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Journal Article 10.1: Kornell, N., & Bjork, R. A. (2008). Learning concepts and categories: Is spacing the “Enemy of Induction”? Psychological Science, 19(6), 585-592.

Abstract: Inductive learning--that is, learning a new concept or category by observing exemplars--happens constantly, for example, when a baby learns a new word or a doctor classifies x-rays. What influence does the spacing of exemplars have on induction? Compared with massing, spacing enhances long-term recall, but we expected spacing to hamper induction by making the commonalities that define a concept or category less apparent. We asked participants to study multiple paintings by different artists, with a given artist’s paintings presented consecutively (massed) or interleaved with other artists’ paintings (spaced). We then tested induction by asking participants to indicate which studied artist (Experiments 1a and 1b) or whether any studied artist (Experiment 2) painted each of a series of new paintings. Surprisingly, induction profited from spacing, even though massing apparently created a sense of fluent learning: Participants rated massing as more effective than spacing, even after their own test performance had demonstrated the opposite.

Journal Article 10.2: Hampton, J. A. (2012). Thinking intuitively: The rich (and at times illogical) world of concepts. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(6), 398-402.

Abstract: Intuitive knowledge of the world involves knowing what kinds of things have which properties. We express this knowledge in generalities, such as “Ducks lay eggs.” Intuitive knowledge contrasts with extensional knowledge about actual entities in the world, which we express in quantified statements, such as “All U.S. presidents are male.” Reasoning based on this intuitive knowledge, while highly fluent and plausible, may in fact lead us into logical fallacy. Several lines of research have pointed to conceptual memory as the source of such logical failure. We represent concepts with prototypical properties, rather than with logical definitions, and we judge likelihood and argument strength on the basis of similarity between these prototypes instead of using correct notions of probability or logical inference. Evidence that our minds represent the world in this intuitive way can be seen in a range of phenomena, including people’s interpretations of logical connectives applied to everyday concepts, the effects of creativity and emergent features in conceptual combination, and the logically inconsistent beliefs that people express in their everyday language.

Journal Article 10.3: Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Cognitive and neural contributions to understanding the conceptual system. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(2), 91-95.

Abstract: The conceptual system contains categorical knowledge about experience that supports the spectrum of cognitive processes. Cognitive science theories assume that categorical knowledge resides in a modular and amodal semantic memory, whereas neuroscience theories assume that categorical knowledge is grounded in the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and affect. Neuroscience has influenced theories of the conceptual system by stressing principles of neural processing in neural networks and by motivating grounded theories of cognition, which propose that simulations of experience represent knowledge. Cognitive science has influenced theories of the conceptual system by documenting conceptual phenomena and symbolic operations that must be grounded in the brain. Significant progress in understanding the conceptual system is most likely to occur if cognitive and neural approaches achieve successful integration.