Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

There Is Nothing So Theoretical as a Good Method Anthony G. Greenwald Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2012; vol. 7, 2: pp. 99-108.

Abstract

This article documents two facts that are provocative in juxtaposition. First: There is multidecade durability of theory controversies in psychology, demonstrated here in the subdisciplines of cognitive and social psychology. Second: There is a much greater frequency of Nobel science awards for contributions to method than for contributions to theory, shown here in an analysis of the last two decades of Nobel awards in physics, chemistry, and medicine. The available documentation of Nobel awards reveals two forms of method–theory synergy: (a) existing theories were often essential in enabling development of awarded methods, and (b) award-receiving methods often generated previously inconceivable data, which in turn inspired previously inconceivable theories. It is easy to find illustrations of these same synergies also in psychology. Perhaps greater recognition of the value of method in advancing theory can help to achieve resolutions of psychology’s persistent theory controversies.

Discussion questions:

1. What is confirmation bias?  According to the author, how does confirmation bias affect psychological theory development?
2. What is the method-theory synergy in psychology?  What are some examples of theory being used to develop new methods?  What are some examples of methods producing new theories?
3. What do you think is the “best” relationship between method and theory?

Much Pain, Little Gain? Paradigm-Specific Models and Methods in Experimental Psychology Thorsten Meiser  Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2011; vol. 6, 2: pp. 183-191.

Abstract

Paradigm-oriented research strategies in experimental psychology have strengths and limitations. On the one hand, experimental paradigms play a crucial epistemic and heuristic role in basic psychological research. On the other hand, empirical research is often limited to the observed effects in a certain paradigm, and theoretical models are frequently tied to the particular features of the given paradigm. A paradigm-driven research strategy therefore jeopardizes the pursuit of research questions and theoretical models that go beyond a specific paradigm. As one example of a more integrative approach, recent research on illusory and spurious correlations has attempted to overcome the limitations of paradigm-specific models in the context of biased contingency perception and social stereotyping. Last but not least, the use of statistical models for the analysis of elementary cognitive functions is a means toward a more integrative terminology and theoretical perspective across different experimental paradigms and research domains.

Discussion questions:

1. What does the author mean by “paradigm-driven research?”
2. What does the author view as the essential and dangerous roles of experimental paradigms?”
3. What do you think about the author’s conclusion that “experimental paradigms should still be taken as tools for research and not be confused with targets of research?”

Why the Cognitive Approach in Psychology Would Profit From a Functional Approach and Vice Versa Jan De Houwer Perspectives on Psychological Science, March 2011; vol. 6, 2: pp. 202-209.

Abstract

Cognitively oriented psychologists often define behavioral effects in terms of mental constructs (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the formation of associations in memory) and thus effectively treat those effects as proxies for mental constructs. This practice can, however, hamper scientific progress. I argue that if psychologists would consistently define behavioral effects only in terms of the causal impact of elements in the environment (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the pairing of stimuli), they would adopt a functional approach that not only reveals the environmental causes of behavior but also optimizes cognitive research. The cognitive approach in turn strengthens the functional approach by facilitating the discovery of new causal relations between the environment and behavior. I thus propose a functional–cognitive framework for research in psychology that capitalizes on the mutually supportive nature of the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology.

Discussion questions:

1. Why does the author believe that using behavioral effects as indirect measure (“proxies of”) of mental processes is problematic?
2. What is the functional-cognitive framework that the author proposes?
3. What are the potential arguments against and limitations of the functional approach?
   

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Brain Imaging, Cognitive Processes, and Brain Networks Brian D. Gonsalves and Neal J. Cohen Perspectives on Psychological Science, November 2010; vol. 5, 6: pp. 744-752.

Abstract

The recent, rapid expansion of the application of neuroimaging techniques to a broad variety of questions about the structure and function of mind and brain has led to much necessary and often critical introspection about what these techniques can actually tell us about cognitive processes. In this article, we attempt to place neuroimaging within the broader context of the cognitive neuroscience approach, which emphasizes the benefits of converging methodologies for understanding cognition and how it is supported by the functioning of the brain. Our arguments for what neuroimaging has to offer are supported by two specific examples from research on memory that, we believe, show how neuroimaging data have provided unique insights not only into brain organization, but also into the organization of the mind.

Discussion questions:

1. What do the authors mean by talking about the “functional architecture of the mind” and the “structural architecture of the brain?”
2. The author identifies two “powerful uses of brain imaging data in understanding cognition.”  What are they? Using examples, how do these uses differ from each other?
3. What insights about memory have come from neuroimaging studies?

Binding Items and Contexts: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Episodic Memory Charan Ranganath Current Directions in Psychological Science, June 2010; vol. 19, 3: pp. 131-137.

Abstract

In order to remember a past event, the brain must not only encode the specific aspects of an event but also bind them in a manner that can later specify the spatiotemporal context in which event occurred. Here, I describe recent research aimed at characterizing the functional organization of two brain regions—the medial temporal lobes and the prefrontal cortex—that allow us to accomplish this task. Converging evidence indicates that different regions of the medial temporal lobes may form representations of items, contexts, and item-context bindings and that areas in the prefrontal cortex may implement working-memory control processes that allow us to build meaningful relationships between items that are encountered over time. The results are compatible with an emerging model that generates novel predictions at both the behavioral and neural levels.

Discussion questions:

1. Describe some cognitive tasks that seem to be controlled by the medial temporal lobes and the prefrontal cortex. Which tasks are of interest to the author of this article?
2. Explain the difference in the type of information processed by the DLPFC and the VLPFC. Can you give some examples of each type of information?
3. In way does this article support the idea that “memory does not work like a video recording of events”?

Mapping Mental Function to Brain Structure: How Can Cognitive Neuroimaging Succeed?  Russell A. Poldrack Perspectives on Psychological Science, November 2010; vol. 5, 6: pp. 753-761.

Abstract

The goal of cognitive neuroscience is to identify the mapping between brain function and mental processing. In this article, I examine the strategies that have been used to identify such mappings and argue that they may be fundamentally unable to identify selective structure–function mappings. To understand the functional anatomy of mental processes, it will be necessary for researchers to move from the brain-mapping strategies that the field has employed toward a search for selective associations. This will require a greater focus on the structure of cognitive processes, which can be achieved through the development of formal ontologies that describe the structure of mental processes. In this article, I outline the Cognitive Atlas Project, which is developing such ontologies, and show how this knowledge could be used in conjunction with data-mining approaches to more directly relate mental processes and brain function.

Discussion questions:

1. Describe the three cognitive neuroscience strategies discussed in the article.
2. Which of these strategies does the author argue we should follow in cognitive neuroscience research? Why does he make this argument?
3. What is the “Cognitive Atlas”? How can it help researchers in the cognitive neuroscience area?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Predicting the Effects of Actions: Interactions of Perception and Action Günther Knoblich and Rüdiger Flach Psychological Science, November 2001; vol. 12, 6: pp. 467-472.

Abstract

Many theories in cognitive psychology assume that perception and action systems are clearly separated from the cognitive system. Other theories suggest that important cognitive functions reside in the interactions between these systems. One consequence of the latter claim is that the action system may contribute to predicting the future consequences of currently perceived actions. In particular, such predictions might be more accurate when one observes one's own actions than when one observes another person's actions, because in the former case the system that plans the action is the same system that contributes to predicting the action's effects. In the present study, participants (N = 104) watched video clips displaying either themselves or somebody else throwing a dart at a target board and predicted the dart's landing position. The predictions were more accurate when participants watched themselves acting. This result provides evidence for the claim that perceptual input can be linked with the action system to predict future outcomes of actions.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain what the authors mean by the “interaction of perception and action.” What perspective of cognitive psychology is this consistent with?
2. Explain how the task used in this study involves the “interaction of perception and action.”
3. Explain how their results from this task support the “interaction of perception and action.”

Confuse Your Illusion: Feedback to Early Visual Cortex Contributes to Perceptual Completion Martijn E. Wokke, Annelinde R. E. Vandenbroucke, H. Steven Scholte, and Victor A. F. Lamme Psychological Science, January 2013; vol. 24, 1: pp. 63-71., first published on December 10, 2012

Abstract

A striking example of the constructive nature of visual perception is how the human visual system completes contours of occluded objects. To date, it is unclear whether perceptual completion emerges during early stages of visual processing or whether higher-level mechanisms are necessary. To answer this question, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt signaling in V1/V2 and in the lateral occipital (LO) area at different moments in time while participants performed a discrimination task involving a Kanizsa-type illusory figure. Results show that both V1/V2 and higher-level visual area LO are critically involved in perceptual completion. However, these areas seem to be involved in an inverse hierarchical fashion, in which the critical time window for V1/V2 follows that for LO. These results are in line with the growing evidence that feedback to V1/V2 contributes to perceptual completion.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain what “transcranial magnetic stimulation” is and how the researchers used this technique in their study.
2. Describe the visual illusion the researchers investigated in this study. What was the primary question they examined about the processing of this illusion?
3. What did the results of this study allow the researchers to conclude about the involvement of “lower-order and higher-order visual processes” in the processing of the visual illusion?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Swinging at a Cocktail Party: Voice Familiarity Aids Speech Perception in the Presence of a Competing Voice Ingrid S. Johnsrude, Allison Mackey, Hélène Hakyemez, Elizabeth Alexander, Heather P. Trang, and Robert P. Carlyon Psychological Science, October 2013; vol. 24, 10: pp. 1995-2004., first published on August 28, 2013

Abstract

People often have to listen to someone speak in the presence of competing voices. Much is known about the acoustic cues used to overcome this challenge, but almost nothing is known about the utility of cues derived from experience with particular voices—cues that may be particularly important for older people and others with impaired hearing. Here, we use a version of the coordinate-response-measure procedure to show that people can exploit knowledge of a highly familiar voice (their spouse’s) not only to track it better in the presence of an interfering stranger’s voice, but also, crucially, to ignore it so as to comprehend a stranger’s voice more effectively. Although performance declines with increasing age when the target voice is novel, there is no decline when the target voice belongs to the listener’s spouse. This finding indicates that older listeners can exploit their familiarity with a speaker’s voice to mitigate the effects of sensory and cognitive decline.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain the “cocktail-party problem” discussed in this article. How does the task used in this study relate to this phenomenon?
2. Why did these researchers focus on older adults in this study?
3. How did the presence of a familiar voice speaking in the task affect the performance of the subjects? What did the researchers conclude from these results?

