Train v. City of New York

420 U.S. 35

Case Year: 1975

Case Ruling: 9-0, Affirmed

Opinion Justice: White

FACTS

The Constitution obliges the president of the United States to enforce all laws, not only those the administration supports. Although a number of presidents have been criticized for failing to carry out certain laws with sufficient enthusiasm, it would be difficult to prove that the chief executive has not satisfied the constitutional mandate of faithful execution. On rare occasions, however, a president has openly refused to execute a law validly passed by Congress. In such cases court challenges are to be expected.

What happened when Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 over President Richard Nixon’s veto is a good illustration. The act made federal money available to local governments for sewers and clean water projects. After losing the legislative battle, the president instructed the appropriate officials of his administration not to allot to local governments the full funds authorized by Congress.

New York City, which expected to be a recipient of these funds, filed suit against Russell Train, head of the Environmental Protection Agency, to force the administration to release the impounded money. In interpreting the legislation, the Supreme Court in Train v. City of New York (1975) focused on whether Congress intended to give the president discretion to determine how much of the appropriated money to allocate.

 

MR. JUSTICE WHITE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case poses certain questions concerning the proper construction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which provide a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution. Section 2 of the 1972 Act, 86 Stat. 833, in adding Title II, 201-212, to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, 33 U.S.C. 1281-1292 makes available federal financial assistance in the amount of 75% of the cost of municipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Under 207, there is “authorized to be appropriated” for these purposes “not to exceed” $5 billion dollars for fiscal year 1973, “not to exceed” $6 billion for fiscal year 1974, and “not to exceed” $7 billion for fiscal year 1975. Section 205 (a) directs that “[s]ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to [207]” for fiscal year 1973 be allotted “not later than 30 days after October 18, 1972.” The “[s]ums authorized” for the later fiscal years 1974 and 1975 “shall be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized....” From these allotted sums, 201 (g) (1) authorizes the Administrator “to make grants to any ... municipality ... for the construction of publicly owned treatment works ...,” pursuant to plans and specifications as required by 203 and meeting the other requirements of the Act, including those of 204. Section 203 (a) specifies that the Administrator’s approval of plans for a project “shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the United States for the payment of its proportional contribution to such project.”

The water pollution bill that became the 1972 Act was passed by Congress on October 4, 1972, but was vetoed by the President on October 17. Congress promptly overrode the veto. Thereupon the President, by letter dated November 22, 1972, directed the Administrator “not [to] allot among the States the maximum amounts provided by section 207” and, instead, to allot “[n]o more than $2 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1974....” On December 8, the Administrator announced by regulation that in accordance with the President’s letter he was allotting for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 “sums not to exceed $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively.”

This litigation, brought by the city of New York and similarly situated municipalities in the State of New York, followed immediately. The complaint sought judgment against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency declaring that he was obligated to allot to the States the full amounts authorized by 207 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, as well as an order directing him to make those allotments. In May 1973, the District Court denied the Administrator’s motion to dismiss and granted the cities’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “the Act requires the Administrator to allot the full sums authorized to be appropriated in 207.

Because of the differing views with respect to the proper construction of the Act between the federal courts in the District of Columbia in this case and those of the Fourth Circuit in Train v. Campaign Clean Water, we granted certiorari in both cases and heard them together. The sole issue before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the Administrator to allot to the States under 205 (a) less than the entire amounts authorized to be appropriated by 207. We hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm the Court of Appeals.

Section 205 (a) provides that the “[s]ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to [207] ... shall be allotted by the Administrator.” Section 207 authorizes the appropriation of “not to exceed” specified amounts for each of three fiscal years. The dispute in this case turns principally on the meaning of the foregoing language from the indicated sections of the Act.

The Administrator contends that 205 (a) directs the allotment of only “sums”--not “all sums”--authorized by 207 to be appropriated and that the sums that must be allotted are merely sums that do not exceed the amounts specified in 207 for each of the three fiscal years. In other words, it is argued that there is a maximum, but no minimum, no the amounts that must be allotted under 205 (a). This is necessarily the case, he insists, because the legislation, after initially passing the House and Senate in somewhat different form, was amended in Conference and the changes, which were adopted by both Houses, were intended to provide wide discretion in the Executive to control the rate of spending under the Act.

The changes relied on by the Administrator, the so-called Harsha amendments, were two. First, 205 of the House and Senate bills as they passed those Houses and went to Conference, directed that there be allotted “all sums” authorized to be appropriated by 207. The word “all” was struck in Conference. Second, 207 of the House bill authorized the appropriation of specific amounts for the three fiscal years. The Conference Committee inserted the qualifying words “not to exceed” before each of the sums so specified.

The Administrator’s arguments based on the statutory language and its legislative history are unpersuasive. Section 207 authorized appropriation of “not to exceed” a specified sum for each of the three fiscal years. If the States failed to submit projects sufficient to require obligation, and hence the appropriation, of the entire amounts authorized, or if the Administrator, exercising whatever authority the Act might have given him to deny grants, refused to obligate these total amounts, 207 would obviously permit appropriation of the lesser amounts. But if, for example, the full amount provided for 1973 was obligated by the Administrator in the course of approving plans and making grants for municipal contracts, 207 plainly “authorized” the appropriation of the entire $5 billion. If a sum of money is “authorized” to be appropriated in the future by 207, then 205 (a) directs that an amount equal to that sum be allotted. Section 207 speaks of sums authorized to be appropriated, not of sums that are required to be appropriated; and as far as 205 (a)’s requirement to allot is concerned, we see no difference between the $2 billion the President directed to be allotted for fiscal year 1973 and the $3 billion he ordered withheld. The latter sum is as much authorized to be appropriated by 207 as is the former. Both must be allotted.

It is insisted that this reading of the Act fails to give any effect to the Conference Committee’s changes in the bill. But, as already indicated, the “not to exceed” qualifying language of 207 has meaning of its own, quite apart from 205 (a), and reflects the realistic possibility that approved applications for grants from funds already allotted would not total the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated. Surely there is nothing inconsistent between authorizing “not to exceed” 5 billion for 1973 and requiring the full allotment of the 5 billion among the States. Indeed, if the entire amount authorized is ever to be appropriated, there must be approved municipal projects in that amount, and grants for those projects may only be made from allotted funds.

As for striking the word “all” from 205, if Congress intended to confer any discretion on the Executive to withhold funds from this program at the allotment stage, it chose quite inadequate means to do so. It appears to us that the word “sums” has no different meaning and can be ascribed no different function in the context of 205 than would the words “all sums.” It is said that the changes were made to give the Executive the discretionary control over the outlay of funds for Title II programs at either stage of the process. But legislative intention, without more, is not legislation. Without something in addition to what is now before us, we cannot accept the addition of the few words to 207 and the deletion of the one word from 205 (a) as altering the entire complexion and thrust of the Act. As conceived and passed in both Houses, the legislation was intended to provide a firm commitment of substantial sums within a relatively limited period of time in an effort to achieve an early solution of what was deemed an urgent problem. We cannot believe that Congress at the last minute scuttled the entire effort by providing the Executive with the seemingly limitless power to withhold funds from allotment and obligation. Yet such was the Government’s position in the lower courts--combined with the argument that the discretion conferred is unreviewable.

The Administrator has now had second thoughts. He does not now claim that the Harsha amendments should be given such far-reaching effect. In this Court, he views 205 (a) and 207 as merely conferring discretion on the Administrator as to the timing of expenditures, not as to the ultimate amounts to be allotted and obligated. He asserts that although he may limit initial allotments in the three specified years, “the power to allot continues” and must be exercised, “until the full $18 billion has been exhausted.” It is true that this represents a major modification of the Administrator’s legal posture, but our conclusion that 205 (a) requires the allotment of sums equal to the total amounts authorized to be appropriated under 207 is not affected. In the first place, under 205 (a) the Administrator’s power to allot extends only to “sums” that are authorized to be appropriated under 207. If he later has power to allot, and must allot, the balance of the $18 billion not initially allotted in the specified years, it is only because these additional amounts are “sums” authorized by 207 to be appropriated. But if they are “sums” within the meaning of 205 (a), then that section requires that they be allotted by November 17, 1972, in the case of 1973 funds, and for 1974 and 1975 “not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized.” The November 22 letter of the President and the Administrator’s consequent withholding of authorized funds cannot be squared with the statute.

Second, even assuming an intention on the part of Congress, in the hope of forestalling a veto, to imply a power of some sort in the Executive to control outlays under the Act, there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicating that such discretion arguably granted was to be exercised at the allotment stage rather than or in addition to the obligation phase of the process. On the contrary, as we view the legislative history, the indications are that the power to control, such as it was, was to be exercised at the point where funds were obligated and not in connection with the threshold function of allotting funds to the States. The Court of Appeals carefully examined the legislative history in this respect and arrived at the same conclusion, as have most of the other courts that have dealt with the issue. We thus reject the suggestion that the conclusion we have arrived at is inconsistent with the legislative history of 205 (a) and 207.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. So ordered.