United States v. Comstock (2010)

560 U.S. 126

Case Year: 2010

Case Ruling: 7-2, Reversed

Opinion Justice: Breyer

FACTS

18 U.S.C. §4248, a federal law, allows district courts to order the civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released. The government started a civil-commitment proceeding under §4248 against Graydon Earl Comstock. He and several other respondents moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded its powers under the necessary and proper clause.

 

JUSTICE BREYER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT

A federal civil-commitment statute authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released. We have previously examined similar statutes enacted under state law to determine whether they violate the Due Process Clause. See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997). But this case presents a different question. Here we ask whether the Federal Government has the authority under Article I of the Constitution to enact this federal civil-commitment program or whether its doing so falls beyond the reach of a government “of enumerated powers.” McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). We conclude that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact §4248 as “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the powers “vested by” the “Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 18.

. . . [T]he Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation. Nearly 200 years ago, this Court stated that the Federal "[G]overnment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers," McCulloch [v. Maryland(1819)], which means that "[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of" those powers, United States v. Morrison (2000). But, at the same time, "a government, entrusted with such" powers "must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution." McCulloch. Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution's grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are "convenient, or useful" or "conducive" to the authority's "beneficial exercise." Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the word "necessary" does not mean "absolutely necessary." In language that has come to define the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he wrote:

"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch.

We have since made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. . . .

We have also recognized that the Constitution "addresse[s]" the "choice of means"

"primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone." Burroughs v. United States (1934).

Thus, the Constitution, which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of federal crimes beyond those related to "counterfeiting," "treason," or "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas" or "against the Law of Nations," Art. I, §8, cls. 6, 10; Art. III, §3, nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to create such crimes. And Congress routinely exercises its authority to enact criminal laws in furtherance of, for example, its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to enforce civil rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to establish post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so forth. Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 3, 4, 7, 9; Amdts. 13–15. . . .

Neither Congress' power to criminalize conduct, nor its power to imprison individuals who engage in that conduct, nor its power to enact laws governing prisons and prisoners, is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. But Congress nonetheless possesses broad authority to do each of those things in the course of "carrying into Execution" the enumerated powers "vested by" the "Constitution in the Government of the United States," Art. I, §8, cl. 18—authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Second, the civil-commitment statute before us constitutes a modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed for many decades. . . . Congress has long been involved in the delivery of mental health care to federal prisoners, and has long provided for their civil commitment. . . . In 2006, Congress enacted the particular statute before us[,] §4248. It differs from earlier statutes in that it focuses directly upon persons who, due to a mental illness, are sexually dangerous. Notably, many of these individuals were likely already subject to civil commitment under §4246, which, since 1949, has authorized the postsentence detention of federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness and who are thereby dangerous (whether sexually or otherwise). Aside from its specific focus on sexually dangerous persons, §4248 is similar to the provisions first enacted in 1949. In that respect, it is a modest addition to a longstanding federal statutory framework, which has been in place since 1855.

Third, Congress reasonably extended its longstanding civil-commitment system to cover mentally ill and sexually dangerous persons who are already in federal custody, even if doing so detains them beyond the termination of their criminal sentence. For one thing, the Federal Government is the custodian of its prisoners. As federal custodian, it has the constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the danger federal prisoners may pose. Indeed, at common law, one "who takes charge of a third person" is "under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control" that person to prevent him from causing reasonably foreseeable "bodily harm to others." Restatement (Second) of Torts §319. If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable disease that threatens others, surely it would be "necessary and proper" for the Federal Government to take action, pursuant to its role as federal custodian, to refuse (at least until the threat diminishes) to release that individual among the general public, where he might infect others. And if confinement of such an individual is a "necessary and proper" thing to do, then how could it not be similarly "necessary and proper" to confine an individual whose mental illness threatens others to the same degree?

Moreover, §4248 is "reasonably adapted," to Congress' power to act as a responsible federal custodian (a power that rests, in turn, upon federal criminal statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally enumerated authority). Congress could have reasonably concluded that federal inmates who suffer from a mental illness that causes them to "have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct," §4247(a)(6), would pose an especially high danger to the public if released. And Congress could also have reasonably concluded (as detailed in the Judicial Conference's report) that a reasonable number of such individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody, in part because the Federal Government itself severed their claim to "legal residence in any State" by incarcerating them in remote federal prisons. Here Congress' desire to address the specific challenges identified in the Reports cited above, taken together with its responsibilities as a federal custodian, supports the conclusion that §4248 satisfies "review for means-end rationality,"i.e., that it satisfies the Constitution's insistence that a federal statute represent a rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority.

