SAGE Journal Articles

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Journal Article 8.1: Kriner, D. L. (2018). Congress, public opinion, and an informal constraint on the commander-in-chief. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20, 52–68.

Abstract: US presidents have routinely ordered the use of force without seeking prior authorization from Congress. However, this practice does not mean that the legislature is irrelevant, as Congress often influences decisions by exercising informal political levers. One of the most important is through Congress’ ability to affect popular support for the commander-in-chief. Through a pair of experiments embedded on nationally representative opinion surveys, this article evaluates whether Congress’ constitutional prerogatives in war powers remain relevant when battling the president in the public sphere. Policy criticism significantly decreased support for the use of force, as did challenges to administration actions on constitutional grounds. Although Congress routinely fails to use the constitutional tools at its disposal to check the commander-in-chief, these powers bolster Congress’ capacity to influence public opinion. Hence, while presidents enjoy considerable leeway in the military arena, Congress’ capacity to erode public support can serve as a check on presidential power.

Journal Article 8.2: Teten, R. L. (December 2007). “We the people” The “modern” rhetorical popular address of the presidents during the founding period. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 669-682.

Abstract: This article examines the usage of popular address rhetoric within all the State of the Union Addresses to determine whether presidents have consistently used this rhetorical tool, or whether the introduction of going public is indeed a “modern” development that was little used in the rhetorical past of the presidency. By looking at instances in which the president identifies himself with the people, Congress, or as president, the author finds that many formerly “traditional” presidents exhibit “modern” tendencies, which suggests inconsistencies with the “traditional/modern” divide that is a commonly utilized paradigm in presidential study.

Journal Article 8.3: Whitford, A. B. & Ochs, H. L. (November 2006). The political roots of executive clemency. American Politics Research, 34, 825-846.

Abstract: It is widespread conventional wisdom that presidential pardons—the only way for offenders to remove or eliminate all disabilities that arise from a federal or military offense—are political. We move beyond this belief and assess five broad ways that federal pardons may be systematically influenced by the policy agendas present in a separated powers system. We model the aggregate dispensation of clemency appeals (requests for pardons) using Prais-Winsten regression and find that the probability of denials for executive clemency reflects the president’s own agenda and ideological position, congressional attention to criminal justice issues, and the homicide rate. In sum, both policy signals and the political processes they signify permeate the presidential pardons process.

Journal Article 8.4: Deering, C. J. & Maltzman, F. (December 1999). The politics of executive orders: Legislative constraints on presidential power. Political Research Quarterly, 52, 767-783.

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that Presidents use executive orders, sometimes characterized as presidential legislation, when legislation is too difficult to pass (in the face of an opposition Congress, for example) or when executive departments or agencies tend to embrace their congressional patrons, rather than the White House. According to this model, executive orders are strategic instruments used by a President to circumvent the constitutionally prescribed policymaking process. Recently studies have found little systematic evidence that executive orders are used to circumvent a hostile Congress. We argue that strategic Presidents do use executive orders to circumvent a hostile Congress, but not if they are likely to be overtumed by Congress. In other words, the use of executive orders reflects both their ability to achieve and to maintain preferred changes to the policy status quo. We test this portrait of presidential decision-making by examining determinants of the annual variation in the number of executive orders issued during the post-World War II period.