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Article 1: Okamura, K. (2015). Dynamic Development of Public Attitudes Towards Science Policymaking. Public Understanding of Science, 25(4), 465-479.

Abstract: Understanding the heterogeneity of mechanisms that form public attitudes towards science and technology policymaking is essential to the establishment of an effective public engagement platform. Using the 2011 public opinion survey data from Japan (n = 6,136), I divided the general public into three categories: the Attentive public, who are willing to actively engage with science and technology policymaking dialogue; the Interested public, who have moderate interest in science and technology but rely on experts for policy decisions; and the Residual public, who have minimal interest in science and technology. On the basis of the results of multivariate regression analysis, I have identified several key predispositions towards science and technology and other socio-demographic characteristics that influence the shift of individuals from one category of the general public to another. The findings provide a foundation for understanding how to induce more accountable, evidence-based science and technology policymaking.

Article 2: Victor, J. N. (2007). Strategic Lobbying: Demonstrating How Legislative Context Affects Interest Groups’ Lobbying Tactics. American Politics Research, 35(6), 826-845.

Abstract: Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying.