

Future of NATO

IS THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE OBSOLETE?

During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the West's line of defense against possible Soviet aggression. But the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the disappearance of NATO's communist equivalent — the Warsaw Pact — raised doubts about NATO's relevance. Nearly 20 years later, the specter of obsolescence still hangs over the venerable 26-nation alliance. So-called "Atlanticists" in both the United States and Europe say NATO's role in keeping the United States tied strategically to Europe justifies the alliance's continued existence. Moreover, NATO makes Moscow uneasy, and that's a good thing, they say. Others feel NATO should "earn its keep" by assuming new military responsibilities, such as protecting global energy-supply routes. But one thing is certain: It's not your grandfather's alliance. Since the 1990s, nearly a dozen former Soviet states and Soviet-bloc nations have joined NATO, easing their transition to democracy. NATO also has expanded its operations beyond Europe to Afghanistan, which may become the 60-year-old alliance's ultimate testing ground.

French soldiers prepare to search a house in Afghanistan in October 2008. They are among the 64,000 soldiers deployed by NATO and a U.S.-led coalition trying to defeat Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents in the Central Asian country.



THE ISSUES

- 3
- Is NATO obsolete?
 - Should energy security become a new NATO responsibility?
 - Can NATO effectively address international terrorism?

BACKGROUND

- 12 **Internal Differences**
The alliance's disagreements have been resolved peacefully.
- 12 **Guarding the Gap**
NATO's anti-Soviet line of defense extended along the Iron Curtain.
- 16 **France Pulls Out**
After France's departure, the alliance began to broaden its political role.
- 17 **Enlarging NATO**
When the Soviet Union collapsed, former Soviet-bloc countries began joining NATO.

CURRENT SITUATION

- 17 **Slowing Expansion**
Support for membership for Ukraine and Georgia has cooled.
- 20 **'A Beast with 100 Heads'**
NATO is debating whether "soft" or military power works best in Afghanistan.

OUTLOOK

- 21 **New Strategic Concept**
To succeed, NATO must become flexible and agile.

SIDEBARS AND GRAPHICS

- 4 **NATO in Europe Has Doubled in Size**
The alliance has grown to 26 members.
- 5 **U.S. Provides Most Funds, Troops**
The United States contributed 45 percent of NATO's military budget.
- 9 **NATO Troop Levels in Afghanistan Jumped Sixfold**
More than 51,000 alliance troops now serve.
- 11 **Technology Gap Separates U.S. and NATO Forces**
Combat interoperability suffers.
- 13 **Chronology**
Key events since 1949.
- 14 **NATO-Russia Relations Are Strained**
Enlargement alarms Russia.
- 16 **Americans Suffer Most Casualties**
More than half of NATO's troop deaths in Afghanistan are among Americans.
- 19 **At Issue**
Has NATO become irrelevant?
- 26 **Voices From Abroad**
Headlines and editorials from around the world.
- FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**
- 23 **For More Information**
Organizations to contact.
- 24 **Bibliography**
Selected sources used.
- 25 **The Next Step**
Additional articles.
- 25 **Citing *CQ Global Researcher***
Sample bibliography formats.



January 2009
Volume 3, Number 1

MANAGING EDITOR: Kathy Koch
kkoch@cqpress.com

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: Thomas J. Colin
tcolin@cqpress.com

CONTRIBUTING WRITERS: Brian Beary,
Peter Behr, Roland Flamini, Karen Foerstel,
Sarah Glazer, Jennifer Weeks, Colin Woodard

DESIGN/PRODUCTION EDITOR: Olu B. Davis

ASSISTANT EDITOR: Darrell Dela Rosa

WEB EDITORS: Andrew Boney,
Jeremiah Horan



A Division of
SAGE Publications

PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER:
John A. Jenkins

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
REFERENCE INFORMATION GROUP:
Alix B. Vance

DIRECTOR, ONLINE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT:
Jennifer Q. Ryan

Copyright © 2009 CQ Press, a division of SAGE Publications. SAGE reserves all copyright and other rights herein, unless previously specified in writing. No part of this publication may be reproduced electronically or otherwise, without prior written permission. Unauthorized reproduction or transmission of SAGE copyrighted material is a violation of federal law carrying civil fines of up to \$100,000.

CQ Press is a registered trademark of Congressional Quarterly Inc.

CQ Global Researcher is published monthly online in PDF and HTML format by CQ Press, a division of SAGE Publications. Annual full-service electronic subscriptions start at \$500. For pricing, call 1-800-834-9020, ext. 1906. To purchase *CQ Global Researcher* electronic rights, visit www.cqpress.com or call 866-427-7737.

Future of NATO

BY ROLAND FLAMINI


THE ISSUES

For weeks, Germany's special forces and Afghan intelligence had been secretly spying on a notorious Taliban commander known only as the Baghlan bomber. They had pieced together his behavior patterns and followed him whenever he left his safe house in northern Afghanistan.

The insurgent leader was linked to a long list of terrorist acts, including the shocking November 2007 raid on the ceremonial reopening of a new sugar factory in Baghlan province, which killed 79 people, including dozens of children and several high-ranking officials and politicians.

Last March, German and Afghan commandos moved in to arrest him. Clad in black and wearing night-vision goggles, they came within a few hundred yards of the house when lookouts raised the alarm. In the ensuing confusion, their quarry got away, though several marksmen had him in their sights.

In fact, said *Der Spiegel*, Germany's most popular news magazine, "It would have been possible for the Germans to kill him," but the notorious terrorist was allowed to escape — and subsequently returned to carry out further attacks.¹ He got away because German troops are among the national contingents serving in Afghanistan with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces who are not allowed to shoot unless they are being fired upon. Troops from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and several other countries are similarly restricted. Because the Baghlan bomber



AFP/Getty Images/Katja Buchholz

With global energy resources heavily concentrated in countries with unstable or unpredictable governments and terrorism on the rise, protecting energy supplies has become a legitimate security issue. NATO is debating whether its 21st-century mandate should include protecting oil pipelines — like these transporting Russian oil to Germany — and global energy-supply routes, including ocean shipping lanes.

was fleeing instead of attacking, he could not be shot.

As a result of these "selective participation" policies, most of the casualties among the 50,000 troops serving in the alliance's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan are being suffered by U.S., British and Canadian soldiers, who are fully engaged in combat operations against insurgents. The United States has lost 630 troops in its NATO contingent in Afghanistan since 2001, Britain 138 and Canada 106; but Italy had only 13 deaths, Germany 28 and Portugal 2.²

The restrictive rules of engagement for some NATO participants reflect the widely divergent views about the alliance's goals in Afghanistan. But the dispute is only one of the many contentious issues plaguing NATO as it celebrates its 60th year at a summit in April. Others include:

- **How best to help Afghanistan** — The United States and Britain see NATO as being engaged in a full-scale conflict against the Taliban insurgency. But most Europeans eschew the idea of achieving a military victory and focus more on helping the Afghan people become self-sufficient in security and democratic governance. The ongoing debate has stymied ISAF's efforts to formulate a unified strategy in Afghanistan and has allowed the Taliban to continue its attacks from within safe havens in Pakistan's largely uncontrolled frontier territory.³

- **How to deal with global terrorism** — After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO responded to President George W. Bush's appeal for support in invading Afghanistan and hunting down 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization. The Bush administration at first opted to go it alone, but once the Taliban were driven out of Afghanistan, the alliance deployed the ISAF. But European governments generally view terrorists as criminals — rather than as jihadist fighters — and disagree with the Bush administration's declaration of a global "war on terror."⁴

Continued on p. 5

NATO in Europe Has Doubled in Size

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — the postwar defense alliance that originally linked the United States and Western Europe — now has 26 members, with additional participants from the fragments of the collapsed Soviet Union, including most of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, making it twice its original size within Europe. In North America, the United States, Canada and Greenland — a self-governing Danish province — are part of NATO. Croatia and Albania are expected to join in April — and possibly Macedonia. Ukraine and Georgia are involved in intense talks with NATO about joining the alliance someday, as are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Although Turkey — on the southern border of the former Soviet Union — had joined the alliance in 1952, NATO's inclusion of Romania, Bulgaria and the three former Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) in 2004 brought the alliance smack up against Russia's northern and eastern borders, stirring Kremlin objections.



* West Germany was admitted to NATO prior to German reunification in 1990.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Continued from p. 3

“Europe is not at war,” European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana famously declared dismissively, adding that Europeans do, however, “energetically oppose terrorism.”⁵


• **Sharing the burden** — The United States has borne the brunt of funding and arming NATO, despite efforts to persuade the Europeans to invest more in defense. NATO members promise to earmark at least 2 percent of their annual gross domestic product (GDP) for defense, but over the years many members have come to regard that minimum as a ceiling. (See graph, at right.)

In fact, while the United States spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense, only five European members — Bulgaria, Britain, France, Greece and Turkey — allocate even 2 percent for defense. Other European governments spend less, in part because of peacetime complacency and the high cost of their social programs. France and Britain accounted for 48 percent of Europe’s defense spending in 2008, while Germany — NATO’s largest European member — spent only 1.2 percent of its GDP on defense in 2008 (scheduled to increase to 1.4 percent this year through 2012). Overall, NATO’s 24 European members have budgeted \$280 billion in military expenditures in 2009, but the impact of those expenditures is dissipated since they are spread out over dozens of separate national programs.⁶

The gap between the United States and its European allies in military technology is also widening, making it increasingly difficult for forces to work together. When NATO intervened to prevent ethnic strife in the Balkans in 1998, for instance, only the United States could conduct precision strikes and airborne refueling and had high-tech surveillance and command-and-control systems. And the situation hasn’t changed much since then. (See sidebar, p. 11.)

U.S. Provides Most Funds, Troops

NATO’s 24 European members contributed about half of the alliance’s \$1.2 trillion budget for military operations in 2007, while the United States alone contributed 45 percent. Most of the money was used for the war in Afghanistan and to maintain NATO troops in Kosovo. NATO doesn’t maintain a standing force. Its troops come from the armies of member nations, and all 3.8 million troops in NATO’s member countries are considered potentially available for a NATO deployment. The United States maintained 1.3 million troops in its armed forces in 2007, more than twice the amount maintained by Turkey, the NATO member with the second-largest army. Iceland does not maintain an army or contribute to NATO’s military budget.



Number of Troops Maintained by NATO Members, 2007 (in thousands)

| | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-------------|-----|----------------|--------------|
| Belgium | 39 | Hungary | 20 | Portugal | 41 |
| Bulgaria | 41 | Iceland | 0 | Romania | 76 |
| Canada | 65 | Italy | 298 | Slovakia | 18 |
| Czech Republic | 25 | Latvia | 6 | Slovenia | 7 |
| Denmark | 18 | Lithuania | 10 | Spain | 132 |
| Estonia | 5 | Luxembourg | 1.6 | Turkey | 496 |
| France | 354 | Netherlands | 51 | United Kingdom | 190 |
| Germany | 247 | Norway | 20 | United States | 1,346 |
| Greece | 142 | Poland | 150 | Total: | 3,799 |

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

• **Selective participation** — During the Cold War, members of the alliance agreed on the threat NATO faced from the Soviet Union and how to

address it. While consensus remains the cornerstone of the alliance, in today’s more complex, post-Cold War world agreeing on strategy is more

difficult, which puts a constant strain on relations. It is generally agreed that if NATO is to survive it must be willing to act “out of area” — or outside of members’ territories. Indeed, “out of area or out of business” is a popular refrain at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, nowadays. Yet European nations are increasingly cautious about committing forces to non-self-defense missions.

As a result, the “coalition of the willing” approach — in which individual members decide which missions they

“good” war — as opposed to the “bad” one in Iraq — is increasing in some European countries.

• **NATO enlargement** — After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO survived — and even grew from 15 members to 26 — because it became “a great tool to transform Cold War countries into democracies,” observes Henning Riecke, a security specialist at the German Foreign Policy Institute in Berlin. Former communist states in Eastern Europe and the Baltics were offered membership in the alliance if

alliance to extend membership to Georgia and Ukraine, a newly prosperous, oil-rich Russia began to raise strong objections.

“The emergence of the powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russia’s security,” Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared in October 2008, referring to NATO. “I heard them saying . . . that the expansion is not directed against Russia. But it’s the potential, not the intention that matters.”⁷ Led by France and Germany — both heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies — NATO has stalled on admitting Russia’s two southern neighbors.

Then last August, Russia’s massive incursion into Georgia in response to a botched Georgian bid to invade its separatist province of South Ossetia stirred new fears in Eastern Europe that Moscow might overrun its democratic neighbors in an effort to reclaim the old Soviet empire.⁸ President Bush has continued to push for NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine despite Europe’s coolness to the idea, and President-elect Obama supported Georgia’s membership during the election campaign.

But perhaps the biggest arguments within NATO today focus on the alliance’s future. “The end of the USSR . . . destroyed any rationale for the United States to continue defending Europe,” argued Doug Bandow, a former Reagan administration senior policy analyst.⁹

Moreover, Europeans have “a growing lack of enthusiasm for defense spending and far-flung military commitments,” says Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, an expert on alliance relations at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Allied leaders must do some “careful bricklaying” if NATO is to stay in business for another 60 years — or even 10 more years, says Sherwood-Randall. Until now, they have based



AFP/Getty Images/Elvis Barukcic

Belgian soldiers from the NATO-led peacekeeping mission (KFOR) in newly independent Kosovo patrol Mitrovica last March. NATO has been monitoring the area since the late 1990s, when the alliance launched air strikes against the former Yugoslavia to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

will participate in — has become the norm. Though the alliance dutifully closed ranks in the case of Afghanistan, NATO refused to become involved in the Iraq conflict, even though several alliance members joined the U.S.-initiated attack. And in April 2009, when incoming President Barack Obama is expected to ask U.S. allies to match projected U.S. troop increases in Afghanistan, Europe will probably balk. With both military and civilian deaths rising in Afghanistan, opposition to what Europeans once regarded as the

they became more democratic. Countries like the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania eagerly complied, attracted by the implied promise — through NATO — of American protection from their old nemesis Russia.

Too battered economically and politically to protest, the Russians were allowed to participate in the alliance by joining the specially created NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, in which Russia has military-observer status in Brussels. But when in 2007 the Bush administration began pressing the

their commitments “on past understandings but now need to renew the effort to reach a joint threat assessment, set allied expectations for behavior and prepare militarily for future scenarios.”

The problem may be that NATO has too many roles in the 21st century. “Today, three NATOs co-exist,” says Riecke. “There’s the NATO of the Cold War, there’s the exporter of stability to ex-Soviet countries and there’s the NATO directed against new threats. East Europeans favor the first NATO because it offers protection from Russia; Western Europeans want the second because it has brought democratic stability; the United States favors the third because of its commitment to the war on terrorism. But which is the real NATO? It’s hard to reconcile the three.”

To mark its 60th anniversary this April, NATO is updating its strategic concept — a document second in importance only to the alliance’s 1949 founding treaty. Alliance officials hope the end product will become the basis for NATO’s post-Cold War strategic role — a discussion many believe is long overdue.

With little likelihood of a new war in Europe, the alliance’s political and military objectives are expected to continue to concentrate on scenarios that involve NATO action outside of members’ territory. Officials also may decide that NATO’s goals include protecting the global energy infrastructure, responding to the rise of China and fighting global terrorism.

As NATO member states discuss the future of the alliance, here are some of the questions being debated:

Is NATO obsolete?

“NATO is an interesting paradox because normally alliances disappear when they win the war,” says Josef Joffe, publisher-editor of the German intellectual weekly *Die Zeit* and a highly respected specialist on defense issues. “Yet this one is still alive for all the old reasons. You want to be al-

lied to the United States because the United States is a kind of security lender of last resort. You never know what might happen, especially with Russia coming back, point No. 1.

“Point No. 2, NATO is the most important thing that stands between us and the renationalization of our defense policies” — that is, the return to nationalism in Europe which he argues has historically led to weapons escalations and eventually to conflict.¹⁰

The debate over whether the North Atlantic Alliance should remain in existence has been going on since the Soviet Union — the threat that sparked NATO’s creation — collapsed in 1991.

American critics of the alliance argue that NATO no longer serves any strategic purpose yet ties up U.S. troops, financially burdens the United States and alarms and alienates Russia. In addition, some Americans say that reliance on the U.S.-led organization discourages Europe from assuming responsibility for its own defense.

“NATO has become absurd in the post-Cold War world, with global warming and food shortages transcending the antiquated security notions associated with armies,” Saul Landau, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, a liberal Washington think tank, wrote recently.¹¹

With Albania and Croatia about to join NATO, “It’s not clear against whom these countries need to be defended. It’s even less clear why America should do the defending,” says Bandow, the former Reagan analyst.¹²

A conservative American critic of NATO, E. Wayne Merry, said U.S. domination of the North Atlantic Alliance, with the Europeans relegated to junior partner roles, has stunted Europe’s growth by preventing “the evolution of European integration to include full responsibility for continental security.” Merry, a former senior U.S. State Department and Pentagon official and now a senior associate

at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, contends that, “The growth of European identity and European integration makes this approach obsolete.”¹³

Advocates of preserving NATO point out that it embodies multilateralism in an increasingly interdependent world. “Bush quickly discovered [in Iraq] that unilateralism didn’t work, and when NATO let him down, he had to create an ad hoc NATO of his own,” observes Massimo Franco, a leading political commentator and columnist at the Italian paper *Corriere della Sera*. Bush’s so-called coalition of the willing in Iraq fell apart, he says, “because it didn’t have the underpinnings of a true alliance.”

Or, as Riecke of the German Foreign Policy Institute points out, “Only NATO is capable of mustering the forces for a very complex operation; no other organization can do it. NATO is the stability actor in Europe.”

Responding to a proposal by Russian President Dmitry A. Medvedev that NATO consider a new “security architecture” for Europe, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands said in early December that NATO members are “quite happy” with the existing security structure in Europe and that there is “not a shimmer of a chance that . . . NATO could or would be negotiated away.”¹⁴

NATO is also a built-in customer for the multibillion-dollar U.S. weapons industry, and American arms manufacturers are avid supporters of NATO expansion. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the Baltic nations has been a boon for weapons sales.¹⁵ The boom began in the 1990s, when former Soviet states wishing to join the alliance were required to modernize their armed forces. Many replaced their dated Soviet arms with new Western weapons.¹⁶

As the number of new NATO countries has increased, arms sales have kept pace. In 2006, U.S. government-to-government arms sales were valued



AFP/Getty Images



AP Photo/Allauddin Khan

Death and Rebuilding

Residents of Afghanistan's Helmand province display the bodies of some of the 17 civilians they say were killed by misguided U.S. or NATO air strikes on Oct. 16, 2008. NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said reports of enemy air strikes in the region that day make it difficult to determine what happened. At least 321 Afghan civilians were killed in air strikes in 2007 — three times as many as in the previous year — feeding Afghan resentment toward U.S. and NATO forces. To avoid such unintended consequences, some European governments promote non-military “soft” power, such as the work provided by NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). An Afghan military official, (below, left) and a Canadian ISAF member (right) inaugurate a road-building project funded by the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar province, in April 2008.

at \$16.9 billion, including \$6.6 billion with NATO countries and Japan and the balance to developing countries. By 2008, the overall amount of such transactions had almost doubled, to \$32 billion, with the United States capturing 52 percent of the world arms market.¹⁷ These numbers do not include private arms sales to different countries by U.S. companies without government involvement — rare in the case of major sales of combat hardware. Such sales are impossible to calculate with any accuracy.

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorsky says the downside of dismantling NATO far outweighs any advantages. He identifies five reasons for keeping NATO in existence:

- The transition costs “would be problematic,” he says. U.S. withdrawal from NATO would deprive the European economy of billions of dollars, not counting the cost of extracting and relocating the U.S. troops.
- With no power to check them, Germany and France would dominate Europe, which other countries would dread — especially Eastern and Central European countries like Poland.
- As a full-fledged power with a bigger population and economy than the United States, Europe would begin to see itself more as a competitor with America, especially with the U.S. arms industry. And once “divorced” from the United States, Europe could align itself with other powers. “A Europe with its own independent military capability will more frequently say ‘no’ to America” on a wide range of international issues, Sikorsky says.
- If the United States and Europe subsequently had to fight alongside each other, “they would no longer be a workable coalition,” he says. “Pretty soon, they would be working to reinvent NATO.”

Should energy security become a new NATO responsibility?

European members of NATO import 50 percent of their energy needs — 25 percent of it from Russia. Thus, as demand rises for oil and gas, and with much of the world's energy resources in countries with unstable or unpredictable governments, energy has become a legitimate security issue.¹⁸

In 2006, a NATO forum on energy-security technology was told that the global oil market loses a million barrels a day to politically motivated sabotage.¹⁹ Later that year at a NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, alliance leaders decided to add energy security to its agenda.

“Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources,” said the summit's final declaration. “We support a coordinated, international effort to assess risk to energy infrastructure and to promote energy infrastructure security.” Member states were charged to “consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security.”²⁰

Precedents for protecting member states' energy supplies date back to the Cold War, when NATO created and maintained 10 storage and distribution facilities across Europe, primarily for military use. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, NATO ships protected Saudi Arabian and Gulf state oil tankers from attack by either side in case they tried to cut off supplies to the West. And in 1990, although NATO did not participate as an organization in the first Gulf War, France, Italy, Britain and the Netherlands joined the United States in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation — thus ensuring that Kuwait retained its oil fields.

The alliance has yet to make public any plan of action, but analysts say NATO could help protect energy sources, including oil fields, pipelines and sea routes used for transporting

NATO Troop Levels in Afghanistan Jumped Sixfold

Over 51,000 NATO troops are serving in the war in Afghanistan — more than a sixfold jump over 2004 levels. About 40 percent of the NATO troops are Americans. Another 12,000 Americans are serving in the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. President-elect Barack Obama has vowed to send additional U.S. troops and is expected to ask NATO countries to deploy more troops as well.



unrefined oil — especially vital sea routes like the Panama and Suez canals and the straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia. Terrorist attacks on these strategic routes would have drastic consequences for energy supplies. Moreover, pipelines deliver 40 percent of the oil and gas to world markets and are even more susceptible to terrorist action.²¹

The idea of expanding NATO's tasks to include protecting global energy supplies has its problems. For example, guarding the thousands of miles of pipelines carrying Russian oil and gas across Central Asia and the Caucasus, if it were even possible, could lead to tension with the Russians.

The size of the undertaking is daunting. “NATO cannot really protect pipelines, but it can control the maritime ‘choke’ points where traffic is heavy, such as the Gulf, and key drilling points,” observes Riecke at the German Foreign Policy Institute. The involvement of an essentially Western alliance in global energy security

could make other countries feel uneasy as well. For example, an energy role would extend NATO's reach into Asia, and the Chinese will almost certainly object, he says.

In addition, argues Turkish commentator and oil executive Sohbet Karbuz, if NATO deploys in Gulf waters, non-NATO countries might decide to do the same, adding to regional tensions. “What if China now wants to patrol the Strait of Hormuz?” asks Karbuz. “After all, China imports more oil from the region than the United States or the European Union.”

Can NATO effectively address international terrorism?

On Sept. 12, 2001, less than 24 hours after terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 of the alliance charter, which commits all members to aid any member that is attacked. Thus the first time the article came into play was not against the Soviet Union — for whom it was originally intended — but against jihadist terrorists.

FUTURE OF NATO

In 2002, at a summit in Prague, Czech Republic, NATO retroactively included antiterrorism as “a permanent agenda item and priority for the alliance,” according to NATO.²² Leaders recognized the challenge of international terrorism as a new role

to break out of its transatlantic mold and become a global antiterrorist force. NATO needs what he calls a “bold transformation . . . to build a “strategic [antiterrorist] partnership,” he says. He would like to see the alliance open its doors to Japan, Aus-

antiterrorist program, including developing expertise in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and establishing specialist teams to deal with the after-effects of such attacks. An alliance-wide, fail-safe cyber system to protect the NATO computer network from terrorist hackers has also been implemented. And in 2004, NATO agreed to establish a Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit to analyze and distribute terrorist intelligence throughout the alliance.²⁴


Since 9/11, NATO has also carried out Operation Active Endeavour to “detect and deter” terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, through which 65 percent of Europe’s oil and gas imports pass.²⁵ The continuous maritime surveillance operation escorts oil super-tankers and other ships and inspects ships on the high seas, looking for illegally transported nuclear materials. The operation was initially limited to the eastern Mediterranean but in 2004 was extended to cover the entire Mediterranean.

In 2004, NATO provided Greece with a massive, protective blanket — in the form of navy patrols and air surveillance — around Athens and other Summer Olympics venues to protect the games from terrorists. In 2006, NATO did the same for the Soccer World Cup in Germany. But militarily NATO’s biggest antiterrorist engagement to date has clearly been Afghanistan, where nearly all member states are deployed.

“NATO has brought essential value to the fight against terrorism, and Afghanistan is the best example of this,” says Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer.

It is widely agreed that NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan if its role in the fight against terrorism is to have credibility. “The mission is vital for NATO,” says Bastian Giegerich, a research fellow on European Security at the London-based International

Continued on p. 12



AFP/Getty Images/Bill Pugliano

A military funeral is held for U.S. Army Pfc. Joseph A. Miracle, 22, on July 14, 2007, in Waterford, Mich. He was one of the 630 Americans killed during NATO operations in Afghanistan since 2001. About 60 percent of the NATO’s casualties in Afghanistan have been Americans, followed by British and Canadian forces. German, French, Italian and other NATO troops are only allowed to shoot in self-defense, so their troops are not stationed in heavy combat areas.

for the alliance, even though there was no consensus among members about the nature of the threat and how to deal with it.

Former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar even calls on NATO

to better reflect the nations that are willing and able to cooperate in eliminating the threat of Islamist terror.”²³

Although the alliance has not taken Aznar’s advice, it did launch a major

Technology Gap Separates U.S. and NATO Forces

Combat interoperability is still a long way off.

Working together effectively in combat has always been a key objective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). So far, however, so-called interoperational cooperation among NATO allies remains more an earnest desire than military reality.

A wide technology gap exists not only between the United States and Eastern Europe's armed forces, which for the most part are still switching from Soviet-era arms to Western versions, but also with its more modern Western European allies.

The gap is partly a legacy of the Cold War, when Europeans were forced to concentrate on defensive equipment against a possible invasion, such as armor and heavy artillery, while the United States — worried more about a long-distance war on another continent — devoted more resources to long-range air transport and missile development.

During the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, the Europeans suddenly realized that without U.S. support they could never have sustained their participation in the conflict. The Americans carried out 75 percent of the combat and support sorties and fired 95 percent of the cruise missiles and other precision-guided devices. Americans also had the only satellite-supported system that guides so-called "smart" bombs and tactical missiles. The U.S. Air Force also had several hundred aircraft equipped with electronic systems that protect planes from enemy air-defense systems and can perform in-flight refueling.¹

In recent years Europe's aircraft industry has been closing the technology gap. NATO forces began using German-made in-flight refueling aircraft in 2004. But completion of a European-made equivalent of the U.S. C-17 Globemaster military transport, originally due for delivery in late 2008, has been delayed more than a year due to production hold-ups.

As for high-tech combat, Europeans are far from becoming interoperational with their U.S. counterparts because they lag behind in technology. In Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. forces use spy satellites, airborne intelligence-gathering units and software that analyzes combat options — all linked via satellite to troops on the ground.

However, all this precision technology hasn't always been able to avoid killing Afghan civilians, and NATO's image has suffered badly as a result. Yet, without U.S. involvement, the Europeans could not conduct such modern warfare. Experts also say Europe's annual \$150 billion defense expenditures would be more effective if they were pooled. But Europeans find collective decision-making difficult.

