Websites

1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://www.plato.stanford.edu/

If you would like to read more about some of the philosophical issues raised in this chapter, such as dualism, identity theory, folk psychology and reductionism, then this website provides an excellent overview. Just click on USA Main Site and then look through the Table of Contents presented in alphabetical order on the homepage, clicking on those of interest.

 

2. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://www.iep.utm.edu/

A good alternative to the Stanford site. Again, useful for expanding on the issues raised in this chapter. The homepage has key terms ordered alphabetically or allows you to submit your own key term search.

 

3. Descartes’ Meditations: A Trilingual HTML Edition

http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/

For those of you who are interested in learning more about Descartes’ arguments for a split between the mind and the body/brain, which still influences Western thinking today, then this website enables you to study the original source material: Descartes’ famous book, Meditations. From the homepage, simply click on the John Veitch Translation of 1901.

 

4. The Philosopher’s Magazine Online

http://www.philosophersnet.com/

If you are interested in engaging in philosophical debate on topics beyond those presented in this chapter, then try this website. It provides a wider range of material for you to ‘philosophise’ over, including games and other interactive material, as well as links to further sites and topics of interest.

 

5. David Chalmers’ Website

http://www.consc.net/chalmers/

This site provides some excellent links to philosophical papers on consciousness and other related topics. However, it is not for the faint-heated: for although there is useful information for the novice, much of the material is written for a more advanced audience. But if you are really interested in the topic of consciousness, then you should give it a go. In particular, click on the PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy.