Police accountability has two dimensions. First, efforts to hold individual officers to account. IPCC investigations into fatal incidents involving the police are good illustra­tions of this form of accountability. The second aspect of accountability relates to governance in broader terms of the direction, principles and overall performance of the police service.

Prior to the 1964 Police Act there was no systematic means for investigating com­plaints about officer conduct, and the response remained a matter for individual forces.

The international trend towards the wholly independent investigation of complaints was exemplified in the 2002 Police Reform Act, which established the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). The IPCC provisions allow for the wholly independent investigation of complaints.

Other approaches seek to develop police professional standards. Codes of ethics are developed in an effort to promote a normative framework to which officers should aspire. Emphasising ethical police performance has also been seen as a method to enhance police legitimacy and improve public confidence.

Similarly, human rights provisions have provided a framework to control police opera­tions. While citizens have the right to privacy, for example, the police can contravene this with surveillance operations, providing that these are ‘necessary’ (no alternatives are available) and ‘proportionate’ (in relation to the gravity of the matter at hand).

Police reform in the context of international development has centred around the promotion of human rights. In this context, human rights agendas have not only focused on controlling what officers are permitted to do, they also establish a range of objectives that the police are expected to secure.

The governance of British police is shared between central government, Police and Crime Commissioners, Police and Crime Panels, and Chief Constables. While Chief Constables have operational responsibility and independence, the PCCs, PCPs and central government are responsible for financial provisions and estab­lishing the policy and direction of police services.

The establishment of the office of PCC in 2012 was predicated on government claims that a system of democratic accountability (via a locally elected PCC) was replacing bureaucratic accountability through public service management.

The PCC role faces serious challenges relating to the difficulty of a single individual representing large and complex communities that might not have a coherent or consistent set of needs and demands. There might also be a danger of PCCs com­promising the operational independence of police, especially as PCCs have the power to dismiss chief officers.

Developments in the governance and accountability of the public police do not easily extend to the emerging context of plural policing. While legislation requires that private security personnel are licensed and the Security Industry Authority can inspect companies, concerns continue about the extent to which the sector more widely is accountable and effectively regulated. Certainly questions about the direction and control of the private security industry continue to be resolved by the market mechanism, which marginalises public interest and social justice questions.