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Journal Article 13.1: Makse, T. (2017). A very particular set of skills: Former legislator traits and revolving door lobbying in congress. American Politics Research, 45, 866–886.

Abstract: In recent decades, observers of Congress have devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby members of Congress and staffers go on to careers in lobbying. This practice raises a number of normative concerns that are perhaps most heightened when it comes to the lobbying activities of members of Congress themselves. In this article, I examine the factors determining which former members go through the revolving door, and find that members with central network positions and highly effective legislators are more likely to become lobbyists. I then examine the extent to which members-turned-lobbyists have an impact on bills in Congress. I find evidence that lobbying by former members increases a bill’s probability of progressing and some evidence that highly effective legislators also go on to become more effective lobbyists. Taken together, these findings support conventional wisdom that former members become some of the most influential lobbyists.

Journal Article 13.2: Ozymy, J. (January 2013). Keepin' on the sunny side: Scandals, organized interests, and the passage of legislative lobbying laws in the American states. American Politics Research, 41, 3-23.

Abstract: Political Scientists have widely explored why legislatures pass campaign finance regulations and how these laws condition the influence of organized interests over elected officials. Studies have not explained how state houses can overcome entrenched interests, to pass more restrictive legislative lobbying laws. Interest group pressure can be overcome when routine politics are impacted by agenda-setting environments and broader state political contexts that prompt the passage of legislative lobbying reforms. Findings suggest that although moralistic political culture and political scandals set the agenda for stricter regulation, the prospects for reform are tempered by the power of organized interests in state houses.

Journal Article 13.3: Jacobson, R. D. (November 2011). The politics of belonging: Interest group identity and agenda setting on immigration. American Politics Research, 39, 993-1018.

Abstract: This article explores how interest groups decide policy positions through case studies of three organizations’ shifting stances on the issue of immigration. In all three cases, the AFL-CIO, the Sierra Club, and the Christian Coalition, issue positions are signaling mechanisms central to the construction of an organizational identity. Leadership considers the message the stance on a policy issue sends to potential constituents and allies. Organizational agendas are one tool used by leaders to craft new narratives about what the group stands for, who the group represents, and who belongs. Key determinants of leaderships’ calculation over redrawing the boundaries of inclusion and representation and what signal an issue stance will convey includes organizational strength and a reading of a shifting political terrain. An evolutionary metaphor, instead of a rational actor model, is better suited to understand this critical component of interest group behavior, agenda setting.

Journal Article 13.4: Victor, J. N. (November 2007). Strategic lobbying: Demonstrating how legislative context affects interest groups’ lobbying tactics. American Politics Research, 35, 826-845.

Abstract: Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying.