Defendant Raul Perez-Gonzalez was arrested for transporting individuals whom he knew to be illegal aliens “in furtherance” of their illegal presence in the United States. His car was stopped by an Ohio State police officer, who discovered fifteen Spanish-speaking illegal aliens in the rear of the vehicle. Perez-Gonzalez had a roster indicating that each individual paid $250. He explained that he worked for the company that owned the van, and his job was to drive people from Texas to New York. Perez-Gonzalez claimed that this was his first trip for the company and he was being paid $350. The vehicle had no external markings to indicate that it was a commercial vehicle. The van left early in the morning and had taken a complex route, apparently designed to avoid states that are heavily patrolled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The vehicle also had darkened windows that concealed the occupants. Only three or four passengers were permitted to exit the van at rest stops in order to avoid calling attention to the group. Perez-Gonzalez contended that he suspected, but did not know, that his passengers were illegal aliens. He merely intended to transport them to New York, where they apparently hoped to find employment. The government, on the other hand, contended that Perez-Gonzalez acted purposely to assist individuals whom he knew to be illegal aliens in furthering (supporting) their illegal presence in the United States. What evidence supports the conclusion that Perez-Gonzalez knew that the passengers were illegal aliens? How does transporting illegal aliens to New York further their illegal presence in the United States?

             On the facts presented in this problem, should a jury find Perez-Gonzalez guilty of “furthering” the presence of illegal aliens? See United States v. Perez-Gonzalez, 307 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002). What if Perez-Gonzalez testified that he believed the passengers were fleeing political persecution in their home countries and he was driving them to the liberally minded New York immigration office to apply for political asylum status (this status permits individuals who are able to demonstrate a well-founded fear of political persecution to remain in the United States). Would he be guilty of “furthering” their illegal presence? See United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985).

             United States .v Perez-Gonzales, 307 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant knew or should have known that his passengers were illegal aliens and was determined to have a purpose to further their illegal presence in the United States. The court pointed to various facts that supported the defendant's specific intent to assist individuals to avoid apprehension. This included Perez-Gonzales' selection of roads that he believed would lessen the chance of detection by immigration authorities, the fact that only a limited number of individuals were permitted to exit at a rest stop and fact that Perez-Gonzales traveled at night. It is true that there was no evidence that the defendant knew that his passengers were seeking employment in New York City. On the other hand, he presumably knew that they would be less likely to be apprehended in New York City than in Texas. The court suggested that Perez-Gonzales must have been aware that he was being paid a significant amount of money in return for his participation in illegal conduct.

             In Merkt, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a defendant would not be held liable who was able to establish the affirmative defense that he or she was transporting an illegal alien to an immigration office. 

         Johnson was convicted of the misdemeanor of making harassing phone calls to his former girlfriend G.B. from February through March 2006. G.B. then obtained a restraining order, which resulted in Johnson discontinuing the calls. G.B. testified that when she ended their relationship in February 2006, she told Johnson that she did not want to see or hear from him again, and that if he bothered her, she would obtain a restraining order.

              Johnson placed 119 calls to G.B.’s home, work, and cell phone numbers during a thirty-day period following the breakup. Most of the calls were brief. G.B. did not answer, and Johnson left messages. Johnson admitted that he knew that the calls were “frustrating” to G.B. and admitted that she had asked him not to call. G.B. testified that Johnson “would break [her] down” and that she had switched jobs to different buildings several times to try to avoid the calls. Johnson also tried to contact G.B. by appearing uninvited at her home, at a training class that she was attending, and at her child’s birthday party.

         An individual is liable for making harassing phone calls under Minnesota law if he or she “repeatedly makes telephone calls” or “makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring” when these acts are undertaken “with the specific intent to abuse, disturb or cause distress.” Johnson argues that the evidence is insufficient to infer that he possessed the specific intent to harass G.B. by telephoning her. He contends that his intent was to express his love and that he wanted to resume their seven-year relationship.

         Would you convict Johnson of making harassing phone calls? See State v. Johnson, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 913.

                 Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the district court to infer that he had specific intent to harass G.B. by telephoning her. He maintains that his only specific intent was "love," that he wished to resume their seven-year relationship, and that he stopped calling immediately in March 2006, after G.B. obtained a restraining order against him. But this court has concluded that a fact-finder may infer an intent to harass based on "[t]he number and nature of the calls." G.B. testified that when she ended her relationship with appellant in February 2006, she told him she did not want to see or hear from him again, and if she did, she would obtain a restraining order. The record shows that despite this conversation, appellant placed 119 calls to G.B.'s home, work, and cell-phone numbers within a 38-day period. Most of these calls were very short; G.B did not answer, and appellant left messages. Appellant admitted that he knew the calls were "frustrating" to G.B. and that she had asked him not to call. G.B. testified that appellant's calls "would break [her] down" and that she switched jobs to different buildings several times to try to avoid the calls. The record also shows that during the period that appellant made the calls, he tried to contact G.B. by appearing uninvited at her home, at a training class she was attending, and at her child's birthday party.

      Because appellant persisted in making numerous, unwanted phone calls to G.B. after she made it clear that she was upset by the calls and because the calls were accompanied by other assertive behavior in seeking to contact her, objective facts and circumstances support the district court's inference that when appellant made the calls, he believed that the calls would frustrate G.B., and, therefore, he acted with intent to disturb G.B. or cause her distress.

         Defendant Andy Hypolite is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. His cousin and his cousin’s friend offered him a round-trip airline ticket to fly to New York and transport $70,000 back to Trinidad. Hypolite was to receive $6,000 on his return. At the airport in Trinidad, his cousin’s friend gave Hypolite “drink packets” that appeared to be milk products. U.S. Customs officials in New York found that the packets actually contained 2.9 kilograms of cocaine, and they arrested Hypolite. Hypolite claimed that he was unaware that he was transporting illegal drugs. He conceded that he had a “strong suspicion” that the packets contained narcotics, but he did not ask whether the packages contained drugs, because he “blanked it out” and tried “not to pry too much.”

         Was Hypolite guilty of knowingly importing illegal drugs into the United States? See United States v. Hypolite, 81 F. Appx. 751 (2003).

         United States v. Hypolite, 81 Fed. Appx. 751 (2003). Knowledge may be established in those instances that a defendant consciously avoids learning of a fact under circumstances where there is a high probability of its existence unless the factfinder finds that the defendant, in fact, did not believe in its existence. Hypolite testified that he tried not to “pry too much” and “just blanked out.” The circumstances surrounding the transaction were suspicious and established a high probability that the defendant was carrying narcotics.  

         The government indicted fifteen men for offenses arising from their participation in an illegal gambling enterprise. Nicholas Janis was convicted of conducting an illegal gambling business or aiding and abetting its conduct and was sentenced to 60 days.

            The head of the gambling enterprise was Thomas Orlando. The enterprise operated a series of “wirerooms,” where bets were accepted on sporting events. The “wirerooms” also were the site of casino gambling nights at which the invitees played blackjack, craps, and poker.

             Janis was a gambler and was acquainted with members of the Orlando organization, including Thomas Orlando. In the fall of 1982, Merino, who unknown to Janis was a government informant, rented a house owned by Janis for one of Merino’s friends, Pluta, a bookmaker affiliated with the Orlando organization. Pluta did not immediately move in, and from November 1982 until July 1983 the house was in continuous use as a wireroom, operated first by Merino and then by Pluta. Merino and Pluta were the tenants, although the rent was paid by Michael Gioringo, whom Janis knew to be a member of the Orlando organization. After Pluta moved out of the house, Janis offered the key to the house to Orlando.

             Janis claimed that he did not know that the house was being used as a wireroom. The government responded that the rented house was a short distance from the street that Janis drove down on his way to work. “It would have been easy for him to drive by the house from time to time to see what was doing, and if he had done so he might have discovered its use as a wireroom.” Janis claimed that the judge improperly had issued a “willful blindness” instruction to the jury because there was no evidence that he knew or strongly suspected that the house was being used for “shady dealings” or that he took steps to make sure that he did not “acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings.” Is Janis correct in his claim? See U.S. v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1991).

         U.S. v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1991)    

         The government indicted fifteen men for offenses arising from their participation in an illegal gambling enterprise. Twelve of the defendants pleaded guilty, another absconded, and the remaining two, who are the appellants before us, went to trial and were convicted. ….Nicholas Janis was convicted of conducting an illegal gambling business or aiding and abetting its conducting, and was sentenced to 60 days.         
     The head of the gambling enterprise was Thomas Orlando, one of the defendants who pleaded guilty. Active primarily in Bridgeview and other southwestern suburbs of Chicago between 1978 and 1987, the enterprise operated a succession of "wirerooms," where bets on various sporting events were accepted over the telephone, and it also sponsored "smokers," or casino gambling nights, held at restaurants and bars, where guests played blackjack, craps, and poker.                     
     Janis was a gambler and knew members of the Orlando organization, including Orlando himself and Richard Merino, a bookmaker for the organization. Together with a real estate agent who has not been charged with any wrongdoing, Janis owned, as an investment, a lot in Bridgeview with two houses on it, one behind the other. In the fall of 1982, Merino, who unbeknownst to Janis was a government informant, went to Janis and said he wanted to rent the smaller of the houses, the one in the rear, for his friend Pluta, who was recently divorced. This was done. Pluta did not move in until the spring of the next year (1983), but from November 1982 until July 1983 the house was in continuous use as a wireroom, operated first (it appears) by Merino and then, after Pluta moved in, by Pluta. The house was not used in the gambling enterprise after that, but early the following year the government tape-recorded a telephone conversation between Janis and Orlando in which Janis offered Orlando a key to the house and asked him whether everything was all right. Orlando responded: "Yeah, yeah, they just wanted to get out of there. They spotted some guys out there I guess." Janis replied: "I know." Although Merino and then Pluta were the nominal tenants, often the rent was paid not by either of them but instead by Michael Gioringo, whom Janis knew to be an aide to Thomas Orlando.               
     The only other evidence of Janis's participation in the gambling enterprise was the testimony of a former friend and fellow gambler, Edward Arnold. Arnold testified that Janis had told him late in 1982 or early in 1983 that he had rented a house in Bridgeview to an acquaintance of Tommy Orlando or Richard Merino. Arnold further testified that shortly after this conversation the phone number that the Orlando enterprise had given him to use in calling in bets was changed to a number that he recognized as a "southwest side" number, an area that, as he knew, included Bridgeview. On the basis of the conversation and the phone number Arnold testified that "in my opinion it was possible that bets were being taken out of that house . . . that Nick was renting. . . . The purpose of calling Arnold was not to elicit testimony on a matter not in dispute but to explore the process by which he had reasoned to this conclusion and to ask the jury to infer that Janis had reasoned similarly to the same conclusion and therefore knew that his house was being used in the gambling enterprise . . . .
     Reference to Janis's knowledge brings us to the central issue in the case, the propriety of the judge's having given the "ostrich" instruction, on which see the thorough discussion in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). The instruction told the jury, "You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear that he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly." There is no quarrel with the wording of the instruction… the question is whether it should have been given.                       
     The ultimate question that the jury had to decide was whether Janis either had participated in conducting the Orlando gambling enterprise or, more plausibly, had aided and abetted the enterprise, by renting the house to Merino knowing it would be used as a wireroom.                  
     The tape-recorded conversation from which we quoted earlier makes clear that Janis learned of the house's use as a wireroom eventually, but possibly only after that use had ceased. It is true that he offered Orlando the key so that it could be reopened as a wireroom, but he was never taken up on his offer (perhaps because the FBI shut down Orlando's enterprise three weeks later) and the wireroom never was reopened in his house. ….A critical question, therefore, was whether Janis knew when he rented the house that it was destined for use as a wireroom. There was no direct evidence of his knowledge, but that was not necessary, and certainly it would have been proper to instruct the jury to this effect. The jury could have inferred from Arnold's testimony and the recorded conversation with Orlando that Janis had known what use the rented house would be put to.                       
    It is not the purpose of the ostrich instruction to tell the jury that it does not need direct evidence of guilty knowledge in order to find such knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Still less is it to enable conviction of one who merely suspects that he may be involved with wrongdoers. …The most powerful criticism of the ostrich instruction is, precisely, that its tendency is to allow juries to convict upon a finding of negligence for crimes that require intent…. The criticism can be deflected by thinking carefully about just what it is that real ostriches do (or at least are popularly supposed to do). They do not just fail to follow through on their suspicions of bad things. They are not merely careless birds. They bury their heads in the sand so that they will not see or hear bad things. They deliberately avoid acquiring unpleasant knowledge. The ostrich instruction is designed for cases in which there is evidence that the defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings. A deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the law requires….[T]o know, and to want not to know because one suspects, may be, if not the same state of mind, the same degree of fault." …      
     The government points out that the rented house in Bridgeview was a short way down a side street from the thoroughfare on which Janis commuted to work daily. It would have been easy for him to drive by the house from time to time to see what was doing, and if he had done so he might have discovered its use as a wireroom. He did not do so. But this is not the active avoidance with which the ostrich doctrine is concerned. It would be if the house had been on the thoroughfare, and Janis, fearful of what he would see if he drove past it, altered his commuting route to avoid it. Janis failed to display curiosity, but he did nothing to prevent the truth from being communicated to him. He did not act to avoid learning the truth.     
     The critical question so far as Janis's guilt or innocence was concerned is simple (to pose, not necessarily to answer): what did Janis know? Did he know that he was renting his house for use as a wireroom, or did he believe that he was renting his house to the Orlando crew for some private purpose of theirs unconnected with gambling? (Even criminals have private lives.) The ostrich instruction did not advance this inquiry; it confused it, by pointing the jury to circumstances of deliberate avoidance of knowledge that did not exist. As we said in United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1990) when the facts require the jury to make a "binary choice" between "actual knowledge" and "complete innocence," the ostrich instruction should not be given.              
     If Janis strongly suspected that his house was being used as a wireroom, and to avoid confirming his suspicions he expended resources on avoiding a confrontation with the facts (as by taking a circuitous route to work), then his actions, far from showing that he was not an aider and abettor …would show that he was—would show that he wanted the gambling enterprise to succeed so badly that he expended time and effort to avoid acquiring proof of the enterprise's character and with it indisputably guilty knowledge that might compel him to withdraw for fear of being prosecuted with no chance of avoiding conviction by pleading ignorance of what the enterprise was up to.        
     It was an error to give the ostrich instruction . . . 

         The fifty-seven-year-old defendant Strong emigrated from Arabia to China and then to the United States. He testified that he was a member of the Sudan Muslim religious faith since birth and became one of the sect’s leaders. The three central beliefs of the religion are “cosmetic consciousness, mind over matter, and psysiomatic psychomatic consciousness.” Mind over matter empowers a master or leader to lie on a bed of nails without bleeding, walk through fire or on hot coals, perform surgical operations without anesthesia, raise people off the ground, and suspend a person’s heartbeat, pulse, and breathing while the individual remained conscious. The defendant claimed that he could stop a follower’s heartbeat and breathing and plunge knives into an adherent’s chest without injuring the person. Strong testified that he performed this ceremony countless times over the previous forty years.

         On January 28, 1972, Strong performed this ceremony on Kenneth Goings, a recent recruit to the sect. The wounds from the hatchet and three knives that Strong inserted into Goings proved fatal. Prior to being stabbed, Goings objected, and the defendant stated that “it will be all right, son.” The defendant and one of his adherents testified that they perceived no danger and, in fact, the adherent had volunteered to participate. Another member of the sect claimed that Strong had performed this ritual on another occasion without harming the individual involved in the ritual.

         The defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter at trial and appealed the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury to consider a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. Should the judge remand the case for a new trial and instruct the trial court judge to permit the jurors to decide for themselves whether the defendant is guilty of either reckless or negligent homicide? See People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1975).

         People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1975). Recklessness requires an awareness and disregard of a risk and such a disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Negligence involves a failure to perceive the risk. Strong testified that “mind over matter” was a central tenet of the religion. There was testimony that both Strong and the victim did not perceive a risk. The New York Court of Appeals ruled as a result that the jury should have been given instructions on negligence as well as recklessness. 

          In July 1995, Ronnie Polk was the passenger in an automobile that was stopped for a moving violation in close proximity to Highland Christian School in Lafayette, Indiana. A police officer’s search led to the seizure of crack cocaine and several tablets of diazepam. In Indiana, possession of more than three grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school is enhanced from a Class D felony to a Class A felony punishable by thirty years in prison, and possession of a “Schedule IV” drug without a doctor’s prescription within 1,000 feet of a school is enhanced from a Class D to a Class C felony, punishable by four years in prison.

            Polk was convicted and sentenced for both offenses, and his two sentences were to run concurrently. Polk also was convicted of being a habitual offender, and his combined sentence for the three convictions totaled fifty years. Polk maintains that the legislature did not intend for the possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school to be a strict liability offense that applied to passengers possessing narcotics in automobiles, because this did not advance Indiana’s interest in protecting schoolchildren. Applying the statute to individuals in automobiles would allow the police to wait to stop automobiles suspected of containing narcotics as they approached within 1,000 feet of a school.

         How would you decide Polk v. State in light of the precedent established in State v. Walker? See Polk v. State, 683 N.E.2d 567 (Ind. 1997).

Polk v. State, 683 N.E.2D 567 (Ind. 1997).