Visual Attention in Driving: The Effects of Cognitive Load and Visual Disruption Yi-Ching Lee, John D. Lee, and Linda Ng Boyle Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, August 2007; vol. 49, 4: pp. 721-733.

Abstract

Objective: This study investigates the effect of cognitive load on guidance of visual attention. Background: Previous studies have shown that cognitive load can undermine driving performance, particularly drivers' ability to detect safety-critical events. Cognitive load combined with the loss of exogenous cues, which can occur when the driver briefly glances away from the roadway, may be particularly detrimental. Method: In each of two experiments, twelve participants engaged in an auditory task while performing a change detection task. A change blindness paradigm was implemented to mask exogenous cues by periodically blanking the screen in a driving simulator while a change occurred. Performance measures included participants' sensitivity to vehicle changes and confidence in detecting them. Results: Cognitive load uniformly diminished participants' sensitivity and confidence, independent of safety relevance or lack of exogenous cues. Periodic blanking, which simulated glances away from the roadway, undermined change detection to a greater degree than did cognitive load; however, drivers' confidence in their ability to detect changes was diminished more by cognitive load than by periodic blanking. Conclusion: Cognitive load and short glances away from the road are additive in their tendency to increase the likelihood of drivers missing safety-critical events.Application: This study demonstrates the need to consider the combined consequence of cognitive load and brief glances away from the road in the design of emerging in-vehicle devices and the need to provide drivers with better feedback regarding these consequences.

Discussion questions:

1. How did the researchers manipulate “cognitive load” in this study? How does this relate to multitasking in daily life?
2. Explain the difference between “endogenous control” and “exogenous control” as they relate to driving performance.
3. From the results of their study, what did the authors conclude about the effect of cognitive load on driving performance? What implication do these results have for cell phone use while driving?

The Neural Basis of Selective Attention: Cortical Sources and Targets of AttentionalModulation Steven Yantis Current Directions in Psychological Science, April 2008; vol. 17, 2: pp. 86-90.

Abstract

Selective attention is an intrinsic component of perceptual representation in a visual system that is hierarchically organized. Modulatory signals originate in brain regions that represent behavioral goals; these signals specify which perceptual objects are to be represented by sensory neurons that are subject to contextual modulation. Attention can be deployed to spatial locations, features, or objects, and corresponding modulatory signals must be targeted within these domains. Open questions include how nonspatial perceptual domains are modulated by attention and how abstract goals are transformed into targeted modulatory signals.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain what the author means by “selective attention.” Can you think of some examples from your daily life?
2. Describe some of the brain areas involved in these attention tasks. What is some of the evidence that these brain areas are involved in these tasks?
3. Explain what the authors mean by “attention modulation.” How does this relate to selective attention?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

The Adaptive Nature of Visual Working Memory A. Emin Orhan, Chris R. Sims, Robert A. Jacobs, and David C. Knill Current Directions in Psychological Science, June 2014; vol. 23, 3: pp. 164-170.

Abstract

A growing body of scientific evidence suggests that visual working memory and statistical learning are intrinsically linked. Although visual working memory is severely resource limited, in many cases, it makes efficient use of its available resources by adapting to statistical regularities in the visual environment. However, experimental evidence also suggests that there are clear limits and biases in statistical learning. This raises the intriguing possibility that performance limitations observed in visual working memory tasks can to some degree be explained in terms of limits and biases in statistical-learning ability, rather than limits in memory capacity.

Discussion questions:

1. What do the authors mean by “statistical learning”? In what way do they claim it is linked to working memory?
2. Why do the authors argue that visual working memory is “efficient”? Explain what they mean by this.
3. What do the authors believe are the limits to adaptation in visual working memory?

The Capacity of Visual Short-Term Memory is Set Both by Visual Information Load and by Number of Objects G.A. Alvarez and P. Cavanagh Psychological Science, February 2004; vol. 15, 2: pp. 106-111.

Abstract

Previous research has suggested that visual short-term memory has a fixed capacity of about four objects. However, we found that capacity varied substantially across the five stimulus classes we examined, ranging from 1.6 for shaded cubes to 4.4 for colors (estimated using a change detection task). We also estimated the information load per item in each class, using visual search rate. The changes we measured in memory capacity across classes were almost exactly mirrored by changes in the opposite direction in visual search rate (r2 = .992 between search rate and the reciprocal of memory capacity). The greater the information load of each item in a stimulus class (as indicated by a slower search rate), the fewer items from that class one can hold in memory. Extrapolating this linear relationship reveals that there is also an upper bound on capacity of approximately four or five objects. Thus, both the visual information load and number of objects impose capacity limits on visual short-term memory.           

Discussion questions:

1. What was the primary research question asked by the authors of this article?
2. How did the authors examine this question? What tasks did they use in their study?
3. What answer to their research question did the authors find from the results of their study?

Applying Psychological Science to Examine Prospective Memory in Simulated Air Traffic Control Shayne Loft Current Directions in Psychological Science, October 2014; vol. 23, 5: pp. 326-331

Abstract

Failures to remember to perform deferred task actions in work settings such as air traffic control can have serious consequences. Most research examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying prospective memory has used simple, static tasks, which may make it difficult to generalize results to work settings. I describe a body of research that has applied theory and methods from the basic prospective-memory and attention-capture literatures to simulations of air traffic control. These theories and methods can be used to anticipate many findings, such as the finding that prospective-memory demands incur performance costs in ongoing air traffic control tasks, and that prospective-memory error and costs to ongoing air traffic control tasks can be reduced by the use of spatial context or prospective-memory aids. Research in laboratory settings that simulates work contexts such as air traffic control can both establish the utility of psychological theory and produce application-relevant information.

Discussion questions:

1. Describe the prospective memory tasks examined in this article. Can you think of comparable prospective memory tasks that you perform in your daily life?
2. What does the author mean that prospective memory tasks have a “cost”?
3. What is meant by “focal targets” in prospective memory tasks? How is this relevant for the air traffic control tasks described in the article?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Testing Enhances the Transfer of Learning Shana K. Carpenter Current Directions in Psychological Science, October 2012; vol. 21, 5: pp. 279-283.

Abstract

Many studies have shown that retrieving information during a test facilitates later memory for that information. Most research on this testing effect has focused on retention of information measured via a final test that is similar to the initial test. Much less is known about the potential of testing to promote the application—i.e., transfer—of learning. In this article, I review recent studies that have begun to address this issue, specifically with regard to the benefits of testing on transfer across temporal contexts, test formats, and knowledge domains. The small but growing number of studies on this topic have so far reported robust benefits of testing on transfer of learning. Future research is encouraged that explores the potential of tests to promote not just direct retention of information, but also the application of knowledge to new situations.

Discussion questions:

1. What is the testing effect? How is it relevant to daily life?
2. What is meant by the “transfer of learning”? Can you think of an example of this from your own learning?
3. According to the author, what factors influence “transfer of learning”?

Is Forgetting Caused by Inhibition? Jeroen G. W. Raaijmakers and Emőke Jakab Current Directions in Psychological Science, June 2013; vol. 22, 3: pp. 205-209.

Abstract

A well-known finding in memory research is the forgetting effect that occurs because of practicing some Item A on the recall of a related Item B. The traditional explanation for such interference effects is based on the notion of competition. According to the inhibition theory of forgetting, however, such forgetting is due to an inhibitory control process that operates whenever the retrieval of specific target information is hindered by competition from related information. The suppression of the related information is a longer lasting phenomenon that may show up on later testing. We report several experiments that were carried out to test 2 fundamental assumptions of the inhibition theory: the interference dependence and retrieval specificity assumptions. The results of these experiments do not support the predictions of the inhibition theory. Instead, the results are more compatible with the standard account that attributes the forgetting to competition at the time of the later testing.

Discussion questions:

1. What is “retrieval-induced forgetting”? How is this type of forgetting tested?
2. According to the authors, what causes retrieval-induced forgetting?
3. What factors influence this effect in memory?

An Asymmetry Between Memory Encoding and Retrieval: Revelation, Generation, and Transfer-Appropriate Processing Neil W. Mulligan and Jeffrey P. Lozito Psychological Science, January 2006; vol. 17, 1: pp. 7-11.

Abstract

Transfer-appropriate-processing accounts of memory emphasize the similarity of encoding and retrieval processes, and imply that experimental manipulations should have similar effects on encoding and retrieval. Exceptions to this expectation are thus of great interest, but extant exceptions (produced by studies using divided attention, alcohol, and benzodiazepines) are debatable, single dissociations between encoding and retrieval. The present experiments demonstrate a reversed dissociation, in which the same variable produced opposite effects when implemented at encoding and retrieval. At encoding, participants either solved anagrams of study words or read intact study words. At retrieval, participants likewise solved anagrams or read intact words prior to making recognition memory judgments. Compared with reading intact words, solving anagrams at encoding enhanced later recognition accuracy, whereas solving anagrams at test impaired accuracy. These results were obtained with old/new decisions (Experiment 1) and with confidence ratings (Experiment 2).

Discussion questions:

1. What is the generation effect? How does it compare in memory performance with encoding by simply reading words?
2. In what way do the results of the study illustrate the interaction between encoding and retrieval?
3. What is the difference between a single dissociation and a double dissociation in results between tasks?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Using Popular Films to Enhance Classroom Learning: The Good, the Bad, and the Interesting Andrew C. Butler, Franklin M. Zaromb, Keith B. Lyle, and Henry L. Roediger IIIPsychological Science, September 2009; vol. 20, 9: pp. 1161-1168.

Abstract

Popular history films sometimes contain major historical inaccuracies. Two experiments investigated how watching such films influences people's ability to remember associated texts. Subjects watched film clips and studied texts about various historical topics. Whereas the texts contained only correct information, the film clips contained both correct information (consistent with the text) and misinformation (contradicted by the text). Before watching each clip, subjects received a specific warning, a general warning, or no warning about the misinformation. One week later, they returned for a cued-recall test about the texts. Watching a film clip increased correct recall of consistent information relative to recall of the same information when subjects did not see the clip. However, when the information in the film contradicted the text, subjects often (falsely) recalled misinformation from the film. The specific warning substantially reduced this misinformation effect. Teachers should use popular history films with caution and should warn students about major inaccuracies in the films.

Discussion questions:

1. According to the results of this study, what are the positive and negative effects on memory for historical information of watching historical films?
2. Why did the researchers include two read/view conditions, one where they watched the film first and one where they read the text first?
3. What effect did warning the participants of inaccurate information in the films have on their memory for the historical information they were learning?

The Adaptive Nature of Memory and Its Illusions Mark L. Howe Current Directions in Psychological Science, October 2011; vol. 20, 5: pp. 312-315.

Abstract

In this article I discuss how false memories do not always have to be associated with negative outcomes. Indeed, under some circumstances, memory illusions, like other illusions more generally, can have positive consequences. I discuss these consequences in the context of the adaptive function of memory, including how false memories can have fitness-relevant benefits for subsequent behavior and problem solving. My hope is that this article changes how illusions are conceptualized, especially those arising from memory. Rather than being a “demon” that vexes our theories of memory, illusions can be thought of as sometimes having positive consequences much in the same way as many of the other outputs of a very powerful, adaptive memory system.

Discussion questions:

1. According to the author, false memories can be “adaptive.” Explain what he means by this.
2. In what way are false memories a product of the way that memory evolved in early in humans?
3. How can researchers test the idea that false memories may have positive effects?

Tricks of Memory Henry L. Roediger III and Kathleen B. McDermott Current Directions in Psychological Science, August 2000; vol. 9, 4: pp. 123-127.

Abstract

Remembering an episode from even the recent past may involve a blend of fiction and fact. We discuss a straightforward laboratory paradigm that is proving useful in the study of false memories of simple episodes. In this paradigm, subjects study lists of 15 related words (bed, rest, awake …) that are all related to a critical word that is not presented (sleep). Later, subjects recall and recognize the critical missing word with about the same probability that they remember words from the list. This memory illusion is resistant to people's attempts to avoid it. We argue that similar memory errors are commonplace and are a natural outcome of an intelligent cognitive system, which makes inferences about incoming information. Therefore, memory illusions, like perceptual illusions, are a consequence of normal human information processing and offer a window for examining basic cognitive processes.

Discussion questions:

1. How does the DRM paradigm described in this article experimentally create false memories?
2. What is the significance of the large number of “remember” responses found for critical lures?
3. What can we learn about the type of memory that is spared in Alzheimer’s patients from the results showing that they falsely recall critical lures as often as other groups of subjects?   

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

New Directions in Mental-Imagery Research: The Binocular-Rivalry Technique and Decoding fMRI Patterns Joel Pearson Current Directions in Psychological Science, June 2014; vol. 23, 3: pp. 178-183.

Abstract

Mental imagery typically involves the voluntary retrieval and representation of a sensory memory, but it can also sometimes be involuntary. Despite mental imagery having been a topic of interest for thousands of years, the methodological tools necessary to scientifically probe its underlying mechanisms have only recently been developed. New methods in behavioral psychophysics (the binocular-rivalry technique) and brain imaging (decoding techniques) have been developed and utilized to uncover many new insights into the mechanisms and brain areas involved in mental imagery. These insights are igniting further empirical and theoretical work into imagery itself as well as its role in many high-level cognitive processes and mental disorders.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain how fMRI is being used as a “decoding” technique to better understand visual imagery.
2. Explain how the binocular-rivalry technique is used to better understand visual imagery.
3. What are some limitations to these methods of study?

Evaluating the Mind’s Eye: The Metacognition of Visual Imagery Joel Pearson, Rosanne L. Rademaker, and Frank Tong Psychological Science, December 2011; vol. 22, 12: pp. 1535-1542., first published on November 4, 2011

Abstract

Can people evaluate phenomenal qualities of internally generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid or detailed? This question exemplifies a problem of metacognition: How well do people know their own thoughts? In the study reported here, participants were instructed to imagine a specific visual pattern and rate its vividness, after which they were presented with an ambiguous rivalry display that consisted of the previously imagined pattern plus an orthogonal pattern. On individual trials, higher ratings of vividness predicted a greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear dominant when the participant was subsequently presented with the binocular rivalry display. Off-line self-report questionnaires measuring imagery vividness also predicted individual differences in the strength of imagery bias over the entire study. Perceptual bias due to mental imagery could not be attributed to demand characteristics, as no bias was observed on catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry displays. Our findings provide novel evidence that people have a good metacognitive understanding of their own mental imagery and can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imagination.

