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Journal Article 4.1: Gau, J. M. (2013, November). Consent searches as a threat to procedural justice and police legitimacy: An analysis of consent requests during traffic stops. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 24(6), 759-777.

Abstract: Consent searches during traffic stops offer police a way to expediently check motorists’ vehicles for contraband. Asking drivers for consent to search their vehicles, however, may cause them to feel negatively about the encounter and, consequently, to question officers’ motives for pulling them over. The present study analyzes stopped motorists’ reactions to consent requests; specifically, consent requests are theorized to damage these individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice and, moreover, of the legitimacy of the stop itself. Logistic regression analyses of a nationally representative sample support these hypotheses. Policy implications include the need for judicious use of consent searches, as they appear to be a form of procedural injustice that erodes police legitimacy.

Journal Article 4.2: Ross, D. L., & Myers, J. J. (2010, September). Recent legal developments: Maryland v. Shatzer: Revisiting reinterviewing after invoking Miranda’s right to counsel. Criminal Justice Review, 35(3), 371-385.

Abstract: A unanimous Supreme Court modified its previously strict holding forbidding reinterviewing a suspect after he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. An initial request for an attorney no longer means that police can never reinitiate questioning. Questioning may be resumed when a suspect has returned to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation. Once a break in custody occurs that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects, it is permissible for detectives to reapproach suspects to inquire whether there is a change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel. Adequate breaks in custody suitably attenuate the inherently compelling and coercive pressures that existed during the original custodial interrogation. This decision militates against the finite Edwards presumption of an involuntary waiver of rights.