Fourth, the statute properly accounts for state interests. Respondents and the dissent contend that §4248 violates the Tenth Amendment because it "invades the province of state sovereignty" in an area typically left to state control. New York v. United States (1992). But the Tenth Amendment's text is clear: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The powers "delegated to the United States by the Constitution" include those specifically enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the implementation authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Virtually by definition, these powers are not powers that the Constitution "reserved to the States." . . .

Fifth, the links between §4248 and an enumerated Article I power are not too attenuated. Neither is the statutory provision too sweeping in its scope . . . as Chief Justice Marshall recognized in McCulloch,

"the power 'to establish post offices and post roads' . . . is executed by the single act of making the establishment. . . . [F]rom this has been inferred the power and duty ofcarrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to another. And, from thisimplied power, has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail." . . .

Our necessary and proper jurisprudence contains multiple examples of similar reasoning. . . .

Indeed even the dissent acknowledges that Congress has the implied power to criminalize any conduct that might interfere with the exercise of an enumerated power, and also the additional power to imprison people who violate those (inferentially authorized) laws, and the additional power to provide for the safe and reasonable management of those prisons, and the additional power to regulate the prisoners' behavior even after their release. . . .

Nor need we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general "police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States." As the Solicitor General repeatedly confirmed at oral argument, §4248 is narrow in scope. It has been applied to only a small fraction of federal prisoners. And its reach is limited to individuals already "in the custody of the" Federal Government.

The Framers demonstrated considerable foresight in drafting a Constitution capable of such resilience through time. As Chief Justice Marshall observed nearly 200 years ago, the Necessary and Proper Clause is part of "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch. . . .

Taken together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the statute is a "necessary and proper" means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others. The Constitution consequently authorizes Congress to enact the statute.

[reversed]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

Respondents argue that congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause can be no more than one step removed from an enumerated power. This is incorrect. When the inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient links to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the chain.

Concluding that a relation can be put into a verbal formulation that fits somewhere along a causal chain of federal powers is merely the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional inquiry. The inferences must be controlled by some limitations lest, as Thomas Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable game of "this is the house that Jack built."

This separate writing serves two purposes. The first is to withhold assent from certain statements and propositions of the Court's opinion. The second is to caution that the Constitution does require the invalidation of congressional attempts to extend federal powers in some instances.

The Court concludes that, when determining whether Congress has the authority to enact a specific law under the Necessary and Proper Clause, we look "to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power." . . .

The terms "rationally related" and "rational basis" must be employed with care, particularly if either is to be used as a stand-alone test. The phrase "rational basis" most often is employed to describe the standard for determining whether legislation that does not proscribe fundamental liberties nonetheless violates the Due Process Clause. . . .

The operative constitutional provision in this case is the Necessary and Proper Clause. This Court has not held that the [Williamson v.] Lee Optical [(1955)] test, asking if "it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct" an evil, is the proper test in this context. Rather, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, application of a "rational basis" test should be at least as exacting as it has been in the Commerce Clause cases, if not more so. . . . The rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration. While undoubtedly deferential, this may well be different from the rational-basis test as Lee Optical described it. . . .

A separate concern stems from the Court's explanation of the Tenth Amendment. . . .

The opinion of the Court should not be interpreted to hold that the only, or even the principal, constraints on the exercise of congressional power are the Constitution's express prohibitions. The Court's discussion of the Tenth Amendment invites the inference that restrictions flowing from the federal system are of no import when defining the limits of the National Government's power, as it proceeds by first asking whether the power is within the National Government's reach, and if so it discards federalism concerns entirely.

These remarks explain why the Court ignores important limitations stemming from federalism principles. Those principles are essential to an understanding of the function and province of the States in our constitutional structure. . . .

With these observations, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

JUSTICE ALITO, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

I am concerned about the breadth of the Court's language and the ambiguity of the standard that the Court applies, but I am persuaded, on narrow grounds, that it was "necessary and proper" for Congress to enact the statute at issue in this case, in order to "carr[y] into Execution" powers specifically conferred on Congress by the Constitution, see Art. I, §8, cl. 18. . . .

I entirely agree with the dissent that "[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact only those laws that 'carr[y] into Execution' one or more of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution," but §4248 satisfies that requirement because it is a necessary and proper means of carrying into execution the enumerated powers that support the federal criminal statutes under which the affected prisoners were convicted. . . .

