before there is any chance that its claim can prevail. Second, since the Bill of Rights is expressly designed to protect the individual against the aggregated and sometimes intolerant powers of the state, the government must show that the interest asserted will in fact be substantially harmed by granting the type of exemption requested by the individual.

There is no reason why these general principles should not apply in the military, as well as the civilian, context. As this Court has stated unanimously, "`our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.'"... Furthermore, the test that one can glean from this Court's decisions in the civilian context is sufficiently flexible to take into account the special importance of defending our Nation without abandoning completely the freedoms that make it worth defending.

The first question that the Court should face here, therefore, is whether the interest that the Government asserts against the religiously based claim of the individual is of unusual importance. It is perfectly appropriate at this step of the analysis to take account of the special role of the military. The mission of our Armed Services is to protect our Nation from those who would destroy all our freedoms. I agree that, in order to fulfill that mission, the military is entitled to take some freedoms from its members. As the Court notes, the military "'must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.'"... The need for military discipline and esprit de corps is unquestionably an especially important governmental interest.

But the mere presence of such an interest cannot, as the majority implicitly believes, end the analysis of whether a refusal by the Government to honor the free exercise of an individual's religion is constitutionally acceptable. A citizen pursuing even the most noble cause must remain within the bounds of the law. So, too, the Government may, even in pursuing its most compelling interests, be subject to specific restraints in doing so. The second question in the analysis of a free exercise claim under this Court's precedents must also be reached here: will granting an exemption of the type requested by the individual do substantial harm to the especially important governmental interest?

I have no doubt that there are many instances in which the unique fragility of military discipline and esprit de corps necessitates rigidity by the Government when similar rigidity to preserve an assertedly analogous interest would not pass constitutional muster in the civilian sphere.... Nonetheless, as JUSTICE BRENNAN persuasively argues, the Government can present no sufficiently convincing proof in this case to support an assertion that granting an exemption of the type requested here would do substantial harm to military discipline and esprit de corps....

First, the Government's asserted need for absolute uniformity is contradicted by the Government's own exceptions to its rule.... Furthermore, the Government does not assert, and could not plausibly argue, that petitioner's decision to wear his yarmulke while indoors at the hospital presents a threat to health or safety.... In the rare instances where the military has not consistently or plausibly justified its asserted need for rigidity of enforcement, and where the individual seeking the exemption establishes that the assertion by the military of a threat to discipline or esprit de corps is in his or her case completely unfounded, I would hold that the Government's policy of uniformity must yield to the individual's assertion of the right of free exercise of religion. On the facts of this case, therefore, I would require the Government to accommodate the sincere religious belief of Captain Goldman. Napoleon may have been correct to assert that, in the military sphere, morale is to all other factors as three is to one, but contradicted assertions of necessity by the military do not on the scales of justice bear a similarly disproportionate weight to sincere religious beliefs of the individual.