United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch

327 U.S. 546

Case Year: 1946

Case Ruling: 8-0, Reversed

Opinion Justice: Black

FACTS

In 1942, faced with pressing needs for power production during World War II, Congress authorized the building of the Fontana Dam on the Little Tennessee River in North Carolina. The dam created a twenty-nine-mile-long reservoir. Between the reservoir and the Great Smoky Mountain National Park was the forty-thousand-acre parcel of land that would become the subject of this litigation. Prior to the dam’s construction, 216 families occupied the area in question, the only convenient means of access to which was a single state highway. The reservoir, however, flooded most of the thoroughfare, leaving the area practically isolated.

Solving the problems caused by the flooding involved the interests of several parties. Because the land was part of the watershed, the federal Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) feared that, if left in private hands, the land might be used in a way that would frustrate government objectives. The National Park Service became involved because part of the land fell within the Great Smoky Mountain Park. The state of North Carolina had an obligation to provide highway access to the area as long as the residents continued to live there. The county government had issued bonds to finance the building of the highway, and those bonds had not yet been paid off. Building a new road would be financially difficult, and the critical expertise and manpower needed to do so were not available due to the demands of the war.

After eighteen months of negotiations, North Carolina government officials, the TVA, the National Park Service, and the county agreed to a plan. The TVA agreed to acquire all of the affected property by purchase or condemnation, thus relieving North Carolina of having to provide road access. North Carolina would contribute $100,000 to finance this effort. The county would be paid $400,000 to retire the outstanding highway bonds. Ownership of the land would be transferred to the National Park Service to be included in the Great Smoky Mountain Park, with the provision that the TVA would retain the authority to carry out necessary program activities on the land. The total cost of this plan would be considerably less than that of building a new road to replace the flooded one.

Most of the landowners agreed to the plan and received compensation for selling their property to the government. However, six landowners, including Columbus Welch, refused to sell. The federal government, on behalf of the TVA, sued to condemn and acquire the six parcels. The landowners claimed that the government had authority only to take private property that was needed for the actual construction of the dam, that it lacked authority under the law to take property that was not flooded or otherwise needed for the building of the dam. The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the landowners.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use and that the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority. It is true that this Court did say in City of Cincinnati v. Vester that ‘It is well established that, in considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the question what is a public use is a judicial one.’ But the Court’s judgment in that case denied the power to condemn ‘excess’ property on the ground that the state law had not authorized it. And in Hairston v. Danville & Western Railway, this Court, referring to the ‘rule’ later stated in the Vester case, said that ‘No case is recalled where this court has condemned, as a violation of the 14th Amendment, a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws.’ And see Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co. But whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what is a ‘public use’ in Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court has said that when Congress has spoken on this subject ‘Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.’ Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States. Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields. We hold that the T.V.A. took the tracts here involved for a public purpose, if, as we think is the case, Congress authorized the Authority to acquire, hold, and use the lands to carry out the purposes of the T.V.A. Act.

In passing upon the authority of the T.V.A. we would do violence to fact were we to break one inseparable transaction into separate units. We view the entire transaction as a single integrated effort on the part of T.V.A. to carry on its Congressionally authorized functions. And we find not only that Congress authorized the Authority’s action, but also that the T.V.A. has proceeded in complete accord with the Congressional policy embodied in the Act. That Act does far more than authorize the T.V.A. to build isolated dams. The broad responsibilities placed on the Authority relate to navigability, flood control, reforestation, marginal lands, and agricultural and industrial development of the whole Tennessee Valley. The T.V.A. was empowered to make contracts, purchase and sell property deemed necessary or convenient in the transaction of its business, and to build dams, reservoirs, transmission lines, power houses, and other structures. It was particularly admonished to cooperate with other governmental agencies--federal, state, and local--specifically in relation to the problem of ‘readjustment of the population displaced by the construction of dams, the acquisition of reservoir areas, the protection of watersheds, the acquisitions of rights-of-way, and other necessary acquisitions of land, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.’ All of the Authority’s actions in these respects were to be directed towards ‘development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the development consequent to this Act ... all for the general purpose of fostering an orderly and proper physical, economic, and social development of said areas.’ To discharge its responsibilities the T.V.A. was granted ‘such powers as may be necessary or appropriate’ for their exercise. Section 4(h) of the Act gives the T.V.A. the very broad power to ‘exercise the right of eminent domain.’ Section 4(i) of the Act empowers the Authority to condemn certain specified types of property and concludes by referring to ‘all property that it (the Authority) deems necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act.’ To make clear beyond any doubt the T.V.A.’s broad power, Congress in Section 25 authorized the Authority to file proceedings, such as the ones before us, ‘for the acquisition by condemnation of any lands, easements, or rights of way which, in the opinion of the Corporation, are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.’

All of these provisions show a clear Congressional purpose to grant the Authority all the power needed to acquire lands by purchase or by condemnation which it deems necessary for carrying out the Act’s purposes. These proceedings were preceded by a T.V.A. resolution that it did deem these acquisitions necessary for such purposes. Despite Congress’ clear expression of its purpose to grant broad condemnation power to T.V.A. we are asked to hold that the Authority’s power is less than the powers to condemn granted other governmental agencies, which under 40 U.S.C. 257, 40 U.S.C.A. 257 have been held to have a power to condemn coextensive with their power to purchase. Neither the fact that the authority wanted to prevent a waste of government funds, nor that it intended to cooperate with the National Park Commission detracted from its power to condemn granted by the Act. The cost of public projects is a relevant element in all of them, and the government, just as anyone else, is not required to proceed oblivious to elements of cost. And when serious problems are created by its public projects, the Government is not barred from making a common sense adjustment in the interest of all the public. Where public need requires acquisition of property, that need is not to be denied because of an individual’s unwillingness to sell. When the need arises individuals may be required to relinquish ownership of property so long as they are given that just compensation which the Constitution requires. Such compensation can be awarded these respondents by the District Court. Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE REED, CONCURRING.

I agree that the TVA has authority to condemn the tracts of land which the Authority seeks to acquire by these proceedings….

I do not join in the opinion of the Court because of certain language … which implies to me that there is no judicial review of the Authority’s determination that acquisition of these isolated pieces of private property is within the purposes of the TVA Act. The Court seems to accept the Authority’s argument that a good faith determination by it that property is necessary for the purposes of the Act bars judicial review as to whether the proposed use will be within the statutory limits. This argument of lack of judicial power properly was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals although, as explained above, I think that court erroneously held that the TVA Act did not authorize these condemnations. It is my opinion that the TVA is a creature of its statute and bound by the terms of that statute, and that its every act may be tested judicially, by any party with standing to do so, to determine whether it moves within the authority granted to it by Congress.

This taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or is not is a judicial question. Of course, the legislative or administrative determination has great weight but the constitutional doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be unduly restricted if an administrative agency could invoke a so-called political power so as to immunize its action against judicial examination in contests betweenthe agency and the citizen. The former cases go no further than this....

THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins in this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER CONCURRING.

I join in the opinion of the Court for I do not read it as does my brother REED. The Bill of Rights provides that private property shall not ‘be taken for public use, without compensation.’ U.S. Const. Amend. V. This Court has never deviated from the view that under the Constitution a claim that a taking is not ‘for public use’ is open for judicial consideration, ultimately by this Court. It is equally true that in the numerous cases in which the issue was adjudicated, this Court never found that the legislative determination that the use was ‘public’ exceeded Constitutional bounds. But the fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting. All the cases cited in the Court’s opinion sustaining a taking recognize and accept the power of judicial review. I assume that in citing these cases the Court again recognizes the doctrine that whether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence.