SAGE Journal Articles
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Abstract: When the U.S. Supreme Court extended the application of the exclusionary rule in its landmark decision Mapp v. Ohio, it was leading the way in employing the exclusionary remedy as a means to protect people’s rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The past 50 years have seen significant changes in the criminal justice landscape on the world scene. The exclusionary rule is no longer unique to American jurisprudence. The rule has been adopted by other Western countries as well. The American exclusionary rule, however, remains a unique rule in terms of its deterrence rationale and mandatory nature. No other countries have adopted a mandatory rule or rested the rule on its deterrent effect. This article discusses the operation of the exclusionary rule in four other countries and provides a comparative analysis of the American exclusionary rule. It analyzes the problems associated with the operation of a deterrence-based mandatory rule and explores the possibility of changing the American exclusionary rule from a mandatory to a discretionary rule. The analysis takes note especially two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that signal significant changes in the application of the exclusionary rule in the United States
Journal Article #2: Turner, J. R., Hemmens, C., & Matz, A. K. (2014). Is it reasonable? A legal review of warrantless searches of probationers and parolees. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 27, 684–701.
Abstract: Probationers and parolees have a reduced expectation of privacy. In most states, they are subject to searches by their supervising probation or parole officer without prior notice or cause. However, for law enforcement officers, their ability to search a probationer or parolee can be constrained by the need to articulate probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. This legal review examines federal and state laws, providing guidance on when law enforcement officers can search probationers/parolees, and whether it requires probable cause, a reasonable suspicion, or the presence of the supervising probation/parole officer. Results of the legal review should prove especially informative for agencies engaged in multiagency partnerships.
Abstract: In a unanimous 2009 opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Fourth Amendment authorizes officers to frisk vehicle occupants during a traffic stop if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. Situations reasonably suggesting the possible presence of weapons by any or all seized persons during legitimate traffic stops now affirmatively allow an immediate show of authority to neutralize the potential danger. The decision resulted from the court’s balancing interests under the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The nature and extent of the passenger’s privacy interest in bodily integrity was weighed against the government’s interest in officer safety. Officer safety trumped passenger privacy. Although there are those who would claim that the current decision is but another step toward dissipating the Bill of Rights provision as it relates to matters involving the automobile, the decision is more of an evolution than an outright abandonment (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 1971). The Fourth Amendment mandates that all searches and seizure be reasonable. This article discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment law as it relates to frisks involving vehicles and its occupants. This research traces the evolution of these frisks from its earliest roots under Carroll v. United States (1925), to its inception under Terry v. Ohio (1968) and finally, to the most recent decision, Arizona v. Johnson (2009). Society’s privacy interests and police officers’ safety interests are explored from a practical and workable context such that an appropriate balance of conduct may result when conducting legitimate traffic encounters.