Learning Objectives

  1. Describe what the basis is for stops and frisks in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
     
  2. Explain the difference between investigative Terry stops and arrests.
     
  3. Define the term reasonable suspicion, and include the various factors that the police consider in determining whether or not there is reasonable suspicion.
     
  4. Discuss the circumstances under which an informant’s tip constitutes reasonable suspicion.
     
  5. Explain the role drug courier profiles play in reasonable suspicion stops.
     
  6. Describe the significance of “race” in the police determinations of reasonable suspicion.
     
  7. Explain Terry stops and the movement of suspects, the length of seizures, and the intrusiveness of the methods used to investigate suspected criminal activity.
     
  8. Discuss the circumstances in which the police may require drivers, as well as the passengers, in a vehicle they detain on a reasonable suspicion traffic stop to exit the automobile, and the circumstances under which the police may frisk the driver and passengers.
     
  9. Discuss the circumstances under which the police may frisk a suspect, as well as the scope of a Terry frisk.
     
  10. Explain under what conditions the police who stop a vehicle on reasonable suspicion may search the passenger compartment of an automobile.
     
  11. Describe the legal test for the seizure of narcotics in Minnesota v. Dickerson.

 

SUMMARY: In Terry v. Ohio, Chief Justice Earl Warren stressed that a police officer may in “appropriate circumstances” approach and seize an individual to investigate possible criminal behavior despite the fact that the officer does not have probable cause to make an arrest. The question asked by a judge in reviewing a police officer’s decision to stop an individual is “whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man or woman of reasonable caution in the belief” that there is reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is under way, or is about to occur.

The Supreme Court stressed that reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause” and may be based on less complete and less reliable information. In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion, the “totality of the circumstances” is to be taken into account. Judges consider a number of factors, including whether there is a pattern of conduct indicative of criminal activity, the time of day, whether the events occur in a high-crime area, the police officer’s knowledge that a suspect has an arrest record or criminal background, flight or evasion or nervousness of the suspect, and the officer’s experience in making arrests for this type of activity. The facts are to be interpreted in light of an officer’s experience and training. Reasonable suspicion is based on probabilities rather than certainties, and in putting together the pieces of the puzzle that constitute reasonable suspicion, innocent people inevitably may be mistakenly stopped and searched.

Reasonable suspicion also may be based on an informant’s tip. An informant is required to be known to the police and to have proven reliable in the past. The court also will ask how the informant has obtained the information. An informant with firsthand knowledge of criminal activity should be able to provide detailed information.

A tip that lacks these indicia of reliability may be relied on where corroborated in essential details by the police. Most important is the informant’s demonstrated ability to have predicted a suspect’s pattern of activity. The judge strikes a balance. The less reliable the informant, the more a court may insist that the informant is in the position to provide detailed information. A tip that is thought to initially lack the indicia of reliability may be strengthened by police corroboration and by the fact that the informant came forward personally and by a criminal statute that punishes intentionally “false criminal reports.”

Law enforcement has developed profiles to detect terrorists, drug couriers, and other offenders. Courts generally do not give particular weight to the claim that an individual fits a “profile” and, instead, ask whether the combination of the factors identified in the profile constitutes reasonable suspicion. In many instances, courts have found reasonable suspicion where law enforcement agents have supplemented the profile with additional observations.

An individual may not be lawfully stopped by the police when the sole reason for his or her seizure is race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or other descriptive characteristic. An individual also may not be stopped based on the fact that he or she “does not belong in a neighborhood.” Race, ethnicity, or some other physical characteristic, however, may be considered as one of several factors in a finding of reasonable suspicion.

The Supreme Court has stressed that a Terry stop and frisk is a limited intrusion to investigate and to detect crime. Law enforcement officials may interfere with your freedom and privacy only to the extent required to accomplish their purpose. A Terry stop is open to constitutional challenge when a suspect is treated as if he or she has been subjected to a probable cause arrest rather than to a reasonable suspicion stop. This inquiry typically focuses on three areas: movement, length of detention, and intrusiveness.

The Supreme Court has introduced some modest flexibility into Terry in the case of traffic stops. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme Court held that the “legitimate and weighty” interest in protecting the safety of a police officer outweighs the “de minimis” (trivial) intrusion on the liberty of the citizen involved in requiring a driver to leave an automobile. In Maryland v. Wilson, the Supreme Court extended the ruling in Mimms and held that an officer may require a passenger or passengers to exit a car. Several state supreme courts, however, have rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings and require that law enforcement officers possess reasonable suspicion before directing individuals to vacate a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court also has held that an officer is free to interrogate and investigate criminal activity on the part of passengers that is unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop so long as this investigation does not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.”

The second prong of the judgment in Terry addresses the nature and scope of a Terry frisk. The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio recognized that American criminals have a “long tradition of armed violence” and that a number of law enforcement officers are killed and wounded every year in the line of duty. Most of these fatalities and injuries are inflicted at fairly close range with guns and knives. The Court accordingly ruled that where “nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [an officer’s] reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” The frisk is not automatic. The suspect must be provided with the opportunity to dispel the officer’s reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety and security.

The driver and a passenger in an automobile detained by the police may be frisked based on reasonable suspicion. In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court extended Terry frisks to the passenger compartment of automobiles. The Court stressed that the search must be limited to those areas in which a “weapon may be placed or hidden” and to those instances in which the police “possess [an] articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons.” Minnesota v. Dickerson affirmed the limited right of a police officer conducting a frisk to seize illegal narcotics. The officer under the “plain-feel” doctrine must have probable cause to believe that the object that he or she encounters is an illegal narcotic.

In summary, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court explicitly balanced the interest in investigating and detecting crime against the intrusion into individual privacy and held that individuals may be subjected to limited seizures based on reasonable suspicion. The Court further ruled that officers may conduct frisks to protect themselves. The Court attempted to ensure that these police–citizen interactions would be perceived as fair and neutral by requiring that an officer base his or her decision making on objective facts interpreted in light of his or her experience. This balancing test has been employed by the Court in addressing areas ranging from the removal of the occupants of automobiles to the searches of passenger compartments and intrusions to seize narcotics. Terry stops and frisks are based on probabilities and predictions and on occasion may result in interference with the liberty of innocents. We have traded a measure of liberty for safety and security. Do you agree that the appropriate balance has been struck by the Supreme Court in regard to stop and frisk?