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SAGE Journal User Guide

There Is Nothing So Theoretical as a Good Method Anthony G. Greenwald Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2012; vol. 7, 2: pp. 99-108.

Abstract

This article documents two facts that are provocative in juxtaposition. First: There is multidecade durability of theory controversies in psychology, demonstrated here in the subdisciplines of cognitive and social psychology. Second: There is a much greater frequency of Nobel science awards for contributions to method than for contributions to theory, shown here in an analysis of the last two decades of Nobel awards in physics, chemistry, and medicine. The available documentation of Nobel awards reveals two forms of method–theory synergy: (a) existing theories were often essential in enabling development of awarded methods, and (b) award-receiving methods often generated previously inconceivable data, which in turn inspired previously inconceivable theories. It is easy to find illustrations of these same synergies also in psychology. Perhaps greater recognition of the value of method in advancing theory can help to achieve resolutions of psychology’s persistent theory controversies.

Discussion questions:

1. What is confirmation bias?  According to the author, how does confirmation bias affect psychological theory development?
2. What is the method-theory synergy in psychology?  What are some examples of theory being used to develop new methods?  What are some examples of methods producing new theories?
3. What do you think is the “best” relationship between method and theory?

Much Pain, Little Gain? Paradigm-Specific Models and Methods in Experimental Psychology Thorsten Meiser  Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2011; vol. 6, 2: pp. 183-191.

Abstract

Paradigm-oriented research strategies in experimental psychology have strengths and limitations. On the one hand, experimental paradigms play a crucial epistemic and heuristic role in basic psychological research. On the other hand, empirical research is often limited to the observed effects in a certain paradigm, and theoretical models are frequently tied to the particular features of the given paradigm. A paradigm-driven research strategy therefore jeopardizes the pursuit of research questions and theoretical models that go beyond a specific paradigm. As one example of a more integrative approach, recent research on illusory and spurious correlations has attempted to overcome the limitations of paradigm-specific models in the context of biased contingency perception and social stereotyping. Last but not least, the use of statistical models for the analysis of elementary cognitive functions is a means toward a more integrative terminology and theoretical perspective across different experimental paradigms and research domains.

Discussion questions:

1. What does the author mean by “paradigm-driven research?”
2. What does the author view as the essential and dangerous roles of experimental paradigms?”
3. What do you think about the author’s conclusion that “experimental paradigms should still be taken as tools for research and not be confused with targets of research?”

Why the Cognitive Approach in Psychology Would Profit From a Functional Approach and Vice Versa Jan De Houwer Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2011; vol. 6, 2: pp. 202-209.

Abstract

Cognitively oriented psychologists often define behavioral effects in terms of mental constructs (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the formation of associations in memory) and thus effectively treat those effects as proxies for mental constructs. This practice can, however, hamper scientific progress. I argue that if psychologists would consistently define behavioral effects only in terms of the causal impact of elements in the environment (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the pairing of stimuli), they would adopt a functional approach that not only reveals the environmental causes of behavior but also optimizes cognitive research. The cognitive approach in turn strengthens the functional approach by facilitating the discovery of new causal relations between the environment and behavior. I thus propose a functional–cognitive framework for research in psychology that capitalizes on the mutually supportive nature of the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology.

Discussion questions:

1. Why does the author believe that using behavioral effects as indirect measure (“proxies of”) of mental processes is problematic?
2. What is the functional-cognitive framework that the author proposes?
3. What are the potential arguments against and limitations of the functional approach?