Discussion questions:

1. Why is the question these researchers wanted to answer difficult to study?
2. Explain the task the researchers used in their study to overcome these difficulties.
3. From the results of the study, what were the authors able to conclude about how well individuals can evaluate their own visual images?

Why motor simulation cannot explain affordance perception Gunnar Declerck Adaptive Behavior, August 2013; vol. 21, 4: pp. 286-298., first published on July 9, 2013

Abstract

According to several authors in psychology and neurosciences, our ability to perceive affordances is subtended by motor simulation mechanisms. Such mechanisms provide dynamic representations of feasible actions, thus enabling to scale the surrounding structures on the behavioural repertoire and capacities supported by our body. This attractive hypothesis has been taken up in robotics, to build intelligent systems able to determine in advance whether a given action would be successful given the current state of the environment and their own skills. Several arguments, however, suggest that the motor simulation framework is not sufficient to explain affordance perception: (1) it rests on a misunderstanding of what affordances are: not actions that are currently feasible, but actions that are possible; (2) it is computationally unrealistic: motor simulation is too costly in terms of computational resources to explain how one can access prospectively to actions that are potentiated by surrounding structures; (3) it only covers the part of the perceptual field within the scope of our attention, but the affordances we perceive do not reduce to the object or state of affairs our attention is focused on at time t; and (4) it can only work if a first layer of affordances is available: motor simulation cannot explain affordance perception, because its very functioning presupposes such perception. Other mechanisms must consequently be hypothesized.

Discussion questions:

1. What, according to Jeannerod, is the function of motor simulation?
2. What are “affordances?”  What does the author mean by distinguishing between “could” and “can” actions?
3. Describe what the author is proposing about the relationship between the three ovals in Figure 1.  What does the intersection region represent?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Finding Levels of Abstraction in Speech Production: Evidence From Sound-Production Impairment Adam Buchwald and Michele Miozzo Psychological Science, September 2011; vol. 22, 9: pp. 1113-1119., first published on August 9, 2011

Abstract

A widely held view in linguistics and psycholinguistics is that there are distinct levels of processing for context-independent and context-specific representations of sound structure. Recently, this view has been disputed, in part because of the absence of clear evidence that there are abstract mental representations of discrete sound-structure units. Here, we present novel evidence that separate context-independent and context-specific representations of sound structure are supported by distinct brain mechanisms that can be selectively impaired in individuals with acquired brain deficits. Acoustic data from /s/-deletion errors of 2 aphasic speakers suggest both a phonological level of processing at which sound representations (e.g., /p/) do not specify context-specific detail (e.g., aspirated or unaspirated) and a distinct level at which context-specific information is represented. These data help constrain accounts of sound-structure processing in word production and crucially support the claim that context-independent linguistic information affects language production.

Discussion questions:

1. Explain the difference between context-dependent and context-independent information. Can you provide an example of each with regard to speech?
2. How did these researchers measure the different types of context information in their study?
3. From the results of the study, what were the researchers able to conclude about the roles of context-dependent and context-independent information in speech production?

Object Shape and Orientation Do Not Routinely Influence Performance During Language Processing Joost Rommers, Antje S. Meyer, and Falk Huettig Psychological Science, November 2013; vol. 24, 11: pp. 2218-2225., first published on September 24, 2013

Abstract

The role of visual representations during language processing remains unclear: They could be activated as a necessary part of the comprehension process, or they could be less crucial and influence performance in a task-dependent manner. In the present experiments, participants read sentences about an object. The sentences implied that the object had a specific shape or orientation. They then either named a picture of that object (Experiments 1 and 3) or decided whether the object had been mentioned in the sentence (Experiment 2). Orientation information did not reliably influence performance in any of the experiments. Shape representations influenced performance most strongly when participants were asked to compare a sentence with a picture or when they were explicitly asked to use mental imagery while reading the sentences. Thus, in contrast to previous claims, implied visual information often does not contribute substantially to the comprehension process during normal reading.

Discussion questions:

1. Describe the “embodied cognition” view of language processing tested in this study.
2. How did the researchers test this view in their study?
3. Was the embodied cognition view supported in this study? What results from the study support your answer?

The Truth About Chickens and Bats: Ambiguity Avoidance Distinguishes Types of Polysemy Hugh Rabagliati andJesse Snedeker Psychological Science, July 2013; vol. 24, 7: pp. 1354-1360., first published on May 30, 2013

Abstract

Words mean different things in different contexts, a phenomenon called polysemy. People talk about lines of both people and poetry, and about both long distances andlong times. Polysemy lets a limited vocabulary capture a great variety of experiences, while highlighting commonalities. But how is this achieved? Are polysemous senses contextually driven modifications of core meanings, or must each sense be memorized separately? We show that participants’ ability to avoid referentially ambiguous descriptions of pictures named by polysemous words provides evidence for both possibilities. When senses followed a regular pattern (e.g., animals and the foodstuffs derived from them; noisy chicken, tasty chicken), participants avoided using ambiguous labels in referentially ambiguous situations (e.g., both types of chicken were present), a result indicating that they noticed a common meaning. But when senses were idiosyncratically related (e.g., sheet of glass, drinking glass), participants frequently produced ambiguous labels, a result indicating that the meanings were separately stored. We discuss implications for the relationship between word meanings and concepts.

