Daniel v. Paul

395 U.S. 298

Case Year: 1969

Case Ruling: 7-1, Reversed

Opinion Justice: Brennan

FACTS

Doris Daniel and Rosalyn Kyles, black residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, filed suit in federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit the Lake Nixon Club from denying them admission to the facility. The Lake Nixon Club was a 232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, picnicking, miniature golf, dancing, and a snack bar located twelve miles west of Little Rock. The club was owned and operated by Euell Paul and his wife, who purchased it in 1962 and operated it on a racially segregated basis. The couple ran Lake Nixon as a private club, charging a twenty-five-cent membership fee plus additional fees for club facilities. Daniel claimed that Lake Nixon was not a private organization but, rather, a public accommodation operating in interstate commerce and therefore required to comply with the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court found that the club was being operated on a racially discriminatory basis, but that it did not fall in any of the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act. The court of appeals affirmed, and Daniel requested Supreme Court review.

 

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted a sweeping prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce. This prohibition does not extend to discrimination or segregation at private clubs. But, as both courts below properly found, Lake Nixon is not a private club. It is simply a business operated for a profit with none of the attributes of self-government and member-ownership traditionally associated with private clubs. It is true that following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pauls began to refer to the establishment as a private club. They even began to require patrons to pay a 25-cent “membership” fee, which gains a purchaser a “membership” card entitling him to enter the Club’s premises for an entire season and, on payment of specified additional fees, to use the swimming, boating, and miniature golf facilities. But this “membership” device seems no more than a subterfuge designed to avoid coverage of the 1964 Act. White persons are routinely provided “membership” cards, and some 100,000 whites visit the establishment each season. As the District Court found, Lake Nixon is “open in general to all of the public who are members of the white race.” Negroes, on the other hand, are uniformly denied “membership” cards, and thus admission, because of the Pauls’ fear that integration would “ruin” the “business.” The conclusion of the courts below that Lake Nixon is not a private club is plainly correct--indeed, respondent does not challenge that conclusion here.

We therefore turn to the question whether Lake Nixon Club is “a place of public accommodation” as defined by 201 (b) of the 1964 Act, and, if so, whether its operations “affect commerce” within the meaning of 201 (c) of that Act.

Section 201 (b) defines four categories of establishments as covered public accommodations. Three of these categories are relevant here:

“Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce.... “(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

“(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

“(4) any establishment (A) ... (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”

Section 201 (c) sets forth standards for determining whether the operations of an establishment in any of these categories affect commerce within the meaning of Title II:

“The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if ... (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) ..., it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) ..., it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) ..., there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, ‘commerce’ means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States....”

Petitioners argue first that Lake Nixon’s snack bar is a covered public accommodation under 201 (b) (2) and 201 (c) (2), and that as such it brings the entire establishment within the coverage of Title II under 201 (b) (4) and 201 (c) (4). Clearly, the snack bar is “principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.” Thus, it is a covered public accommodation if “it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves ... has moved in commerce.” We find that the snack bar is a covered public accommodation under either of these standards. The Pauls advertise the Lake Nixon Club in a monthly magazine called “Little Rock Today,” which is distributed to guests at Little Rock hotels, motels, and restaurants, to acquaint them with available tourist attractions in the area. Regular advertisements for Lake Nixon were also broadcast over two area radio stations. In addition, Lake Nixon has advertised in the “Little Rock Air Force Base,” a monthly newspaper published at the Little Rock Air Force Base, in Jacksonville, Arkansas. This choice of advertising media leaves no doubt that the Pauls were seeking broad-based patronage from an audience which they knew to include interstate travelers. Thus, the Lake Nixon Club unquestionably offered to serve out-of-state visitors to the Little Rock area. And it would be unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000 patrons actually served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler. Since the Lake Nixon Club offered to serve and served out-of-state persons, and since the Club’s snack bar was established to serve all patrons of the entire facility, we must conclude that the snack bar offered to serve and served out-of-state persons.

The record, although not as complete on this point as might be desired, also demonstrates that a “substantial portion of the food” served by the Lake Nixon Club snack bar has moved in interstate commerce. The snack bar serves a limited fare--hot dogs and hamburgers on buns, soft drinks, and milk. The District Court took judicial notice of the fact that the “principal ingredients going into the bread were produced and processed in other States” and that “certain ingredients [of the soft drinks] were probably obtained ... from out-of-State sources.” Thus, at the very least, three of the four food items sold at the snack bar contain ingredients originating outside of the State. There can be no serious doubt that a “substantial portion of the food” served at the snack bar has moved in interstate commerce.