Some years ago, a distinguished study group created by the Judicial Conference of the United States found that, in a disturbing number of cases, no State was willing to assume the financial burden of providing for the civil commitment of federal prisoners who, if left at large after the completion of their sentences, would present a danger to any communities in which they chose to live or visit. These federal prisoners, having been held for years in a federal prison, often had few ties to any State; it was a matter of speculation where they would choose to go upon release; and accordingly no State was enthusiastic about volunteering to shoulder the burden of civil commitment.

The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte blanche. Although the term "necessary" does not mean "absolutely necessary" or indispensable, the term requires an "appropriate" link between a power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress. And it is an obligation of this Court to enforce compliance with that limitation.

The law in question here satisfies that requirement. This is not a case in which it is merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between the powers underlying the federal criminal statutes and the challenged civil commitment provision. Here, there is a substantial link to Congress' constitutional powers.

For this reason, I concur in the judgment that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. §4248.

JUSTICE THOMAS, WITH WHOM JUSTICE SCALIA JOINS IN ALL BUT PART III-A-1-B, DISSENTING

The Court holds today that Congress has power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a law authorizing the Federal Government to civilly commit "sexually dangerous person[s]" beyond the date it lawfully could hold them on a charge or conviction for a federal crime. I disagree. The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact only those laws that "carr[y] into Execution" one or more of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution. Art. I, §8, cl. 18. Because §4248 "Execut[es]" no enumerated power, I must respectfully dissent.

"As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991). In our system, the Federal Government's powers are enumerated, and hence limited. Thus, Congress has no power to act unless the Constitution authorizes it to do so. The States, in turn, are free to exercise all powers that the Constitution does not withhold from them. Amdt. 10. This constitutional structure establishes different default rules for Congress and the States: Congress' powers are "few and defined," while those that belong to the States "remain . . . numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45 (J. Madison).

The Constitution plainly sets forth the "few and defined" powers that Congress may exercise. Article I "vest[s]" in Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted," §1, and carefully enumerates those powers in §8. The final clause of §8, the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Art. I, §8, cl. 18. As the Clause's placement at the end of §8 indicates, the "foregoing Powers" are those granted to Congress in the preceding clauses of that section. The "other Powers" to which the Clause refers are those "vested" in Congress and the other branches by other specific provisions of the Constitution. . . .

Roughly 30 years after the Constitution's ratification, McCulloch firmly established this understanding in our constitutional jurisprudence. Since then, our precedents uniformly have maintained that the Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent fount of congressional authority, but rather "a caveat that Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically granted 'foregoing' powers of §8 'and all other Powers vested by this Constitution."

No enumerated power in Article I, §8, expressly delegates to Congress the power to enact a civil-commitment regime for sexually dangerous persons, nor does any other provision in the Constitution vest Congress or the other branches of the Federal Government with such a power. Accordingly, §4248 can be a valid exercise of congressional authority only if it is "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" one or more of those federal powers actually enumerated in the Constitution.

Section 4248 does not fall within any of those powers. The Government identifies no specific enumerated power or powers as a constitutional predicate for §4248, and none are readily discernable. Indeed, not even the Commerce Clause—the enumerated power this Court has interpreted most expansively—can justify federal civil detention of sex offenders. Under the Court's precedents, Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity (such as sexual violence) based solely on the effect such activity may have, in individual cases or in the aggregate, on interstate commerce. That limitation forecloses any claim that §4248 carries into execution Congress' Commerce Clause power, and the Government has never argued otherwise.

This Court, moreover, consistently has recognized that the power to care for the mentally ill and, where necessary, the power "to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some" mentally ill persons, are among the numerous powers that remain with the States. As a consequence, we have held that States may "take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill"—including those who are sexually dangerous—provided that such commitments satisfy due process and other constitutional requirements. . . .

In my view, this should decide the question. Section 4248 runs afoul of our settled understanding of Congress' power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress may act under that Clause only when its legislation "carr[ies] into Execution" one of the Federal Government's enumerated powers. Art. I, §8, cl. 18. Section 4248 does not execute any enumerated power. Section 4248 is therefore unconstitutional. . . .

Not long ago, this Court described the Necessary and Proper Clause as "the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action." Regrettably, today's opinion breathes new life into that Clause, and—the Court's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding—comes perilously close to transforming the Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police power that "we always have rejected" [U.S. v.] Lopez [(1995)]. In so doing, the Court endorses the precise abuse of power Article I is designed to prevent—the use of a limited grant of authority as a "pretext . . . for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government." McCulloch.

I respectfully dissent.