Mayor of New York v. Miln

36 U.S. 102

Case Year: 1837

Case Ruling: 6-1

Opinion Justice: Barbour

FACTS

Alarmed about a growing influx of immigrants arriving on its shore, the city of New York in 1924 passed a law regulating ships bringing people into the port of New York. The goal was to reduce the number of ill and destitute people entering the state who would soon need public assistance. The law required that shipmasters file a sworn statement with the mayor of New York listing the name, place of origin, age, and occupation of every individual transported into the city. A $75 fine was imposed on every person not listed or for whom false information was submitted. The law also authorized the mayor to require the owners of such vessels to be responsible for up to $300 per person for costs to the city if any passengers went on public assistance within two years of arrival in New York. Furthermore, it required the master of the vessel to return to their place of origin any noncitizen passengers declared by the mayor to be likely to go on public welfare. Finally, all immigrants were to report to the mayor within twenty-four hours of arrival in New York and to provide personal information as well as the name of the vessel bringing them into the city and the identity of the ship’s master.

George Miln owned the ship the Emily, for which William Thompson was master. In August 1929 Thompson sailed theEmily into New York carrying one hundred passengers, for which he failed to make the required report to the mayor. The city took action against the owner, Miln, requesting payment of $15,000 in fines for noncompliance. Miln argued in response that the regulation was unconstitutional because it infringed on the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce.

Because its judges were divided, the circuit court was unable to reach a decision on the case and certified it to the U.S. Supreme Court, which first considered it in the last days of John Marshall. The justices were not able to reach a decision, and the case was scheduled to be argued again the next year. By that time, however, Marshall had died and Roger Taney had assumed the chief justiceship.

 

BARBOUR, JUSTICE, DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is contended by the counsel for the defendant, that the act in question is a regulation of commerce; that the power to regulate commerce is, by the constitution of the United States, granted to congress; that this power is exclusive, and that consequently, the act is a violation of the constitution of the United States....

We shall not enter into any examination of the question, whether the power to regulate commerce, be or be not exclusive of the states, because the opinion which we have formed renders it unnecessary: in other words, we are of opinion, that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus considered, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the states....

If, as we think, it be a regulation, not of commerce, but police; then it is not taken from the states. To decide this, let us examine its purpose, the end to be attained, and the means of its attainment. It is apparent, from the whole scope of the law, that the object of the legislature was, to prevent New York from being burdened by an influx of persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign countries, or from any other of the states; and for that purpose, a report was required of the names, places of birth, &c., of all passengers, that the necessary steps might be taken by the city authorities, to prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers. Now, we hold, that both the end and the means here used, are within the competency of the states, since a portion of their powers were surrendered to the federal government. Let us see, what powers are left with the states. The Federalist, No 45, speaking of this subject, says, the powers reserved to the several states, all extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the state. And this court, in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden[1824]..., in speaking of the inspection laws of the states, say, they form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general government, all which can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, and those which respect turnpike-roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.

... If we look at the place of [the law’s] operation, we find it to be within the territory, and therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York. If we look at the person on whom it operates, he is found within the same territory and jurisdiction. If we look at the persons for whose benefit it was passed, they are the people of New York, for whose protection and welfare the legislature of that state are authorized and in duty bound to provide. If we turn our attention to the purpose to be attained, it is to secure that very protection, and to provide for that very welfare. If we examine the means by which these ends are proposed to be accomplished, they bear a just, natural and appropriate relation to those ends....

There is ... no collision between the law in question, and the acts of congress ... ; and therefore, if the state law were to be considered as partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation; it would stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny, if tried by the standard laid down in the reasoning of the court, quoted from the case of Gibbons v. Ogden.

But we do not place our opinion on this ground. We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we consider impregnable positions. They are these: That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified and exclusive.

We are aware, that it is at all times difficult to define any subject with proper precision and accuracy; if this be so in general, it is emphatically so, in relation to a subject so diversified and multifarious as the one which we are now considering. If we were to attempt it, we should say, that every law came within this description which concerned the welfare of the whole people of a state, or any individual within it; whether it related to their rights or their duties; whether it respected them as men, or as citizens of the state; whether in their public or private relations; whether it related to the rights of persons or of property, of the whole people of a state or of any individual within it; and whose operation was within the territorial limits of the state, and upon the persons and things within its jurisdiction. But we will endeavor to illustrate our meaning rather by exemplification, than by definition. No one will deny, that a state has a right to punish any individual found within its jurisdiction, who shall have committed an offence within its jurisdiction, against its criminal laws. We speak not here of foreign ambassadors, as to whom the doctrines of public law apply. We suppose it to be equally clear, that a state has as much right to guard, by anticipation, against the commission of an offence against its laws, as to inflict punishment upon the offender, after it shall have been committed. The right to punish, or to prevent crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the party who is obnoxious to the law. The alien who shall just have set his foot upon the soil of the state, is just as subject to the operation of the law, as one who is a native citizen. In this very case, if either the master, or one of the crew of the Emily, or one of the passengers who were landed, had, the next hour after they came on shore, committed an offence, or indicated a disposition to do so, he would have been subject to the criminal law of New York, either by punishment for the offence committed, or by prevention from its commission, where good ground for apprehension was shown, by being required to enter into a recognisance, with surety, either to keep the peace, or be of good behavior, as the case might be; and if he failed to give it, by liability to be imprisoned in the discretion of the competent authority. Let us follow this up to its possible results. If every officer, and every seaman belonging to the Emily, had participated in the crime, they would all have been liable to arrest and punishment; although, thereby, the vessel would have been left without either commander or crew. Now, why is this? For no other reason than this, simply, that being within the territory and jurisdiction of New York, they were liable to the laws of that state, and amongst others, to its criminal laws; and this too, not only for treason, murder and other crimes of that degree of atrocity, but for the most petty offence which can be imagined.

It would have availed neither officer, seaman nor passenger, to have alleged either of these several relations in the recent voyage across the Atlantic. The short but decisive answer would have been, that we know you now only as offenders against the criminal laws of New York, and being now within her jurisdiction, you are now liable to the cognisance of those laws. Surely, the officers and seamen of the vessel have not only as much, but more, concern with navigation, than a passenger; and yet, in the case here put, any and every one of them would be held liable. There would be the same liability, and for the same reasons, on the part of the officers, seamen and passengers, to the civil process of New York, in a suit for the most trivial sum; and if, according to the laws of that state, the party might be arrested and held to bail, in the event of his failing to give it, he might be prisoned, until discharged by law. Here, then, are the officers and seamen, the very agents of navigation, liable to be arrested and imprisoned under civil process, and to arrest and punishment under the criminal law.

But the instrument of navigation, that is, the vessel, when within the jurisdiction of the state, is also liable by its laws to execution. If the state have a right to vindicate its criminal justice against the officers, seamen and passengers, who are within its jurisdiction, and also, in the administration of its civil justice, to cause process of execution to be served on the body of the very agents of navigation, and also on the instrument of navigation, under which it may be sold, because they are within its jurisdiction and subject to its laws; the same reasons, precisely, equally subject the master, in the case before the court, to liability for failure to comply with the requisitions of the section of the statute sued upon. Each of these laws depends upon the same principle for its support; and that is, that it was passed by the state of New York, by virtue of her power to enact such laws for internal policy as it deemed best; which laws operate upon the persons and things within her territorial limits, and therefore, within her jurisdiction.

Now, in relation to the section in the act immediately before us, that is obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries, without possessing the means of supporting themselves. There can be no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be more appropriately exercised. New York, from her particular situation, is, perhaps, more than any other city in the Union, exposed to the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there, and the consequent danger of her citizens being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those who are poor. It is the duty of the state to protect its citizens from this evil; they have endeavored to do so, by passing, amongst other things, the section of the law in question. We should, upon principle, say that it had a right to do so....

... We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infections articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which may be laboring under an infectious disease....

We are, therefore, of opinion, and do direct it to be certified to the circuit court for the southern district of New York, that so much of the section of the act of the legislature of New York, as applies to the breaches assigned in the declaration, does not assume to regulate commerce between the port of New York and foreign ports; and that so much of said section is constitutional. We express no opinion on any other part of the act of the legislature of New York; because no question could arise in the case in relation to any part of the act, except that declared upon.

THOMPSON, JUSTICE.

It is not necessary, in this case, to fix any limits upon the legislation of congress and of the states, on this subject; or to say how far congress may, under the power to regulate commerce, control state legislation in this respect. It is enough to say, that whatever the power of congress may be, it has not been exercised so as, in any manner, to conflict with the state law; and if the mere grant of the power to congress does not necessarily imply a prohibition of the states to exercise the power, until congress assumes to exercise it, no objection, on that ground, can arise to this law. Nor is it necessary to decide, definitively, whether the provisions of this law may be considered as at all embraced within the power to regulate commerce. Under either view of the case, the law of New York, so far at least as it is drawn in question in the present suit, is entirely unobjectionable.

This law does not, in any respect, interfere with the entry of the vessel or cargo....

... The duty here imposed arises, after the master and passengers have arrived within the limits of the state, and is applied to the purely internal concerns of the state. This provision does not affect other states, nor any subject necessary for the purpose of executing any of the general powers of the government of the Union....

Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regulation of a state, than that which concerns the care and management of paupers or convicts, or any other class or description of persons that may be thrown into the country, and likely to endanger its safety, or become chargeably for their maintenance? It is not intended, by this remark, to cast any reproach upon foreigners who may arrive in this country. But if all power to guard against these mischiefs is taken away, the safety and welfare of the community may be very much endangered....

Whether ... the law of New York, so far as it is drawn in question in this case, be considered as relating purely to the police and internal government of the state, and as part of the system of poor laws in the city of New York, and in this view belonging exclusively to the legislation of the state; or whether the subject-matter of the law be considered as belonging concurrently to the state and to congress, but never having been exercised by the latter; no constitutional objection can be made to it. Although the law, as set out in the record appears to have been recently passed, 11th February 1824, yet a similar law has been in force in that state for nearly forty years; and from the references at the argument to the legislation of other states, especially those bordering on the Atlantic, similar laws exist in those states. To pronounce all such laws unconstitutional, would be productive of the most serious and alarming consequences; and ought not to be done, unless demanded by the most clear and unquestioned construction of the constitution....

BALDWIN, JUSTICE.

It may ... be taken as an established rule of constitutional law, that whenever anything which is the subject of foreign commerce, is brought within the jurisdiction of a state, it becomes subject to taxation and regulation by the laws of a state, so far as is necessary for enforcing the inspection and all analogous laws, which are a part of its internal police. And as these laws are passed, in virtue of an original inherent right in the people of each state, to an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction and legislative power, which the constitution has neither granted to the general government, nor prohibited to the states, the authority of these laws is supreme, and incapable of any limitation or control by congress. In the emphatic language of this court, this power ‘ adheres to the territory of the state, as a portion of sovereignty not yet given away.’ It is a part of its soil, of both of which the state is tenant in fee, till she makes an alienation....

...The law in question encroaches on no power of congress, it imposes no tax for any purpose; it is a measure necessary for the protection of the people of a state against taxation for the support of paupers from abroad, or from other states, which congress have no power to impose by direct assessment, or as a consequence of their power over commerce. The constitutional restraints on state laws, which bear on imports, exports or tonnage, were intended, and are applicable only to cases where they would injuriously affect the regulations of commerce prescribed by congress; not the execution of inspection or analogous laws, with which the constitution interferes no further, than to prevent them from being perverted to the raising money for the use of the state, and subjecting them to the revision and control of congress. In this view of the respective powers of the general and state governments, they operate without any collision. Commerce is unrestricted by any state laws, which assume the obstruction of navigation by any vessels authorized by law to navigate from state to state, or from foreign ports to those of a state, whether to transport goods or passengers. Imported articles remain undisturbed, under the protection of congress, after they are landed, until by a package sale they become incorporated into the common mass of property within a state, subject to its powers of taxation and general jurisdiction. But neither vessels nor goods are protected from the operation of those laws and regulations of internal police, over which the states have an acknowledged power, unaffected by any grant or prohibition which impairs its plenitude; the consequence of which is, congress have no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, can pass no laws for its regulation, nor make any exemption from their provisions.

... Poor laws are analogous to health, quarantine and inspection laws, all being parts of a system of internal police, to prevent the introduction of what is dangerous to the safety or health of the people; and health and quarantine laws extend to the vessel, the cargo and passengers. Laws excluding convicts and paupers are as necessary to preserve the morals of the people from corruption, and their property from taxation, as any laws of the other description can be; nor do they interfere any further with the regulations of commerce.... If the principle on which health and quarantine laws are sustained, is applied to this case, the validity of the law in question is not to be doubted....

If it be doubtful whether the power is granted, prohibited or reserved, then, by the settled rules and course of this court, its decision must be in favor of the validity of the state law. That such a course of decision is called for by the highest considerations, no one can doubt; in a complicated system of government like ours, in which the powers of legislation by state and federal government are defined by written constitutions, ordained by the same people, the great object to be effected in their exposition, is harmony in their movements. If a plain collision arises, the subordinate law must yield to that which is paramount; but this collision must not be sought by the exercise of ingenuity or refinement of reasoning; it ought to be avoided, whenever reason or authority will authorize such a construction of a law.... While this remains, as it has been the governing rule of this court, its opinions will be respected, its judgments will control public opinion, and tend to give perpetuity to the institutions of the country. But if state laws are adjudged void, on slight or doubtful grounds, when they are not manifestly repugnant to the constitution, there is great reason to fear, that the people, or the legislatures of the states, may feel it necessary to provide some additional protection to their reserved powers, remove some of the restrictions on their exercise, and abridge those delegated to congress.

STORY, JUSTICE. (DISSENTING.)

I admit, in the most unhesitating manner, that the states have a right to pass health laws and quarantine laws, and other police laws, not contravening the laws of congress rightfully passed under their constitutional authority. I admit, that they have a right to pass poor-laws, and laws to prevent the introduction of paupers into the state, under the like qualifications. I go further, and admit, that in the exercise of their legitimate authority over any particular subject, the states may generally use the same means which are used by congress, if these means are suitable to the end. But I cannot admit, that the states have authority to enact laws, which act upon subjects beyond their territorial limits, or within those limits and which trench upon the authority of congress in its power to regulate commerce. It was said by this court, in the case of Brown v. State of Maryland that even the acknowledged power of taxation by a state cannot be so exercised as to interfere with any regulation of commerce by congress....

... The power given to congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states, has been deemed exclusive, from the nature and objects of the power, and the necessary implications growing out of its exercise. Full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the whole power, and leaves no residuum; and a grant of the whole to one, is incompatible with a grant to another of a part. When a state proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the states, it is doing the very thing which congress is authorized to do. Gibbons v. Ogden. And it has been remarked, with great cogency and accuracy, that the regulation of a subject indicates and designates the entire result; applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those parts which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that upon which it has operated. Gibbons v. Ogden....

... [C]ongress, by its legislation, has, in fact, authorized not only the transportation but the introduction of passengers into the country. The act of New York imposes restraints and burdens upon this right of transportation and introduction. It goes even further, and authorizes the removal of passengers, under certain circumstances, out of the state, and at the expense of the master and owner in whose ship they have been introduced; and this, though they are citizens of the United States, and were brought from other states. Now, if this act be constitutional to this extent, it will justify the states in regulating, controlling, and, in effect, interdicting the transportation of passengers from one state to another, in steamboats and packets. They may levy a tax upon all such passengers; they may require bonds from the master, that no such passengers shall become chargeable to the state; they may require such passengers to give bonds, that they shall not become so chargeable; they may authorize the immediate removal of such passengers back to the place from which they came. These would be most burdensome and inconvenient regulations respecting passengers, and would entirely defeat the object of congress in licensing the trade or business....

Such is a brief view of the grounds upon which my judgment is, that the act of New York is unconstitutional and void. In this opinion, I have the consolation to know, that I had the entire concurrence, upon the same grounds, of that great constitutional jurist, the late MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL. Having heard the former arguments, his deliberate opinion was, that the act of New York was unconstitutional; and that the present case fell directly within the principles established in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden and Brown v. State of Maryland....