The snack bar’s status as a covered establishment automatically brings the entire Lake Nixon facility within the ambit of Title II. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 201 (b) (4) and 201 (c) (4).

Petitioners also argue that the Lake Nixon Club is a covered public accommodation under 201 (b) (3) and 201 (c) (3) of the 1964 Act. These sections proscribe discrimination by “any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment” which “customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce.” Under any accepted definition of “entertainment,” the Lake Nixon Club would surely qualify as a “place of entertainment.” And indeed it advertises itself as such. Respondent argues, however, that in the context of 201 (b) (3) “place of entertainment” refers only to establishments where patrons are entertained as spectators or listeners rather than those where entertainment takes the form of direct participation in some sport or activity. We find no support in the legislative history for respondent’s reading of the statute. The few indications of legislative intent are to the contrary....

The remaining question is whether the operations of the Lake Nixon Club “affect commerce” within the meaning of 201 (c) (3). We conclude that they do. Lake Nixon’s customary “sources of entertainment ... move in commerce.” The Club leases 15 paddle boats on a royalty basis from an Oklahoma company. Another boat was purchased from the same company. The Club’s juke box was manufactured outside Arkansas and plays records manufactured outside the State. The legislative history indicates that mechanical sources of entertainment such as these were considered by Congress to be “sources of entertainment” within the meaning of 201 (c) (3). Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, DISSENTING.

I could and would agree with the Court’s holding in this case had Congress in the 1964 Civil Rights Act based its power to bar racial discrimination at places of public accommodations upon section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But Congress in enacting this legislation did not choose to invoke this broad Fourteenth Amendment power to protect against racial discrimination; instead it tied the Act and limited its protection to congressional power to regulate commerce among the States. Both courts below found that respondent’s swimming and recreational place is covered by the Act if its operations “affect commerce” within the meaning of 201 (c) of the Act. The Act itself, in 201 (c), provides the test for determining whether this respondent’s recreational operations adversely affect interstate commerce. That test is to determine from evidence whether the operation of an establishment like respondent’s (a) “serves or offers to serve interstate travelers” or (b) “a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce....” In order, therefore, for the Act to be held to apply the test must be shown to be met by evidence and judicial findings, not by guesswork, or assumptions, or “judicial knowledge” of crucially relevant facts, or by unproved probabilities or possibilities. My trouble with the Court’s holding is that it runs roughshod over District Court findings supported by the record and emphatically affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Let us briefly review the facts and findings on the foregoing two separate conditions of the Act’s applicability.

(A) Did Lake Nixon serve or offer to serve interstate travelers? There is not a word of evidence showing that such an interstate traveler was ever there or ever invited there or ever dreamed of going there. Nixon Lake can be reached only by country roads. The record fails to show whether these country roads are passable in all kinds of weather. They seem to be at least six to eight miles off the state or interstate roads over which interstate travelers are accustomed to travel....

(B) The second prong of the test to determine applicability of the Act to Lake Nixon is whether a “substantial portion” of the hamburgers, milk, and soda pop sold there had previously moved in interstate commerce. The Court’s opinion generously concedes that the record is “not as complete on this point as might be desired....” This is certainly no exaggeration. In fact, I would go further and agree with the two courts below that the record is totally devoid of evidence to show that a “substantial portion” of the small amount of food sold had previously moved in interstate commerce.... The District Court found as follows on this point:

“Food and soft drinks are purchased locally by [the Club]. The record before the Court does not disclose where or how the local suppliers obtained the products which they sold to the establishments. The meat products sold by defendants may or may not have come from animals raised, slaughtered, and processed in Arkansas. The bread used by defendants was baked and packaged locally, but judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the principal ingredients going into the bread were produced and processed in other States. The soft drinks were bottled locally, but certain ingredients were probably obtained by the bottlers from out-of-State sources.”

Fact-findings on serious problems like this one, which involves marking the jurisdictional authority of State and Nation, should not be made on the basis of “judicial notice” and on probabilities not based on evidence....

It seems clear to me that neither the paddle boats nor the locally leased juke box is sufficient to justify a holding that the operation of Lake Nixon affects interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act. While it is the duty of courts to enforce this important Act, we are not called on to hold nor should we hold subject to that Act this country people’s recreation center, lying in what may be, so far as we know, a little “sleepy hollow” between Arkansas hills miles away from any interstate highway. This would be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal Government complete control over every little remote country place of recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in every one of the 50 States. This goes too far for me. I would affirm the judgments of the two courts below.