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Journal Article 1: Allen, S. H., & Lektzian, D. J. (2013). Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument? Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 121-135. doi:10.1177/0022343312456224

Summary: This article tests the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions. It finds that sanctions that have a large impact on a target state have an effect similar to war on a state’s public health system, while sanctions that do not greatly impact an economy do not have major public health implications.

Questions to Consider

1. If sanctions can have such a severe impact on the population of a state, can they be considered a form of human rights abuse?

2. The authors suggest smart sanctions as an alternative to general economic sanctions. How do they differ from more traditional sanctions, and how do they alleviate humanitarian suffering?

3. Given their negative effects on a state’s population, in what circumstances do you believe it is ok to use economic sanctions?

 

Journal Article 2: Boutton, A. (2014). US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for counterterrorism cooperation. Journal of Peace Research, 51(6), 741-754. doi:10.1177/0022343314543144

Summary: This article examines US aid given to states for the purposes of counter-terrorism. It finds that such aid leads to a reduction in terrorist activities in recipient countries, but only when they do not have an external rival. States that have an external rival divert the aid to add in confronting the rival state.

Questions to Consider

1. Frequently when studying aid, we hear blanket statements about aid effectiveness; what does this article suggest about the need for a more nuanced understanding of how different types of aid work?

2. If this article is correct, can you conceive of a way to restructure aid to states that are in a rivalry relationship to be more effective in combatting terrorism?

 

Journal Article 3: Jeong, J. M., & Peksen, D. (2017). Domestic institutional constraints, veto players, and sanction effectiveness. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Online First. doi:10.1177/0022002717728105

Summary: This article examines the domestic political structure of targets of economic sanctions. It finds that states with multiple and larger veto players are more likely to concede to demands in the face of sanctions.

Questions to Consider

1. What is a veto player?

2. Why might leaders who face multiple veto players be more likely to concede to sanctions?

3. Do you believe policy makers can combine the insights of this article regarding veto players and the idea of smart sanctions to craft more effective sanctions regimes?

 

Journal Article 4: Kono, D. Y., & Montinola, G. R. (2015). Foreign aid, time horizons, and trade policy. Comparative Political Studies, 48(6), 788-819. doi:10.1177/0010414014556048

Summary: This article argues, somewhat counter-intuitively, that foreign aid given to states with long-time horizons does not promote liberalization as those states are likely to liberalize anyway. On the other hand, aid given to states with short time horizons may lead to liberalization.

Questions to Consider

1. As noted, the argument is somewhat counterintuitive; it suggests that aid given to states with a longer time horizon is less effective because those states are already adopting the desired policies. Does this suggest that aid should be diverted from states adopting good policies on their own to states with “bad” policies?

2. If the premise of question one is correct and policy makers embrace this logic, could it lead to a “moral hazard” in which states adopt bad policies to attract aid?

 

Journal Article 5: Licht, A. A. (2010). Coming into money: The impact of foreign aid on leader survival. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1), 58-87. doi:10.1177/0022002709351104

Summary: This study suggests that foreign aid is most helpful to leaders when they are in secure positions. For democracies, leaders are most secure right after taking office; aid can be seen as a detriment to democratic leaders facing opposition. Alternatively, authoritarian leaders are more secure the longer they are in power, suggesting aid is more helpful to secure authoritarian leaders.

Questions to Consider

1. Based on all of these readings, one can conclude that the effectiveness of aid is dependent on a number of complex factors. Do you believe policy-makers are considering these factors when deciding whether or not to give aid?

2. Why are the dynamics for security in office so different for democratic versus authoritarian leaders? Relatedly, what is a winning coalition in an authoritarian state?