         The conclusion is inescapable that the General Assembly believed that possession of cocaine or a Schedule IV controlled substance near a school, distinct from any effort to distribute them there, presented its own dangers to children. In short, it is within the legislature's prerogative to determine that a drug-free zone deters possible spillover effects, and to provide enhanced penalties for controlled substance violations in proximity to schools. The enhancement is rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective. Polk's statutory construction argument amounts to a request for an exception for drug-possessing motorists who pass through a school zone but whose activities do not endanger children under the facts of the particular case. The legislature has determined that the enhancement is appropriate to deter violations. Because that judgment is rational, we cannot write Polk's requested exception into the statute by judicial fiat. Polk maintains that if we rule against his position police will wait to pull over suspected possessors of drugs until their cars are within 1000 feet of a school. However, the enhancement is triggered by possession within the zone, whether or not the defendant is pulled over within the zone. It is the act of entering the zone, and not the police action of pulling the defendant over, that triggers the enhancement. Nothing forces drug offenders to drive within the drug-free zone created by the legislature. To the contrary, they pass there at their own peril and in jeopardy of their own penal interests. Walker settled that drug offenders do not have to know that their activities are taking place near a school to be convicted under the school-zone enhancement. They are on notice of the location of their crimes. Literal application of the enhancement to extreme cases—for example, a subway or airplane passenger—is not before us today.

Holding   

We hold that Minn. Stat. Section 152.023, subd 2(4) does not require proof.

         Joseph Herman started a fire in an abandoned house used by drug addicts in order to remove the “hazard” from the neighborhood. Roughly ten firemen responded to the blaze, including Charles Swan, a nineteen-year veteran of the Chicago Fire Department. Swan placed a twenty-foot wooden ladder against the house in order to knock a hole in the roof and allow smoke to escape. Swan carried a fifteen-pound axe and a pipe pole that was approximately six feet long. As Swan reached the top of the building, the ladder slid from the building and Swan fell roughly eighteen feet and broke his right leg and seriously injured his knee. A lieutenant who was to steady the ladder apparently became distracted and had walked away. The defendant was convicted of aggravated arson based on the fact that a fireman was injured in the line of duty “as a result of the fire.” The only precedent cited by the court involved a defendant who was convicted for setting a fire that led to one fireman inhaling smoke and another injuring his wrist. Was Herman’s setting the fire the proximate cause of Swan’s injury? Do you believe that Swan was injured “as a result of the fire?” Prior to setting the fire, Herman cleared the addicts out of the building. Would Herman’s setting the fire have constituted a proximate cause in the event that unknown to Herman, some of the addicts remained in the structure and were killed in the fire set by Herman? See People v. Herman, 807 N.E.2d 1036 (Ill.App. 2004).

       People v. Herman, 807 NE.2d 1036 (Ill.App. 2004). The Illinois court ruled that Herman was the proximate cause of Swan’s injury. It was foreseeable that someone would be injured as a result of the fire. A defendant is responsible for all the consequences that result in the natural flow of events from his or her criminal acts. The lieutenant’s failure to grip the ladder is not at the level of the type of intervening act that limits a defendant’s liability. In summary, but for the defendant’s act of arson, Swan would not have been on the ladder and would not have suffered an injury. An alternative analysis might view the lieutenant’s act as an intervening act that limits the Herman’s criminal responsibility for Swan’s injury.

         Following a jury trial, defendant Matthew Hall was convicted of aggravated battery of a child. He appeals from that conviction, questioning whether (1) he was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery of a child; and (2) his sentence was excessive. For reasons which follow, we affirm.
     At trial, Shirley Porter testified that, at approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 11, 1992, she was walking near the corner of Kilbourn and Wilcox in Chicago with three of her sons and noticed defendant, who lived in the neighborhood, sitting on a car. Two of Porter's sons were in front of her, and Jonathan, who was two years old, lagged behind as he stopped to open a candy wrapper. At this time, Porter heard a car speeding behind her and then heard sounds like firecrackers going off. The sounds were not unusual. She then heard someone shout "I been shot, I been shot." Porter turned around and saw Jonathan lying against a building with a wound to his head and blood running down his face. At a hospital, an operation was performed on Jonathan's head. He subsequently stayed at a rehabilitation center for several weeks, continued with outpatient therapy for four weeks, and then returned for surgery to remove a bullet from his leg. Jonathan was still undergoing speech therapy.
      Oliver Conic, who was 13 years old at the time of trial, testified that he was leaving the grocery store at Kilbourn and Wilcox around the time of the shooting and saw defendant, who he knew, and two others near a car. He also recognized Porter and Jonathan walking on the sidewalk. A black car then stopped in front of the car that defendant was working on, and the person inside the black car started shooting in defendant's direction. Defendant then ran 10 to 12 feet towards Jonathan, who was on the sidewalk, picked him up and held Jonathan's body so that the infant's body shielded defendant's face and chest as the shots were being fired. Defendant then laid Jonathan against the building and ran around the corner.
     The State then introduced the testimony of Darlene Rich, which corroborated Conic's testimony and which defendant does not contest.
      Dr. Terry Lichtor, a neurosurgeon, testified that he operated on Jonathan on September 11, 1992. Jonathan was in a deep coma when he was brought into the hospital. The bullet wounded the frontal lobe of the brain, which controls personality, some parts of speech and motor skills, and intelligence. He believed that the injuries could have permanent effects on Jonathan.
      The parties stipulated that on September 11, 1992, defendant was over 18 years of age. The State rested. The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Detective Louis Trifilio testified for the defense. He was assigned to the investigation of this shooting on September 11, 1992. When he first saw defendant around 8 p.m. at the police station, defendant was not under arrest, but was held overnight. At approximately 1:00 a.m., he was charged with a misdemeanor. On September 12, 1992, Detective Trifilio spoke with Oliver Conic, who told him that defendant picked up Jonathan for protection during the shooting and ran with him. At approximately 5:00 p.m., after Detective Trifilio had spoken with Conic and Darlene Rich, defendant was charged with a felony.
      Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a child. On November 5, 1993, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 10 years in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
     Defendant's first contention is that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery of a child and makes two separate arguments to support this contention. Defendant first maintains that no legal theory or principle exists to render him culpable for the injuries sustained by Jonathan Williams. He states that he cannot be found guilty under the doctrine of accountability…and he was not the cause of Jonathan's injuries because he did not fire the gun and was merely trying to save his own life.
    One may be found guilty of aggravated battery of a child if that person, age 18 years or older, intentionally or knowingly, and without legal justification and by any means, caused great bodily harm to any child under the age of 13 years. Defendant's acts need not be the sole and immediate cause of the injury. When criminal acts of defendant contribute to the crime, he or she may be found guilty of that crime. Causal relationship is a question of fact which is left to the trier of fact.
     Although "cause" is not defined in the Criminal Code, it is generally recognized that both actual cause and "legal" cause (often called "proximate" cause) are needed to impose criminal liability. This ordinarily means that (1) defendant's conduct must be the "but-for" cause of the forbidden result and (2) the forbidden result which actually occurs must be sufficiently similar to the result or manner which defendant intended, so that defendant fairly may be held responsible for the actual result although it differs from the intended result.
     In this case the evidence presented shows that when the occupants of the car opened fire on defendant, he ran 10 to 12 feet to Jonathan and picked him up. Defendant held Jonathan's body in front of his face and chest, thereby shielding himself from the fired bullets. Three or four more shots were fired while defendant held the infant in front of himself. Jonathan was shot in the head and in the leg.
     With regard to the causation analysis, it is evident that "but-for" defendant's actions, Jonathan would not have been placed in a position of danger–the direct line of fire–and would not have received the gunshot wounds. Jonathan was not next to defendant when the shooting commenced, as defendant had to run 10 to 12 feet towards him to pick him up. Defendant and his two friends, working on the car, patently were the intended targets of the shooting. There is no record evidence that any bystander other than Jonathan was shot. By putting Jonathan directly in the line of fire, the jury was authorized to find, defendant was the actual cause of Jonathan's injuries.
      Similarly, defendant's conduct was the legal or proximate cause of Jonathan's injuries. Although defendant may not have intended that Jonathan be struck by the bullets, as he contends in his brief, it is not unfair to hold defendant responsible for the actual result, given his cowardly and outrageous conduct. The jury's determination here regarding defendant's culpability was not so improbable that there remains a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Because defendant's conduct caused Jonathan's injuries, there is no need to address his arguments regarding the doctrine of accountability or the felony murder rule.
      Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove the requisite state of mind for the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, that he intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm to Jonathan. He contends that, in the alternative, his offense should be reduced to reckless conduct. The State counters that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery of a child because he used Jonathan as a shield, knowing that his actions were practically certain to cause great bodily injury.
When an offense is defined in terms of a particular result, as is the aggravated battery of a child statute, a person is said to act knowingly when he is consciously aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. Whether a person acted knowingly with respect to bodily harm resulting from one's actions is, due to its very nature, often proved by circumstantial evidence, rather than by direct proof.
      Here, the jury was authorized by the evidence to conclude defendant must have been aware that, by putting Jonathan between himself and the shooter and, thereby, into the line of fire, Jonathan was practically certain to get shot. Although defendant correctly argues that no evidence was introduced at trial revealing his state of mind at the time of the shooting, his actions were sufficient to show his intention to substitute the body of the child as protection against and avoidance of his own exposure to danger and, therefore, knowledge that great bodily harm was practically certain to follow. The State was not required to show that defendant was absolutely certain that Jonathan would be harmed by the gunfire.
      There was sufficient evidence adduced here to support a finding of aggravated  battery of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the reasonableness of the jury's verdict in this case, defendant's argument that his conviction should be reduced to reckless conduct is without merit.
     Defendant's final argument is that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 10 years' imprisonment. He states that the sentence is excessive in light of his positive background and the circumstances surrounding his actions. In the instant case, the pre-sentence investigation report indicates that defendant was 32 years old at the time of the offense and had a prior conviction for delivery of cannabis in 1982, for which he received 18 months probation. Although he stopped attending high school in the 11th grade, he entered the Job Corps in 1977 and received a certificate in auto mechanics. Since 1986, defendant had been employed as an auto mechanic, earning about $ 400 to $ 500 per week. The circuit court also considered in mitigation that defendant was initially a potential victim in the shooting, he acted under provocation, he had no history of violent crimes, and he was not likely to commit other crimes in the future. In aggravation, the court considered that Jonathan has a permanent injury, defendant has a criminal record, there is a necessity to deter others from similar conduct in the future, and defendant's cowardly actions were "deplorable" and "so foreign as to be incomprehensible" to the court. Aggravated battery of a child is punishable by a term between 5 and 30 years in prison. In reaching its decision, the circuit court balanced defendant's prior status as a contributing member of society against the seriousness of the offense and sentenced defendant to 10 years' imprisonment.
     The record indicates that the circuit court considered all relevant circumstances in fashioning the sentence and may well have sentenced defendant to a longer term in prison. There was no abuse of discretion in sentencing.

         Daniel Sinnott was charged with Terrroristic Threats and with Ethnic Intimidation. Benny Rojas was Sinnott’s employer and owned the home next door where Sinnott lived with his family. Evelin Rojas was visiting her mother and they heard Sinnott outside shouting, swearing, and slamming doors. Rojas walked out of the house to investigate. Sinnott threw power tools that Rojas's father had given to him down on the steps and attacked Rojas and called her "fucking bitch" and whore and claimed that Rojas's father had cheated him. He then focused on the Rojas family’s ethnicity, shouting, "Fuck you, Mexicans. Go back across the border," and made a number of references to the Alamo. Despite the fact that Rojas corrected Sinnott and told him that she and her family were Puerto Rican and were not Mexicans, he continued to attack the ethnicity of Evelin and her family. Sinnott also threatened that when her father returned, the two men would go for a drive but that Mr. Rojas would not return as Sinnott was going to kill him.        
     Evelin and her mother went across the street to sit on the front steps to smoke cigarettes. Sinnott approached them with an electric drill that he turned on as he approached them. The two women ran for safety and called 911. The police responded and warned Sinnott to stop his belligerent behavior. As soon as the police left, Sinnott resumed his verbal attack against the women, calling them “animals” and “Mexicans” and proclaimed that “this country belongs to him and his white people." Sinnott walked around the block for forty-five minutes and reappeared and charged at Rojas while wielding a hammer as if to strike Evelin who managed to restrain him.       
      Sinnott “argues that the record does not establish that he was motivated to commit his crimes on the basis of Evelin Rojas's ethnicity, but was instead agitated by his anger at her father for a wrong he perceived had been committed in his employment relationship.” How would you rule? Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 97 A.2d 1184 (Pa. Super. 2009).                   

         DID THE DEFENDANT TERRORIZE THE VICTIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ETHNICITY

Commonwealth v. Sinnott,  97 A.2d 1184 (PA Super. 2009)

Opinion by: Bender, J.       

Issue
  Daniel Sinnott appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of Terroristic Threats and Ethnic Intimidation, 18 Pa.C.S. Sections 2706, 2710. Sinnott contends that the Commonwealth failed to adduce sufficient evidence in support of either conviction and asserts accordingly that his judgment of sentence must be reversed. We find the evidence ample to sustain Sinnott's conviction of Terroristic Threats, but insufficient to sustain his conviction of Ethnic Intimidation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence in part and reverse in part.
Facts
  Sinnott's conviction arose out of his angry escalation of a dispute with victim Evelin Rojas (Rojas) after Rojas observed Sinnott in a tirade throwing power tools at the rear steps of the home where Rojas's parents lived. Rojas's father, Benny Rojas, was Sinnott's employer and also owned the home next door where Sinnott lived with his family. Rojas, while visiting with her mother in the kitchen of her parents' home, heard Sinnott outside shouting, swearing, and slamming doors. Although the women at first discounted the display, Rojas eventually ventured from the house to investigate, at which point Sinnott threw power tools that Rojas's father had given to him down on the steps where Rojas was standing. When Rojas admonished Sinnott that he could have hurt her, he berated her as a "fucking bitch" and a whore, and asserted angrily that Rojas's father had cheated him. He then insulted Rojas for her supposed ethnicity saying "Fuck you, Mexicans. Go back across the border," and made repeated references to the Alamo. Although Rojas corrected Sinnott and told him that she and her family were not Mexican, but Puerto Rican, he continued to rail against her and her family, asserting that they were Panamanian. He also threatened that when her father returned, the two men would go for a drive but that Mr. Rojas would not return as Sinnott was going to kill him.
      When Rojas and her mother went to a house across the street to sit on the front steps and smoke, Sinnott followed them and as they sat, approached with an electric drill that he revved as he got nearer, prompting Rojas and her mother to rise and prepare to run to safety. Although Sinnott then diverted his course, Rojas called 911. When the police responded and warned Sinnott to stop his belligerent behavior, he complied only momentarily and resumed after they left, continuing to berate the Rojas women as they sat on the steps, calling them "animals" and "Mexicans" and asserting that "this country belongs to him and his white people." Ultimately, after Sinnott had walked around the block for some forty-five minutes, he charged at Rojas, wielding a hammer as if to strike her. As Rojas grabbed Sinnott's arm to restrain him and shield herself from the impending blow, her long fingernails snagged in his shirt. As Sinnott pushed against her and the two struggled, four of Rojas's nails were ripped from the nail beds, causing her hands to bleed. Rojas's nails took several months to grow back.
      In response to an additional 911 call, the Philadelphia police reported to the scene to find Rojas shaking and injured, and Sinnott barricaded in his house. Sinnott would not come out and spoke to the police through the open windows of the house, telling them to "get the fuck out of here" and to check Rojas's "green card." Although Rojas's father, having since returned, used his keys to allow the police to enter Sinnott's house, the police found the doors obstructed by furniture piled against them and ultimately entered  through a side door that Sinnott had not thought to block. Once inside, the police found an electric drill on the floor next to Sinnott and arrested him for the crimes later charged in the information.
       Following a preliminary hearing, Sinnott waived his right to a jury and the case proceeded to trial before a judge sitting as finder of fact. The court found Sinnott guilty of Simple Assault, Terroristic Threats, Possessing an Instrument of Crime (PIC), and Ethnic Intimidation, and imposed a sentence of four years' probation for Terroristic Threats consecutive to four months' to twenty-three months' imprisonment for Simple Assault. The court imposed no further penalty for PIC or Ethnic Intimidation. Sinnott then filed this appeal, raising the following questions for our consideration:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient for conviction on the charge of Terroristic Threats, insofar as there was no evidence of a settled intent to terrorize, and appellant's words were the product of transitory anger?

2. Was not the evidence insufficient for conviction on the charge of ethnic intimidation, insofar as there was no evidence that appellant was motivated by the hatred of the victim's race, color, religion, or national origin, or that such hatred was the underlying cause of appellant's behavior?

Reasoning

 Both of Sinnott's questions challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record "in the light most favorable to the verdict … giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines Terroristic Threats as follows:

Section 2706. Terroristic threats

Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another;
…

         Based on this definition, "the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize another …. The harm sought to be avoided is the psychological distress that follows an invasion of the victim's sense of personal security. Consequently, "[n]either the [defendant's] ability to carry out the threat nor [the victim's belief] that it will be carried out is an essential element of the crime." Similarly, [i]t is unnecessary for an individual to specifically articulate the crime of violence which he or she intends to commit where the type of crime may be inferred from the nature of the statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement."….
     Sinnott argues that he never intended to evoke terror and that his conduct consisted merely of "spur-of-the-moment" threats made in the heat of anger and that such threats are not proper grounds for conviction under section 2706. Upon consideration of multiple excerpts of the victim's testimony, the trial court found both claims unsustainable. ….
 Sinnott's assertion that his conduct consisted merely of "spur-of-the-moment threats" is …unavailing. …"[B]eing angry does not render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize." Moreover, even if it did, we find no substantiation in the record for a conclusion that Sinnott's actions were in fact "spur-of-the-moment." Indeed, the record establishes that Sinnott continued the altercation for at least an hour, sometimes walking around the block and other times re-entering his own home, only to venture forth again to continue his belligerence toward Rojas and her mother. Unlike those cases in which passions ignite in a quick and heated exchange of words over deeply emotional matters, (we have found the evidence insufficient where defendant threatened to shoot victim in response to victim's threat to run over defendant's children with her car), the record here does not establish circumstances sufficient to negate the intent to terrorize suggested by Sinnott's continued conduct. To the extent that Sinnott had no legitimate quarrel with Evelin Rojas, his continued actions in berating and attempting to frighten her, offer a strong circumstantial inference that his intent fell squarely within the range prohibited by the statute. Accordingly, we find the evidence entirely sufficient to sustain Sinnott's conviction of Terroristic Threats.
     Sinnott contends that the evidence is not sufficient to establish Ethnic Intimidation as the record fails to establish that Rojas's ethnicity was the primary basis for his behavior. Rather, he contends, his actions were motivated by his ill-will toward Benny Rojas over his belief that Mr. Rojas had unfairly deprived him of work and wages. We concur in Sinnott's interpretation of the record on this point.

Our Crimes Code defines Ethnic Intimidation as follows:

Section 2710. Ethnic intimidation
 

         a) Offense defined.—A person commits the offense of ethnic intimidation if, with malicious intention toward the race, color, religion or national origin of another individual or group of individuals, he commits an offense under any other provision of this article or under Chapter 33 (relating to arson, criminal mischief and other property destruction) …with respect to such individual or his or her property or with respect to one or more members of such group or to their property.

* * * *

(c) Definition.—As used in this section "malicious intention" means the intention to commit any act, the commission of which is a necessary element of any offense referred to in subsection (a) motivated by hatred toward the race, color, religion or national origin of another individual or group of individuals.

        
    Our Courts have had limited opportunity to apply section 2710. Nevertheless, our decisions suggest that malicious intention" as required by the language of section 2710(c) may be found to exist only where the circumstances establish that the defendant was motivated by animus toward the victim's race or ethnicity and targeted the victim expressly on that basis. Compare In re M.J.M., 858 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super. 2004) (affirming dispositional order of delinquency where juvenile's remarks toward Puerto Rican students who rode the school bus with him occurred on several occasions such as to constitute harassment and "the record clearly indicate[d] that he chose his victims because of their ethnicity"); and Commonwealth v. Rink, 574 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Super. 1990) (affirming judgment of sentence based upon defendant's conduct in joining a gang of sixteen white juveniles who ventured to the home of the only black family in the neighborhood and, armed with sticks and two-by-fours, beat both husband and wife while shouting racial epithets and defense of different motivation was not supported by evidence of record) with Commonwealth v. Ferino, 640 A.2d 934 (Pa. Super. 1994) (concluding that "based on the unique facts at bar . . . we fail to discern such a malevolence on the part of the appellant directed specifically at the victim because of his race to justify an affirmance of the judgment of sentence for ethnic intimidation").
      In this case, Sinnott argues that the record does not establish that he was motivated to commit his crimes on the basis of Evelin Rojas's ethnicity, but was instead agitated by his anger at her father for a wrong he perceived had been committed in his employment relationship. Thus, although Sinnott does not deny his ethnically charged remarks, he characterizes them as the product of circumstances unrelated to Rojas's ethnicity. Although Sinnott's explanation does not strike us as complete, we recognize as well that section 2710 is a penal statute, our construction of which must be closely circumscribed. "[W]here doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal statute, it is the accused who should receive the benefit of such doubt." Thus given the formulation of the statutory language, which requires that the defendant's acts be "motivated by hatred toward the race, color, religion or national origin of another individual or group of individuals," we are not convinced of the provision's applicability where the testimony and circumstances suggest a more limited motivation.
     In this instance, Evelin Rojas's testimony recounts Sinnott's repeated assertion at the time of the altercation that he was angry with Benny Rojas over their employment relationship and was first motivated by his anger in that regard to throw the tools Benny had given him back onto the Rojas property. ("As we were exiting the home, he was, Daniel, was throwing tools that . . . my dad gave them to him . . . He was throwing the tools over the steps."); ("And he was like, [saying] oh, that Fucking Benny, he cheated me, I am keeping—every single house on this property is going to belong to me . . . ."). Of course, Sinnott's anger at Benny Rojas in no way justifies his repeated use of the ethnically derogatory terms that pepper this record; nevertheless, it does suggest that Sinnott's commission of the predicate offense, i.e., Terroristic Threats, upon which his Ethnic Intimidation conviction depends, was driven principally by factors other than the Rojas's ethnicity. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the record establishes the "malicious intention toward the race, color, religion or national origin of another individual or group of individuals" necessary to conviction of Ethnic Intimidation. The evidence, therefore, is not legally sufficient to sustain this conviction.
 

Holding
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence as it applies to Sinnott's conviction of Terroristic Threats, but reverse the judgment of sentence as it applies to his conviction of Ethnic Intimidation.
 

Questions for Discussion             

1. What must the prosecution establish to convict Sinnott of ethnic intimidation?

2. Why did the superior court acquit Sinnott of ethnic intimidation? 
3. Would Sinnott have acted in the same fashion if Benny Rojas and his family were Caucasian? How do you explain the fact that Sinnott used racially insulting language throughout the confrontation with Evelin and her mother?   

         The misdemeanor of indecent exposure under South Dakota law prohibits the public exposure of one's genitals for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in oneself or another (under circumstances in which that person knows that the person’s conduct is likely to annoy, offend, or alarm another person). Michael James Plenty Horse was convicted of indecent exposure after a security guard observed him alone in a deserted portion of a high school building attempting to have sexual intercourse with a mannequin. The guard found the defendant lying on top of a mannequin, with his band uniform partially removed. It appeared that defendant was having simulated intercourse. Defendant was dressed, but his pants were partially down, and he was holding a wad of paper. Defendant rolled off the mannequin, turned away, and began adjusting his pants. The guard had walked into the room because he noticed that the door to the room was closed for only the third time in the last three years. The guard opened the door and discovered that the lights were not on in the room. Plenty Horse is a “low functioning nineteen-year old who has been a high school sophomore for the past three years. His reading comprehension remains at the level of a fourteen-year old; his math skills, that of an eight-year old; and his written language, that of a thirteen-year old.” Plenty Horse was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation for three years and was required to register as a sex offender. Would you convict Plenty Horse of indecent exposure? See State v. Plenty Horse, 741 N.W.2d 763 (S.D. 2007).

State v. Plenty Horse 741 N.W. 2d 763 (S.D. 2007).

         Conceding that having sex in public with a mannequin would likely offend people, defense counsel nonetheless contends that defendant did not "flash" or expose his genitals "in hopes of being observed, thereby gratifying himself sexually." Because this is a specific intent crime, the prosecution must link the exhibition of one's genitals to the intent to seek sexual gratification by such public exposure. Thus, it must be proved that the offender exhibited or displayed his genitals with the intent of arousing himself or someone else. This is not how the circuit court and the magistrate court interpreted the statute. It appears that they examined each phrase in isolation rather than the statute as a whole to determine whether defendant had the requisite intent. This approach ignores the structure and purpose of the enactment. The statute was intended to criminalize the act of displaying or showing one's genitals in public for sexual gratification. South Dakota's Pattern Jury Instructions accurately set forth the elements of the crime: (1) "The defendant exposed (his) (her) genitals in a public place;" (2) "The defendant did so under circumstances that (he) (she) knew that (his) (her) conduct was likely to (annoy) (offend) (alarm) another person;" and (3) "The defendant did so with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 3-3-30. To be guilty of the offense, first, defendant must have exposed himself in public. Second, defendant must have exposed himself in public under circumstances he knew would likely offend, annoy, or alarm another person. Third, defendant must have exposed himself in public with "the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person."

Although defendant had the observable intent to sexually gratify himself, no evidence demonstrated that he intended to arouse or gratify his (or someone else's) sexual desire by the act of exposing his genitals in public. On the contrary, while he was alone and the lights were off, defendant closed the door and went over by a desk. It was late in the afternoon, near to closing time, and no other patrons were in the area. Nothing establishes that his conduct was done with the specific intent to generate sexual arousal or gratification by the act of publicly exposing, i.e., displaying or offering to the public view, his genitals. Therefore, defendant's act, lewd though it may have been, does not fall within the purview of the indecent exposure statute. 

          Larry Roberts along with other inmates was convicted of the murders of a fellow inmate, Charles Gardner, and of a correctional officer, Albert Path. Gardner was an inmate at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville and was attacked by Roberts and other inmates and was stabbed eleven times. The knife fell to the ground and was grabbed by Gardner, who pursued one of his assailants up a flight of stairs where Gardner plunged the knife into the chest of a prison guard, Officer Patch. Patch died within an hour at the prison clinic. Gardner died shortly thereafter.

             It was established that Gardner was dazed and in shock from the loss of blood as he staggered up the stairs and that Patch was the first individual that he encountered. Several witnesses alleged that Roberts had stabbed Gardner. Gardner was described as a well-behaved inmate who had no motive to intentionally kill Patch. Roberts was charged with killing Gardner and claimed that the cause of Gardner’s death was medical negligence.

         Will this defense prove successful? Should Roberts be held criminally liable for causing the death of Path? See People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d. 274 (Cal. 1992).

People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1992).

              If a person inflicts a dangerous wound on another, it is ordinarily no defense that inadequate medical treatment contributed to the victim's death. . . . . But here the record is devoid of any evidence of grossly improper treatment. Our examination of the record discloses that Gardner's treatment may have been inadequate, but that the prison facilities may well have made a much different course of treatment difficult or impossible. As a matter of law, treatment regimen shown by the record fails to constitute a supervening cause of Gardner's death. The jury need not be instructed on a theory for which no evidence has been presented. Defendant also contends his federal due process rights were violated when the instruction relieved the jury of the obligation to find the proximate-cause element of the crime. We reject this claim for the reason previously given: there was no evidence of grossly improper care on which defendant's desired instruction could be predicated; therefore, due process was not violated.

          At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of the murder of Officer Patch, on the ground there was insufficient evidence of his criminal liability for that death. The court denied the motion. Defendant now contends there was insufficient evidence to find him liable for the first degree murder of Patch. He also contends the jury was incorrectly instructed on the issue.
    As will appear, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendant's act was the proximate cause of the murder of Patch. But the instruction removed the element of proximate cause from the jury's consideration, an error of constitutional magnitude that requires reversal under United States Supreme Court precedent. We therefore reverse defendant's conviction for that murder.
Court affirmed, holding that the chain of causation was not broken.
         Liability for first degree murder cannot attach absent evidence of premeditation and deliberation or of other acts irrelevant to this discussion. There is no evidence whatever that defendant contemplated the murder of Patch, much less premeditated and deliberated it. On that ground, the first degree murder conviction cannot stand, for we discern no other doctrine, such as felony murder or transferred intent that would suffice to confer liability for that degree of murder in this case.
  The next question is whether the evidence permitted the jury to determine that defendant's acts were the proximate cause of Patch's death. We hold there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause for the jury to decide that liability attached for defendant's acts.
      We have consumed much space explaining that if the eventual victim's death is not the natural and probable consequence of a defendant's act, then liability cannot attach. Shots that cause a driver to accelerate impulsively and run over a nearby pedestrian suffice to confer liability; but if the driver, still upset, had proceeded for several miles before killing a pedestrian, at some point the required causal nexus would have become too attenuated for the initial bad actor to be liable even for manslaughter; much less for first degree murder. It is a natural consequence that shots fired at a boat may cause a passenger to leap out and thereby cause another in the boat to drown but if the boat had capsized, floated some miles down the river and over a waterfall, and fallen on the head of another boater, the shooter probably would not be criminally liable for that boater's death.
     After considerable reflection, however, we conclude that the evidence sufficed to permit the jury to conclude that Patch's death was the natural and probable consequence of defendant's act. This is so because Patch was in the area in which harm could foreseeably occur as a result of a prison stabbing. Defendant mortally wounded Gardner, but the latter nevertheless was able to seize a knife that an assailant had left on the floor. As the jury found, the attack left Gardner in a daze, without the ability to reason or calculate. In that condition, he staggered up a flight of stairs to the second floor in pursuit of defendant's accomplice Menefield. There he engaged in a purely reflexive struggle with Patch and plunged the knife into him. It is foreseeable that a wounded inmate might try to arm himself with a weapon abandoned at the scene of a prison melee and pursue his attackers a short distance. The jury was entitled to find that the distance Gardner pursued Menefield was not so great as to break the chain of causation.
      As stated above, however, our inquiry does not end here. Because the jurors found that Gardner was unconscious when he attacked Patch, the instruction directed them not to consider whether the attack on Patch was foreseeable. Under that instruction, whether Patch was standing next to Gardner or half a mile away was not to be taken into account, as long as Patch's killing was the "direct result" of defendant's act.
   As we have explained, the instruction incorrectly stated the law of proximate cause. A result cannot be the natural and probable cause of an act if the act was unforeseeable. An instruction that told the jury to disregard foreseeability would inevitably lead it to ignore the nature of Gardner's response to defendant's attack, and hence would substantially distract the jury from considering the causation element of the offense—an element that was very much at issue in the case. The instructional error thus cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant's conviction of the murder of Patch must be reversed. 

         Norma Suarez left home with her son P. and her daughters N.E. and A.E. in the car. She stopped to visit Michelle Dominguez and then drove to the home of Violanda Corral, P.’s grandmother. Suarez left P. at Corral’s home and started toward home. N.E. was in the front passenger seat and A.E. was in the back seat. Suarez arrived home to find that A.E. was not in the auto. It later was learned that A.E. had fallen from the car as the vehicle crossed the Continental Bridge, was struck by another car, and died of head injuries. Suarez was convicted of recklessly endangering A.E., who was three years old at the time, by failing to properly supervise her child. It was a crime in Texas at the time of this incident for the operator of a motor vehicle to fail to secure a child over two and younger than four years of age by a seat belt or child seat.

              An investigating police officer testified that A.E. fell out of the front passenger window. The officer also found that the seat belt clips in the back seat were “pushed down . . . along the crease” indicating “non-use.” Suarez contended that A.E. put the belt on herself when they left home. Dominguez testified that she later buckled A.E. in the car. Corral stated that she told Suarez to “make sure you buckle up the girls” and testified that she saw Suarez look toward the back seat and then put N.E. in the front seat. Corral indicated that she had no doubt that A.E. was properly secured with a seat belt. There was testimony that A.E. could unbuckle the seat belt herself. Other evidence indicated that Suarez stopped at a red light before driving across the bridge to ensure that A.E. was asleep.

         Did Suarez recklessly cause A.E.’s death? See Suarez v. State, Tex. App. LEXIS 10799 (2003).

         Suarez v. State, Tex.App. LEXIS 10799 (2003). Recklessness is the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustified risk that places a passenger in great danger. A police officer testified at trial that a child does not fall out of a window unless they are unbelted. The evidence indicated that the seatbelt clips in the back of the car were pushed down, indicating a lack of use. Norma clearly also was reckless in the event that when she stopped at the red light before crossing the bridge and did not secure A.E. in the seat. There was evidence before the jury that A.E. was belted when Norma left Corral’s home. In the event that the jury accepted this testimony, Norma also could be found to have been reckless when she failed to notice that A.E. removed the belt when she stopped at the red light before crossing the bridge. Recklessness also could be established by Norma’s failure to fulfill her duty as a mother or as a driver to secure A.E. 

         A two-year-old child was placed in the care of Patterson, who possessed an IQ of 61, which places the defendant in the bottom 1 percent of the population. “"Shortly thereafter, the defendant began to restrict the victim's access to fluids in order to correct certain behavioral problems. She did not allow the victim to consume liquids after 8 p.m. in order to prevent him from wetting the bed. The defendant also prevented the victim from consuming liquids at other times in order to encourage him to consume solid food. An additional disciplinary measure involved placing hot sauce in a cup on the kitchen table to discourage the child from drinking out of other people’s cups.”                  
    Patterson gave the victim little or nothing to drink from the morning of February 22, 2009, to the morning of February 26, 2009. The child began to display the signs of dehydration."                 
    In the days immediately preceding his death, the child-victim began to exhibit numerous symptoms of dehydration. He had dry, cracked lips, a sunken face and a diminished appetite. The child-victim also experienced a significant loss of weight. On the morning of February 26, 2008, the defendant discovered that the child-victim was not breathing. Shortly thereafter, the defendant contacted emergency personnel by telephone. During this call, “the defendant stated that the victim was 'dehydrated.' The deputy chief medical examiner later confirmed that the child had died due to insufficient fluid intake.” Patterson was found guilty of criminally negligent homicide and cruelty to persons (which requires recklessness). The appellate court in explaining the homicide conviction explained that criminal negligence is measured by the standard of a “normally prudent person” and that an individual’s specific characteristics are irrelevant. Do you agree that the defendant should be held to the same standard as an individual with an IQ in the “average range”? Patterson was sentenced to five years incarceration and five years probation. Did it make sense to convict the Patterson of negligent homicide? State v. Patterson, 68 A.3d 83 (Conn. 2013). 

STATE V. PATTERSON, 68 A.3D 83 (CONN. 2013) 

         The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The victim, a two year old boy, was placed in the care of the defendant by his mother on February 18, 2008. On that date, the victim was in good health.

         "Shortly thereafter, the defendant began to restrict the victim's access to fluids in order to correct certain behavioral problems. Specifically, the defendant did not allow the victim to consume liquids after 8 p.m. in order to prevent him from wetting the bed. The defendant also prevented the victim from consuming liquids at other times in order to encourage him to consume solid food. As a result of such restrictions, the defendant gave the victim little or nothing to drink from the morning of February 22, 2009, to the morning of February 26, 2009.

         "Moreover, at some point during the victim's stay, the defendant attempted to discourage him from drinking out of cups belonging to other people. In order to accomplish this, the defendant placed a small amount of hot sauce in a cup and left it on the kitchen table. The victim consumed hot sauce from a cup on at least one occasion.