Discussion questions:

1. In what way does this study show the interaction between language and memory?
2. How did the researchers examine subjects’ activation of multiple meanings of words in the study?
3. How did the results in the study differ for homophones and polysemes?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Learning Concepts and Categories: Is Spacing the “Enemy of Induction”? Nate Kornell and Robert A. Bjork Psychological Science, June 2008; vol. 19, 6: pp. 585-592.

Abstract

Inductive learning—that is, learning a new concept or category by observing exemplars—happens constantly, for example, when a baby learns a new word or a doctor classifies x-rays. What influence does the spacing of exemplars have on induction? Compared with massing, spacing enhances long-term recall, but we expected spacing to hamper induction by making the commonalities that define a concept or category less apparent. We asked participants to study multiple paintings by different artists, with a given artist's paintings presented consecutively (massed) or interleaved with other artists' paintings (spaced). We then tested induction by asking participants to indicate which studied artist (Experiments 1a and 1b) or whether any studied artist (Experiment 2) painted each of a series of new paintings. Surprisingly, induction profited from spacing, even though massing apparently created a sense of fluent learning: Participants rated massing as more effective than spacing, even after their own test performance had demonstrated the opposite.

Discussion questions:

1. In what way was inductive reasoning involved in the concept learning examined in this study?
2. What effect did spacing of exemplars have on concept learning in this study? How did these results compare with subjects’ predictions of their learning?
3. Why did the researchers conduct Experiment 2? What possible confound did it allow them to rule out?

Thinking Intuitively: The Rich (and at Times Illogical) World of Concepts James A. Hampton Current Directions in Psychological Science, December 2012; vol. 21, 6: pp. 398-402.

Abstract

Intuitive knowledge of the world involves knowing what kinds of things have which properties. We express this knowledge in generalities, such as “Ducks lay eggs.” Intuitive knowledge contrasts with extensional knowledge about actual entities in the world, which we express in quantified statements, such as “All U.S. presidents are male.” Reasoning based on this intuitive knowledge, while highly fluent and plausible, may in fact lead us into logical fallacy. Several lines of research have pointed to conceptual memory as the source of such logical failure. We represent concepts with prototypical properties, rather than with logical definitions, and we judge likelihood and argument strength on the basis of similarity between these prototypes instead of using correct notions of probability or logical inference. Evidence that our minds represent the world in this intuitive way can be seen in a range of phenomena, including people’s interpretations of logical connectives applied to everyday concepts, the effects of creativity and emergent features in conceptual combination, and the logically inconsistent beliefs that people express in their everyday language.

Discussion questions:

1. What is the difference between extensions and intensions?
2. What is a conjunction fallacy? Describe an example.
3. What is intuitive reasoning?  How does it allow us to “think creatively?”

Cognitive and Neural Contributions to Understanding the Conceptual System  Lawrence W. Barsalou Current Directions in Psychological Science, April 2008; vol. 17, 2: pp. 91-95.

Abstract

The conceptual system contains categorical knowledge about experience that supports the spectrum of cognitive processes. Cognitive science theories assume that categorical knowledge resides in a modular and amodal semantic memory, whereas neuroscience theories assume that categorical knowledge is grounded in the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and affect. Neuroscience has influenced theories of the conceptual system by stressing principles of neural processing in neural networks and by motivating grounded theories of cognition, which propose that simulations of experience represent knowledge. Cognitive science has influenced theories of the conceptual system by documenting conceptual phenomena and symbolic operations that must be grounded in the brain. Significant progress in understanding the conceptual system is most likely to occur if cognitive and neural approaches achieve successful integration.

Discussion questions:

1. What does the author describe as the “dominant theory in cognitive science?”
2. What does the author describe as the “dominant theory in cognitive neuroscience?”
3. How might “grounded theories” bridge the gap between the theories in cognitive science and those in cognitive neuroscience?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Working Memory Capacity, Attentional Focus, and Problem Solving Jennifer Wiley and Andrew F. Jarosz Current Directions in Psychological Science, August 2012; vol. 21, 4: pp. 258-262.

Abstract

Attentional focus is important for many cognitive processes, including problem solving. In this article, we discuss working memory capacity (WMC), a construct related to the ability to focus attention, and its differential effects on analytic and creative problem solving. One of the main ways in which WMC benefits analytic problem solving seems to be that it helps problem solvers to control their attention, resist distraction, and narrow their search through a problem space. Conversely, several lines of recent evidence have shown that too much focus can actually harm performance on creative problem-solving tasks.

Discussion questions:

1. How does the author characterize “working memory capacity?”
2. How is working memory capacity related to creative problem solving?
3. How does working memory capacity sometimes impact problem solving positively, but negatively on other occasions?

The Mechanism of the Einstellung (Set) Effect: A Pervasive Source of Cognitive Bias Merim Bilalić, Peter McLeod, and Fernand Gobet Current Directions in Psychological Science, April 2010; vol. 19, 2: pp. 111-115.

Abstract

The eye movements of expert players trying to solve a chess problem show that the first idea that comes to mind directs attention toward sources of information consistent with it and away from inconsistent information. This bias continues unconsciously even when players believe they are looking for alternatives. The result is that alternatives to the first idea are ignored. This mechanism for biasing attention ensures a speedy response in familiar situations, but it can lead to errors when the first thought that comes to mind is not appropriate. We propose that this mechanism is the source of many cognitive biases, from phenomena in problem solving and reasoning to perceptual errors and failures in memory.

Discussion questions:

1. What is the “Classical Einstellung Effect?”
2. Describe how the authors quantified the Einstellung Effect in their chess experiment.
3. The authors describe the effect as having both an upside and a downside for problem solving.  Can you think of other examples which demonstrate both of these sides? 

Innovation Relies on the Obscure: A Key to Overcoming the Classic Problem of Functional Fixedness Tony McCaffrey Psychological Science, March 2012; vol. 23, 3: pp. 215-218., first published on February 7, 2012

Abstract

A recent analysis of real-world problems that led to historic inventions and insight problems that are used in psychology experiments suggests that during innovative problem solving, individuals discover at least one infrequently noticed or new (i.e., obscure) feature of the problem that can be used to reach a solution. This observation suggests that research uncovering aspects of the human semantic, perceptual, and motor systems that inhibit the noticing of obscure features would enable researchers to identify effective techniques to overcome those obstacles. As a critical step in this research program, this study showed that the generic-parts technique can help people unearth the types of obscure features that can be used to overcome functional fixedness, which is a classic inhibitor to problem solving. Subjects trained on this technique solved on average 67% more problems than a control group did. By devising techniques that facilitate the noticing of obscure features in order to overcome impediments to problem solving (e.g., design fixation), researchers can systematically create a tool kit of innovation-enhancing techniques.

Discussion questions:

1. What are the two overarching theories of insight problem solving?  Describe how these theories differ.
2. What is the generic-parts technique? How is it used when solving a problem?
3. Describe the design of the experiment.  What are the hypotheses being tested? What do the results of the experiment suggest about the hypotheses?

Click on the following links. Please note these will open in a new window.

SAGE Journal User Guide

Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life Richard P. Larrick, James N. Morgan, and Richard E. Nisbett Psychological Science, November 1990; vol. 1, 6: pp. 362-370.

Abstract

Our research shows that people can apply the cost-benefit rules of microeconomic theory to their everyday decisions. Two populations were examined: (a) people who had previously received extensive formal training in the rules and (b) naive subjects who were randomly assigned to receive brief training in the rules. Training affected reasoning and reported behavior in both populations. The results indicate that extremely general rules govern choices across a wide range of domains and that use of the cost-benefit rules can be improved through training.

Discussion questions:

1. What does the author mean by “cost-benefit rules of choice?”
2. What are the “sunk cost” and “opportunity cost” principles?  Give examples of violations of these principles.
3. Describe the design of the second experiment.  What are the hypotheses being tested? What do the results of the experiment suggest about the hypotheses?

Using Cognitive Models to Map Relations Between Neuropsychological Disorders and Human Decision-Making Deficits Eldad Yechiam, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Julie C. Stout, and Antoine Bechara Psychological Science, December 2005; vol. 16, 12: pp. 973-978.

Abstract

Findings from a complex decision-making task (the Iowa gambling task) show that individuals with neuropsychological disorders are characterized by decision-making deficits that lead to maladaptive risk-taking behavior. This article describes a cognitive model that distills performance in this task into three different underlying psychological components: the relative impact of rewards and punishments on evaluations of options, the rate that the contingent payoffs are learned, and the consistency between learning and responding. Findings from 10 studies are organized by distilling the observed decision deficits into the three basic components and locating the neuropsychological disorders in this component space. The results reveal a cluster of populations characterized by making risky choices despite high attention to losses, perhaps because of difficulties in creating emotive representations. These findings demonstrate the potential contribution of cognitive models in building bridges between neuroscience and behavior.

Discussion questions:

1. What is the Iowa gambling task? Describe the authors’ computerized version of the task.
2. What is the expectancy-valence model?  Describe the model’s three parameters.
3. Generally, what do the authors conclude that the expectancy-valence model shows about decision-making deficits?

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and Keith E. Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science, May 2013; vol. 8, 3: pp. 223-241.

Abstract

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

Discussion questions:

1. What are “dual-process” theories?  What features are generally shared in these theories?
2. The author claims that “not all dual-process theories are the same.  Describe some of the differences between different dual-process theories.
3. Briefly summarize the criticisms of dual-process theories.