SAGE Journal Articles
Abstract: Nasser's behavior in the 1967 Middle East crisis has been variously explained in terms of decision-making deficiencies, personality-related pathologies, and uncontrolled escalation. This paper argues that such accounts are unsatisfactory. They are biased by their use of backward induction, which infers from Nasser's ultimate failure an inevitability to the escalation of the crisis. This inference puts a premium on the evaluation of decisions, rather than on their explanation. It is also inconsistent with Nasser's actual behavior toward the end of the crisis, which strongly suggests an attempt at deescalation. The paper offers an alternative, rational-choice explanation of the crisis. It argues that when the focus of inquiry is shifted from Nasser's failure to his objectives and perception of the strategic context, the crisis decisions of the Egyptian leader can be shown to have been consistent with strategic rationality. Moreover, Nasser's failure was the result not of personality or cognitive deficiencies but rather of Israel's failure to communicate the threshold beyond which she would be compelled to attack. This conclusion underscores the importance of signaling limits to an opponent's escalation so as to facilitate the opponent's learning in crisis.
Abstract: The problem and the solution. The impact of crises on organizations and individuals has been stronger than ever. Despite increasing recognition of the effects of crisis events, most organizations are found not adequately prepared in managing crises. The increasingly frequent occurrence of organizational crises exemplifies the need for human resource development in preparing organizations and their members for crisis situations. However, very little effort has been made in this direction. Recognizing the dynamics and interconnectedness of crisis management, organizational learning, and organizational change, this article proposes an integrated model of organizational learning for crisis management that will likely strengthen organizational capacity and resilience in coping with crises and resultant changes.
Abstract: Over the past three decades, the once-adaptive practice of “taking by force” (cattle raiding) by pastoralist tribes in Northern Uganda has been transformed into a violent, ongoing intractable conflict within the tribes that threatens to destroy the Karimojong people and their way of life. This article suggests that in addition to the typical sources of intractable conflict, a massive influx of automatic weapons not only created instability in the community but also led to a shift in cultural norms. Several cultural norms now perpetuate the conflict, leading to increased intractability.
Abstract: Words evolve in their usage and meaning over time, but few words in the business language have changed as much as the term "win-win." Once confined to the literature on conflict management, the term has been co-opted in the trade press and often used incorrectly in place of the term "compromise." This etymological study traces the lineage of the term from its appearance in the academic literature in the 1970s to its proliferation in the trade press beginning in the early 1980s. Two interpretative errors are described and the effects of these errors on the meaning of the term are detailed.