         "In the days immediately preceding his death, the victim began to exhibit numerous symptoms of dehydration. He had dry, cracked lips, a sunken face and a diminished appetite. He also had lost a significant amount of weight. On the morning of February 26, 2008, the defendant discovered that the victim was not breathing. Shortly thereafter, the defendant contacted emergency personnel by telephone. During this call, the defendant stated that the victim was 'dehydrated.' The deputy chief medical examiner later confirmed that the child had died due to insufficient fluid intake.

         "The defendant possesses an IQ of 61. This score places her within the bottom one half of 1 percent of the population. Due to this cognitive disability, the defendant did not know that withholding liquids could cause the victim to die. The defendant did, however, generally understand that depriving someone of fluids can cause dehydration. . . .”

         The state … convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, two counts of risk of injury to a child and two counts of cruelty to persons. The court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration, suspended after five years, with five years probation." The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim on appeal that "because of her mental disability, there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of (1) criminally negligent homicide, (2) cruelty to persons and (3) risk of injury to a child ….Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to those counts.

         With respect to her first claim, the defendant …relied on the trial court's finding that because of her cognitive disabilities, she was not "consciously aware of the fact that by withholding liquids from [the victim] . . . [he] could become dehydrated and die." According to the defendant, this finding necessarily implied that she was "cognitively unable to perceive the risks created by her actions," and could not therefore be found guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Court rejected this claim. The court began by contrasting the mental states required for manslaughter (recklessness) and criminally negligent homicide (criminal negligence). Whereas recklessness requires that the defendant be aware of, and consciously disregard, a substantial risk of death, criminal negligence requires only the "failure to perceive the risks created by one's actions." Recklessness thus requires a subjective awareness of the risk of death, the court noted, whereas criminal negligence is measured objectively. In other words, "the [p]eculiarities of a given individual, such as intelligence, experience, and physical capabilities, are irrelevant in determining criminal negligence, since the standard is one of the reasonably prudent person."           
    Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim that, in light of her diminished mental capacity, there was insufficient evidence that she possessed the specific intent required for a conviction of risk of injury to a child …. The court explained that "[s]pecific intent is not a necessary requirement of this statute. Rather, the intent to do some act coupled with a reckless disregard of the consequences . . . of that act is sufficient to [establish] a violation of the statute." Consequently, "[i]n order to be found guilty of risk of injury to a child, the defendant must have been aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that withholding liquids could cause the victim harm." Because the defendant, on the morning of the victim's death, had observed the victim's body and informed emergency personnel that the victim was "dehydrated"; the Appellate Court held that the trial court "reasonably could have concluded that the defendant understood the causal relationship between depriving the victim of liquids and the physiological condition known as dehydration that he suffered as a result." Accordingly, [the Appellate Court concluded, the trial court's determination that "the defendant possessed the mental state necessary for conviction …is supported by the evidence contained within the record."       
   The court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration, suspended after five years, with five years probation."

         A juvenile court ordered C.R.M. to attend Anoka County, Minnesota, Juvenile Day School. Students’ coats are hung outside the classroom and inspected in the morning for contraband. A folding knife with a four-inch blade was discovered in C.R.M.’s coat. C.R.M. immediately reacted, “Oh man, I forgot to take it out, I was whittling this weekend.” The head teacher in the school found C.R.M’s reaction to be “spontaneous” and “believable.” C.R.M.’s mother testified that he was wearing a “double jacket” and, although he stated that he patted himself down, he likely would not have felt the knife. The police were contacted, and C.R.M. was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on school property, a felony-level offense. The judge concluded that C.R.M. likely was not “whittling” and probably accidentally brought the knife to school. C.R.M. nonetheless was convicted under a statute that makes possession of a dangerous weapon on school property a strict liability offense. C.R.M., appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution was required to establish that he knowingly possessed a dangerous weapon. The Minnesota statute provides that “[w]hoever possesses, stores, or keeps a dangerous weapon or uses or brandishes a replica firearm or a BB gun on school property is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $ 5,000, or both.” Consider whether there is a clear statement of legislative intent, the severity of the punishment of the offense, whether requiring a demonstration of criminal intent will impede enforcement of the law, and whether the law will result in the arrest of significant number of individuals who unknowingly bring prohibited “weapons” onto the school grounds. See In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000). Should a strict liability standard be applied to a teacher who claims to have brought a firearm to school accidentally? See Esteban v. Commonwealth, 587 S.E.2d 523 (Va. 2003).

 

In re C.R.M, 611 N.W.2D 802 (Minn. 2000), Stringer J.

Issue

         In the course of a standard contraband check conducted on students' coats at a juvenile day school in Anoka County, Minnesota on Monday, November 2, 1998, a teacher found a folding knife with a four-inch blade in appellant C.R.M.'s coat pocket. Appellant, a minor, was a student at the school. Appellant identified the coat as his and said he forgot to remove the knife from his coat after whittling over the weekend. Appellant was convicted for possessing a dangerous weapon on school property, a felony offense. The court of appeals affirmed holding that appellant should have known that the knife was in his coat. Appellant challenges his conviction here, arguing that the state must prove that he had knowledge of possession.

Facts

Appellant attended Anoka County Juvenile Day School pursuant to a prior dispositional order. Contraband searches are conducted on the students' coats nearly every day at the school after the coats are hung on hooks in the hallway near the students' classrooms. If contraband is found, the school's procedure is for the teacher to enter the classroom nearest to where the coats are hung and to ask who owns the coat. When the coat is identified the student who owns it is asked about the contraband. If the contraband is "serious" the school authorities contact probation officers or the police.
       On Monday, November 2, 1998 the lead teacher of the school, Waneta Hord, and several students conducted a routine contraband search. A student brought a coat to Hord reporting a knife in the coat pocket. Hord brought the coat into the nearest classroom, displayed the coat and asked who owned it. Appellant immediately identified the coat as his but when asked by Hord what was in the coat pocket, he said that he did not know. Hord told him that a knife was found in his pocket and removed a folding knife with a four-inch blade. Appellant responded, "Oh man, I forgot to take it out, I was whittling this weekend." In accordance with school procedure upon finding serious contraband, Hord called the police and retained possession of the knife until the police confiscated it. Anoka County Police Sergeant Hammes responded to the call from the school and after investigation appellant was charged with violating Minn. Stat. Section 609.66, subd. 1d, which makes possession of a dangerous weapon on school property a felony level offense. At trial, Hord testified that when she asked who owned the jacket, appellant immediately responded "I do" and was very cooperative throughout all of her questioning. She also testified that when she pulled the knife out and appellant said he had been whittling, his reaction was "spontaneous" and "believable." Sergeant Hammes  testified that appellant admitted that the knife was his, and that the day before he had been whittling with the knife and had put it in his coat pocket but forgot to take it out. Appellant also told Sergeant Hammes that before coming to school on Monday he patted himself down but missed the knife. Appellant's mother told the court that appellant had on a "double jacket" that morning so even though he patted himself down, he could not feel the knife. A probation officer also told the court there was no evidence that appellant brought the knife to school to get into a fight. The court concluded, "I don't know that I believe that [appellant] was whittling. I believe he brought it accidentally."
      After testimony from Horn and Hammes, appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that any reasonable interpretation of section 609.66, subd. 1d, would require appellant to know that the knife was in his coat pocket and that general intent required knowledge of possession. The prosecutor responded that the statute does not require knowledge or intent because it creates a strict liability crime—the state need only show appellant possessed a dangerous weapon on school grounds.
      The district court determined that appellant was guilty, noting:

I'm going to find him guilty as the law is written because he did possess the knife that was in his coat.

Now I'm going to let you take it up but I can't get you to take it up unless I find him guilty, and if someone wants to indicate that in order to achieve a felony status there's got to be mens rea that he had that knife and he knew that he had that knife when he walked in there fine, but right now this isn't the way the statute reads.

A dispositional order was filed on November 24, 1998, ordering appellant to comply with previously imposed conditions relating to the earlier offenses, to write a letter of apology and to possess no weapons, including knives, until he turned 19. The court of appeals affirmed.    
     On review here appellant again argues that Section 609.66 subd. 1d, requires the state to prove that appellant knew that he possessed a dangerous weapon. The statute reads as follows:
 
Whoever possesses, stores, or keeps a dangerous weapon or uses or brandishes a replica firearm or a BB gun on school property is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $ 5,000, or both.
 

The object of statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate legislative intent, construing words according to their common and approved usage. We are aware that the legislative authority to create criminal strict liability offenses has been recognized in Minnesota. We are also mindful however, that strict liability statutes are generally disfavored, and legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear.
    Our first consideration is whether the legislature intended the terms "possesses, stores or keeps" to require the state to prove that the defendant knew that he possessed, stored or kept a weapon. These terms are not defined in the statute and dictionary definitions provide little guidance—thus we turn to legislative history. Section 609.66, subd. 1d, was introduced in the legislature in February 1993 in three separate bills, none including a reference to knowledge or intent.⁷ Legislative discussion before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice and Family Law suggests a focus on regulatory concerns, and that the bill was intended to address inconsistencies in the law by making it a felony for a student to possess a pistol on school grounds as well as to possess other weapons, such as switchblades. An important objective of the bill was thus to make the possession of weapons other than guns in school zones a felony.
      The two goals of the bills—to create safer schools and to create consistent felonies  for weapon possession in schools—were based on concerns for the public welfare and thus implicate decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court regarding the mens rea in enforcement of statutes enacted for the welfare of the public. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Court reflected on the role of public welfare offenses as part of a criminal statutory scheme:

 
Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. … Their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same. … Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused … usually is in a position to prevent [the violation] with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.

