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Journal Article 3.1: Ghatak, S., & Gold, A. (2017). Development, discrimination, and domestic terrorism: Looking beyond a linear relationship. Conflict Management and Peace Studies, 34(6), 618-639.

Abstract: This study relates economic development to one of the well-observed predictors of domestic terrorism—minority discrimination—and revisits the relationship between terrorism and economic development. We argue that terrorism may be a rational choice when minorities’ exclusion from political power and relative deprivation from public goods increases and the unsettling forces in the initial phases of economic development provide aggrieved people with opportunities for mobilization. We find that economic development has a curvilinear relationship with terrorism. Highly developed countries are less likely to experience domestic terrorism than less-developed ones and the least developed countries have few targets. However, both rich and middle-income countries are vulnerable to domestic terrorism in the presence of minority discrimination.

Journal Article 3.2: Dietrich, F. (2013). Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(3), 405-441.

Abstract: Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of dangerous people who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of ‘potential terrorists’, i.e. of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can ‘brutalise’ or ‘appease’ someone’s personality, i.e. his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (undesirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall efficient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation

Journal Article 3.3: Tessler, M., & Robbins, M. D. H. (2007). What leads some ordinary Arab men and women to approve of terrorist acts against the United States? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(2), 305-328.

Abstract: Findings from representative national surveys in Algeria and Jordan show that neither religious orientations, judgments about Western culture, nor economic circumstances account for variance in approval of terrorist acts against U.S. targets. Alternatively, in both countries, approval of terrorism against the United States is disproportionately likely among men and women with negative judgments about their own government and about U.S. foreign policy. Taken together, these findings suggest that approval of terrorism is fostered by negative attitudes toward actors considered responsible for the political and economic status quo. Given that Algeria and Jordan have had different experiences with respect to terrorism and also differ in demographic, political, and economic structure, identical findings from these dissimilar countries suggest that the observed relationships are not country specific and may apply more generally.

Journal Article 3.4: Gelpi, C., & Avdan, N. (2018). Democracies at risk? A forecasting analysis of regime type and the risk of terrorist Attack. Conflict Management and Peace Studies, 35(1), 18-42.

Abstract: How substantial is democracy as a cause of transnational terrorist attacks? Can our identification of democratic political systems help us to anticipate the flow of transnational terrorism? We seek to address these questions by analyzing data on transnational terrorist incidents from 1968 to 2007. We rely on receiver operating curves as a diagnostic tool to assess forecasting ability of various models of terrorist activity. Our analyses yield four central conclusions. First, our model of transnational terrorism provides a fairly strong basis for forecasting attacks—at least at the (relatively broad) level of the country-year. Second, while the overall forecasting capacity of this model is fairly strong, democracy adds very little to our capacity to forecast terrorist attacks relative to a parsimonious model that includes only distance and the prior history of terrorism. Collectively, these two variables perform about as well as a much more broadly specified model in forecasting terrorist attacks out of sample. Third, the model is highly redundant in a predictive sense. That is, many if not most of the other variables appear to provide similar information in terms of identifying terrorist attacks. Finally, we suggest that scholars focus on the development of more fine-grained and time-variant predictive indicators in order to improve our ability to forecast transnational terrorism.

Additional Articles

• Bar-Tal, D. (2007, July). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American Behavioral Scientist, 50(11), 1430-1453.

• Blazak, R. (2001, February). White boys to terrorist men: Target recruitment of Nazi skinheads. American Behavioral Scientist, 44(6), 982-1000.

• Burgoon, B. (2006, April). On welfare and terror: Social welfare policies and political-economic roots of terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(2), 176-203.

• Hamm, M. S. (2004). Apocalyptic violence: The seduction of terrorist subcultures. Theoretical Criminology, 8(3), 323-339.

• Israel, M. (1999, February). Hate speech and the first amendment. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 15(1), 97-110.

• Lauderdale, P., & Oliverio, A. (2005). Introduction: Critical perspectives on terrorism. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46(1-2), 3-10.

• Lee, E., & Leets, L. (2002, February). Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online: Examining its effects on adolescents. American Behavioral Scientist, 45(6), 927-957.

• Piazza, J. A. (2011, May). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 339-353.

• Sandler, T. (2011, May). New frontiers of terrorism research: An introduction. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 279-286.

• Sandler, T. (2013, August). The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock. Journal of Peace Research, 51(2), 257-271.

• Saygili, A. (2017). Crackdown: How regime stability shapes democratic responses to hostage taking terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Xx-x.

• Sen, A. (2008, January). Violence, identity and poverty. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), 5-15.

• Wade, S. J., & Reiter. D. (2007, April). Does democracy matter? Regime type and suicide terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(2), 329-348.

• Watherston, D., & Moran, J. (2003). Terrorism and mental illness: Is there a relationship? International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47(6), 698-713.