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Journal Article 10.1: Betz, D. J., & Stevens, T. (2013). Analogical reasoning and cyber security. Security Dialogue, 44(2), 147-164.

Abstract: This article is an attempt to interrogate some of the predominant forms of analogical reasoning within current cyber-security discourse, with a view to clarifying their unstated premises, major strengths and, vitally, points of conceptual failure. It seeks to improve dialogue between and across the various epistemic communities involved with cyber-security policy. As we seek to adapt to the new security realities of the information age, it is incumbent upon scholars and strategists to address the benefits of connectivity, in all its dimensions, as much as the threats it presents. Current cyber-security discourse channels us into a winner-takes-all modality that is neither desirable nor necessary in the current strategic reality.

Journal Article 10.2: McGuffin, C., & Mitchell, P. (2014). On domains: Cyber and the practice of warfare. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 69(3), 394-412.

Abstract: Cyberspace is a new and evolving realm of human interaction with specific security and defence concerns. Threats to commercial and government interests are being identified and many nations have accepted cyberspace as a domain of military of operations. While governments are investing in the development of military cyber capabilities, there are few examples of military cyber operations from which military doctrine can be developed. In order to bridge the gap between speculation and experience, the principles related to land, sea, and air forces can be used to provide a helpful reference for the cyber domain. The adoption of cyberspace as a domain has more to do with marketing than doctrinal consistency with physical domains. Until some future military cyber operations are categorized as armed attacks, there is insufficient cause to categorize cyberspace as a distinct domain.

Journal Article 10.3: Rossi de Oliveira, A., Faria, J. R., & Silva, E. C. D. (2018). Transnational Terrorism: Externalities and Coalition Formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(3), 496-528.

Abstract: We investigate how externalities and cooperation affect nations’ efforts to counter transnational terrorism activities. Our model captures three factors whose interplay determines counterterrorism (CT) efforts and terrorist activity: the size of the spillover effect, the degree of internalization of the externality, and whether nations’ CT efforts have an asymmetric or symmetric effect on the security of other nations. In our symmetric model, preemptive CT efforts and terrorist activities decrease with the size of the externality regardless of the degree of cooperation between nations. In our asymmetric model, as the externality of the “smaller” nation increases, the “larger” nations reduce their efforts, and the smaller nation reacts by increasing its own efforts. We also investigate coalition stability and show that (a) in the preemptive case, the full coalition is not stable and partial coalitions are stable for sufficiently small externalities; and (b) in the defensive, symmetric case, only the full coalition is stable.

Journal Article 10.4: Enders, W., & Jindapon, P. (2011). On the economics of interrogation: The big 4 versus the little fish game. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 287-301.

Abstract: While military protocol requires that POWs provide only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth (the so-called Big 4), it is naive to think that all detainees, including terrorists, behave in this fashion. Instead, there is evidence that detainees partially cooperate with their captors by revealing a limited amount of valuable information during the interrogation process. Such a strategy makes it appear that the detainee is cooperative and, since interrogations can be costly, serves as a disincentive for further interrogation. In order to capture the essential differences between the two strategies, we model two different types of games between the interrogator and the detainee. Specifically, we compare the Big 4 game to a two-stage game (the Little Fish game) in which the detainee is permitted to reveal low-level information to the interrogator. We formalize both games, derive the optimal rules for each player, and show that the Big 4 game may not be optimal for either player or for the overall well‐being of the interrogating nation. As such, the Little Fish game can Pareto‐dominate the Big 4 game. Hence, it is possible that the al-Qaeda strategy of partial cooperation is superior to that used by most standing armies. We also show that the level of intensity selected by the interrogator must be balanced by such factors as the moral values of the society and recruiting potential of the terrorists versus the likelihood of obtaining important information.

Additional Articles

• Bentz, J. A., Blumenthal, D. J., & Potter, B. A. (2014). It’s all about the data: Responding to international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 70(4), 57-68.

• Byers, M. (2002). Terrorism, the use of force and international law after 11 September. International Relations, 16(2), 155-170.

• Damphousse, K. R. (2007, May). The morning after: Assessing the effect of major terrorism events on prosecution strategies and outcomes. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23(2), 174-194.

• De Goede, M. (2008, March). The politics of preemption and the war on terror in Europe. European Journal of International Relations, 14(1), 161-185.

• Epifanio, M. (2011, May). Legislative response to international terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 399-411.

• Gupta, S. (2008, March). The doctrine of pre-emptive strike: Application and implications during the administration of president George W. Bush. International Political Science Review, 29(2), 181-196.

• Innes, M. (2006, May). Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605(1), 222-241.

• Jenkins, B. (2006, September). Combating nuclear terrorism: Addressing nonstate actor motivations. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 607(1), 33-42.

• Kessler, O., & Werner, W. (2008, April). Extrajudicial killing as risk management. Security Dialogue, 39(2-3), 289-308.

• Lankford, A., & Gillespie, K. (2011, June). Rehabilitating terrorists through counter-indoctrination: Lessons learned from the Saudi Arabian program. International Criminal Justice Review, 21(2), 118-133.

• Levin, B. (May 2007). Trials for terrorists: The shifting legal landscape of the post-9/11 era. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23(2), 195-218.

• Martin, G. (2014). Zero dark squared: Does the US benefit from more special operations forces? International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 69(3), 413-421.

• McCready, D. (2007, December). When is torture right? Studies in Christian Ethics, 20(3), 383-398.

• McGarrell, E. F., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. (2007, May). Intelligence-led policing as a framework for responding to terrorism. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23(2), 142-158.

• Müllerson, R. (2005, August). Being tough on terrorism or respecting human rights: A false dilemma of authoritarian and liberal responses. American Behavioral Scientist, 48(12), 1657-1665.

• Shields, C. A., Damphousse, K. R., & Smith, B. L. (2006, August). Their day in court: Assessing guilty plea rates among terrorists. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22(3), 261-276.

• Skoll, G. R. (2008, March). Torture and the fifth amendment: Torture, the global war on terror, and constitutional values. Criminal Justice Review, 33(1), 29-47.

• Steele, B. J. (2008, June). ‘Ideals that were really never in our possession’: Torture, honor and US identity. International Relations, 22(2), 243-261.

• Stever, J. A. (2005, September). Adapting intergovernmental management to the new age of terrorism. Administration & Society, 37(4), 379-403.

• Ulfstein, G. (2003, June). Terrorism and the use of force. Security Dialogue, 34(2), 153-167.