 
More recently in Staples, the Court provided important guidance for our analysis here when it held that the prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant charged under the National Firearms Act for possessing a machine-gun knew that the weapon he possessed was in fact a machinegun. The Court first acknowledged that "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to," common law crimes and may be read into common law crimes even where the statute does not explicitly require it. However, the Court noted that statutes concerning "public welfare" or "regulatory offenses," at which typically "regulate potentially harmful or injurious items," are not subject to a presumption requiring proof of a mens rea to establish liability. The rationale for eliminating such a presumption is that regulatory statutes impose liability for the "type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety." The Court also reasoned that while there is no tradition of lawful possession or selling of hand grenades or narcotics, "there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country," thus the mere possession of a firearm does not put owners on notice that they are engaging in conduct inherently dangerous to the public. In fact, the Court observed that precisely because certain guns are "commonplace and generally available … we [do] not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation."
      The Staples Court went on to emphasize the importance of the level of punishment attached to an offense in considering whether a statute is regulatory, observing "historically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea." The Court noted that fines and short jail sentences, but not imprisonment, have historically been legitimate punishment for strict liability offenses and reasoned that the less severe penalties attached to public welfare statutes "logically complement" at the absence of the mens rea requirement. The Court then "questioned whether imprisonment is compatible with the reduced culpability required for … regulatory offenses." Observing that the public welfare analysis "hardly seems apt" for a felony, the Court appeared to stop just short of holding that a public welfare offense cannot be a felony. The Court held where, as here, dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate the mens rea requirement. In such a case, the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.
      The Court then concluded that the penalty attached to the statute indicated that Congress did not intend to eliminate the mens rea requirement because "if Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, and to subject them to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect."
      In Minnesota, the distinction between strict liability crimes and those requiring a mens rea has been recognized in both our case law and statutes; for example and relevant here, is Minn. Stat. Section 609.02, subd. 9 (1998), providing definitions for chapter 609 offenses:
 
 (1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in this chapter, such intent is indicated by the term "intentionally," the phrase "with intent to," the phrase "with intent that," or some form of the verbs "know" or "believe."
 
(2)"Know" at requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.

(3) "Intentionally" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result. In addition * * * the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make the actor's conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word "intentionally."
 
(4) "With intent to" or "with intent that" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.
 
      While we have not yet ruled whether under this statute a chapter 609 offense must be interpreted as a strict liability crime where it contains no language indicating intent or knowledge, in several opinions we have ruled on whether mere "possession" in various contexts requires a mens rea. In State v. Siirila, we affirmed a conviction under Minn. Stat. Section 618.02 (1969), which stated "it shall be unlawful for any person to…    possess … any narcotic drug" where appellants had an unusable quantity of marijuana. We observed that the legislature had reduced the crime of possession of a small amount of marijuana from a felony to a gross misdemeanor, and concluded the inference is permissible that, marijuana having been found in a jacket shown to belong to defendant and to have been worn by him, whatever was in the jacket was there with his knowledge. The element of knowledge need not be proved from direct testimony, but may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
     Later, in State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609 (1975), we held that the defendant was guilty under Minn. Stat. Section 152.09, subd. 1(2) (1974), of the felony offense of unlawful possession of cocaine, but noted "to convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the state must prove that defendant consciously possessed … the substance and that defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance." .
 Again in State v. Strong, we held that Minn. Stat. Section 243.55 (1978 & Supp. 1979), which provided "any person who brings … into any state correctional facility … any firearms, weapons or explosives of any kind … shall be guilty of a felony" required the state to show that the defendant had knowledge of possession of the offensive item. Because this was not a chapter 609 offense, we specifically declined to address whether section 609.02 cited above dispensed with proof of a mens rea in a chapter 609 offense absent words of intent. We did observe however, that "most commentators have argued that the legislature should never use strict liability for crimes carrying a sentence of imprisonment and the moral condemnation going with such crimes." 
      We see no reason why the element of scienter should be dispensed with in this situation and we are not convinced that the legislature intended to do so, any more than it intended to dispense with the requirement of scienter when it enacted the penalties for felonious possession of controlled substances.
      The rulings of the United States Supreme Court and this court thus highlight the long established principle of American criminal jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level offenses mens rea is required. Nonetheless, respondent argues that because Minn. Stat. Section 609.02, subd. 9, specifically provides that if the legislature intends to include mens rea in a chapter 609 crime it must be evidenced in the statutory language by some form of the terms "knowledge," "belief" or "intent," and none appears in section 609.66, subd. 1d, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to include mens rea as an element of the crime charged.
      In the context of Supreme Court and this court's criminal jurisprudence regarding the relationship of felony level offenses and mens rea, and our long accepted rules of statutory construction, we do not believe the expression of legislative intent of section 609.02, subd. 9, is so clear. We observe initially that the legislature never explicitly indicated that it intended to create a strict liability offense. The legislative discussion of the severe penalty attached to the section 609.66, subd. 1d, offense is an important factor in our analysis because it underscores that the weapon possession statute was intended to be more than merely regulatory—its legislative sponsor emphasized that the bill was intended to create and expand felony level penalties to include the possession of all dangerous weapons on school grounds.
     Further, section 609.02, subd. 9, definitions provide no clearer illumination as to the legislature's intent with respect to the weapon possession offense. The Supreme Court has suggested that some indication of legislative intent, whether express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a felony level crime. In Staples, the Court stated that if the legislature wanted to make "outlaws" of those possessing weapons while being completely ignorant of the offending characteristics of the weapons, it would have spoken clearly to that effect. Similarly, in United States Gypsum, the Court noted that "certainly far more than a simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement." We have expressed similar concerns, stating that "we are guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear."                       
    We conclude that the "catch all" language of section 609.02, subd. 9, which provides that proof of intent with respect to the numerous criminal statutes included in chapter 609 is an element of the crime when the words "know," "intentionally," or " with intent to" are used is not a sufficiently clear expression of legislative intent to dispense with it with respect to the felony level crime charged here. If it is the legislature's purpose to convict a student for a felony for the unknowing possession of a knife on school property, it should say so directly and unequivocally with respect to that specific crime and not with the convenient but far less specific "if we did not say it we do not mean it."
      The public welfare nature of the offense charged here is also an important consideration in our analysis. Certain items of property, for example unlicensed hand grenades, by their very nature suggest that possession is not innocent because possession itself is demonstrative of intent. On the other hand, great care is taken to avoid interpreting statutes as eliminating mens rea where doing so criminalizes a broad range of what would otherwise be innocent conduct. In Staples the Court held that lawful gun ownership fell into the second category, pointing to the tradition of gun ownership and the fact that guns have not historically been considered of such a dangerous nature that their owners should be on notice that mere possession is a crime. Applying this analysis to the facts here, we observe that knives as common household utensils are clearly not inherently dangerous, as they can be used for a myriad of completely benign purposes—for example peeling an orange or sharpening a pencil—and are certainly not as inherently anti-social as illegal drugs and hand grenades. Moreover, mere possession of something that may fit the statutory definition of "dangerous weapon"—for example, a paring knife or scissors—would not create a level of panic, even on school property, that a "reasonable person should know [possession] is subject to stringent public regulation …." In many if not most cases prosecuted under a statute proscribing occurrences on school property, we note further, the accused will be a school-aged minor.
     Thus we conclude that in light of our jurisprudential history requiring clear legislative intent to dispense with proof of mens rea and our heightened concern when it relates to felony level crimes, and because we believe the nature of the weapon here-a knife-was not so inherently dangerous that appellant should be on notice that mere possession would be a crime, respondent was required to prove that appellant knew he possessed the knife on school property as an element of the section 609.66, subd. 1d, offense charged.
 

Holding
 We reverse the court of appeals decision and remand to the trial court to determine whether appellant had knowledge of possession of the knife while on school property.
 
Gilbert, J. concurring

I concur with the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to emphasize my concern about the majority opinion's new requirement that if the legislature intends to make a crime a strict liability offense, "it should say so directly and unequivocally." This new requirement deviates from our longstanding precedent relating to strict liability crimes that requires only that there be clear legislative intent to dispense with mens rea, rather than requiring a direct and unequivocal statement of intent to create a strict liability offense. In effect and contrary to our precedent, the majority unnecessarily adopts a per se rule that absent a direct and unequivocal statement obviating the need to prove intent, no felony criminal statute can be interpreted to create a strict liability offense. This change in our law is an unnecessary departure where here, after looking for and failing to find an express statement, the majority engages in the very analysis which it declares is unnecessary: it looks at the statute as a whole and concludes that there is not clear legislative intent to enact a strict liability offense.