European NATO members also spend a smaller percentage of their income on defense than the United States. Although under NATO rules all members vow to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, most European members now treat the 2 percent minimum as a ceiling instead, spending about 1.4 percent of their GDPs on de-

fense. The United States spends about 4 percent of its GDP on defense.

American critics of NATO say that with a productive population of 445 million and a combined GDP of about \$11 trillion, Europeans can afford to look after themselves militarily. But by spending less on defense — and refusing to pool their resources on most joint projects — the Europeans create resentment across the Atlantic about the unfair financial burden borne by the United States. The situation also undermines efforts to create a common defense policy within the military organization.



AP Photo/Sr-Airman Julianne Showalter

A helicopter is loaded aboard a huge U.S. C-17 Globemaster military transport plane. Europe's NATO members rely on U.S. cargo planes as they try to close the military technology gap between U.S. and other NATO forces.

Aside from technological coordination issues, basic cooperation also needs to improve among the allies. "Considerations of competition and security, proliferation fears and numerous laws, especially on the U.S. side, often still obstruct the path toward a joint allied 'plug and fight' architecture," wrote German security specialist Henrik Enderlein.²

Coordinating the alliance's military efforts bogs down for two other key reasons, according to Dag Wilhelmsen, manager of NATO's Consultation and Command and Control Agency, which strives to increase interoperability. The greatest challenge, he said, "is the desire of individual nations to safeguard information and technology from their allies." It is also difficult to bring together systems "designed to address national needs, which often differ widely among member nations."³

¹ Hendrik Enderlein, "Military Interoperability," *IP Internationale Politik*, www.ip-global.org/archiv/2002/winter2002/military-interoperability.html.

² *Ibid.*

³ Quoted in Robert Ackerman, "In NATO, technology challenges yield to political inter-polarity handles," *Signal Communications*, Jan. 17, 2006, www.imakenews.com/signal/e_article000509437.cfm?x=b11,0,w.

Continued from p. 10

Institute of Security Studies. “If the alliance fails in Afghanistan, its appetite to engage in that kind of operation will become very limited.”

But the strong differences that persist over how the International Security and Assistance Force should approach its mission in Afghanistan are seen as fundamental flaws in NATO’s commitment. Rather than defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda, Europeans generally perceive ISAF’s role as “counterinsurgency coupled with helping to improve governance,” says Giegerich. Europeans focus on beefing up the effectiveness of Afghan troops and police and strengthening democratic institutions.

Germany’s Gen. Egon Ramms, until recently overall commander of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, defined NATO’s role in Afghanistan as “to help the people of the country . . . protect the Afghan people” against insurgents.²⁶

Britain, Canada and the Netherlands — on the other hand — follow the U.S. approach, which entails armed engagement with the insurgents. The result of this double standard, as an unnamed Pentagon consultant told the *London Daily Telegraph*, is “frustration [and] irritation. . . . The mistake was handing it over to NATO in the first place. For many countries being in Afghanistan seems about keeping up appearances, rather than actually fighting a war that needs to be won.”²⁷

What does not seem in dispute throughout the alliance is that NATO should be involved in the war on terror. But as U.S. Army Gen. Bantz John Craddock, NATO’s supreme commander, says, “Each NATO nation has its own internal issues that it must address.”

On the other hand, he added, “a completely resourced force sends a clear message to our adversary . . . that NATO is committed to achieving success.” ■

BACKGROUND

Internal Differences

Differences over Afghanistan are hardly the first time NATO members have run into internal dissent. In fact, the alliance’s 60-year history is full of spirited debates, but all of them have been peacefully overcome — a testament to the institution’s resilience and adaptability. Meanwhile, the fact that the Soviet Union never attacked defines NATO’s success as a mutual defense alliance between the United States and Western Europe.

At the start of the alliance’s often querulous existence, NATO’s first secretary general, Britain’s Lord Ismay, said the alliance was designed “to keep Russia out, the Germans down and the Americans in.”

Once Russia was out and Germany was no longer regarded as a threat to European peace, many predicted NATO would dissolve. The alliance has done just the opposite, evolving into an expanded security and peacekeeping organization. And its aggressive recruitment effort across Central and Eastern Europe has resulted in a doubling in the alliance’s size in Europe.

When NATO was formed in 1949, a shattered, vulnerable postwar Europe still sought a continued U.S. presence, both out of fear of a possibly resurgent Germany and as protection from the often unpredictable Soviet Union. The Soviets had at least 700,000 troops capable of overrunning Western Europe. European poverty made Moscow-backed communist parties attractive — posing a viable political threat to take power democratically. Fearing that if Moscow somehow took control of industrial Europe it could threaten U.S. interests and even the United States itself, Washington pumped billions of dollars into shattered Eu-

ropean economies (through the massive Marshall Plan), and committed itself to the defense of Europe through NATO.²⁸

The original signatories of the NATO treaty were Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom and, of course, the United States. (*See map, p. 4.*) The French, seeking greater influence, were difficult partners from the start. “The French attitude seems pretty hopeless: they still fear the Germans and still want our money, but not our advice,” U.S. Navy Adm. Forrest Sherman complained in his diary in 1950.²⁹

But there were other strains as well. In 1950 Sherman warned British negotiators that the United States might change its mind about joining NATO if London didn’t withdraw its insistence on appointing a British supreme commander over the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean. The British “demanded exclusive control in the Mediterranean of our fleet plus their odds and ends,” Sherman fumed.³⁰

By 1952, the alliance had expanded to include Greece and Turkey. In 1955, after a long debate, West Germany was allowed to re-arm and was brought into the pact. The Soviets responded by forming the Warsaw Pact alliance with seven Eastern and Central European satellite states.

Guarding the Gap

NATO’s anti-Soviet line of defense extended from the Turkish border with Russia in the south to Norway in the north. But the major threat was in divided Germany, where watchful U.S. and European forces were concentrated along the Fulda Gap in the Bavarian mountains, which created a natural divide between communist East Germany and the West German

Continued on p. 16

Chronology

1940s *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerges as an alliance of democracies in Europe and North America.*

1945
World War II ends.

1949
Twelve Western countries sign the North Atlantic Treaty, promising mutual defense.

1950s-1960s *NATO deploys forces along Iron Curtain to prevent Soviet attack on Western Europe*

1950
U.S. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower becomes first NATO commander.

1952
Greece and Turkey join NATO.

1955
West Germany joins NATO; Soviet Union and seven Eastern European states form the Warsaw Pact.

1966
France withdraws from NATO's military structure, evicts NATO troops.

1967
NATO headquarters moves from Paris to Brussels. NATO agrees to work to improve East-West relations.

1970s-1980s *U.S. and Soviet Union negotiate on nuclear arms control. Soviets invade Afghanistan.*

1972
Interim arms limitation and anti-ballistic missile treaties are signed.

1979
NATO deploys medium-range missiles — but continues arms-control diplomacy — after Moscow deploys intermediate-range nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe. . . . Soviets invade Afghanistan.

1982
Spain joins NATO.

1990s *Soviet Union collapses; Warsaw Pact dissolves. East European nations begin joining NATO. Alliance launches its first military operation.*

1991
Soviet Union collapses; Warsaw Pact dissolves.

1995
NATO flies 3,515 missions to defend civilians in Bosnia from Serb attacks and . . . deploys troops to enforce cease-fire in Bosnia.

1999
Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland become first former Soviet-bloc states to join NATO. . . . Alliance launches air strikes against Yugoslavia to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

2000-Present *NATO continues eastward expansion, deploys troops in Afghanistan. Members debate NATO's 21st-century role.*

2001
NATO declares the Sept. 11 terrorist

attack on the United States an attack on all NATO members. U.S.-led coalition — including some NATO members — attacks Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

2002
NATO-Russia Council is launched, allowing joint consultations.

2003
NATO deploys forces to Kabul, its first major operation outside Europe.

2004
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia join NATO.

2005
NATO enlarges its force in Afghanistan.

2006
NATO takes over from U.S.-led coalition in southern Afghanistan.

2007
Many European governments limit their troops in Afghanistan to self-defensive actions.

2008
At summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO puts off U.S. request for immediate membership for Georgia and Ukraine but endorses American plan to deploy missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic. In August, Russia invades Georgia after surprise Georgian attack on separatist South Ossetia. NATO condemns Russia's "disproportionate" use of force. In December, NATO agrees to delay Georgia and Ukraine membership. To counter U.S. missile plan, Russian President Dmitry A. Medvedev vows to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad in 2009.

April 2009
NATO holds 60th-anniversary summit in Strasbourg, France.

NATO-Russia Relations Are Strained

Alliance enlargement and U.S. missile defense system alarm Russia.

When the Russian missile frigate *Pytlivy* steamed into the Mediterranean in the summer of 2006, it was reversing history. Twenty years earlier, the presence of a Soviet vessel in the area would have triggered alarm bells at NATO's Sixth Fleet headquarters in Naples, Italy.

But that was then. The *Pytlivy* was reporting for duty as the first unit of the Russian Navy to take part in Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's permanent, post-9/11 counterterrorist patrol in the Mediterranean.¹

Russian participation in Active Endeavour is one of the initiatives of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, an outgrowth of the cooperation agreement signed in 1997 by President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin to deepen and widen the scope of bilateral relations and — not incidentally — to offset the largely negative impact of NATO's decision to admit former Soviet republics and satellites into the alliance.² By participating in the council, Moscow has maintained a permanent presence at NATO headquarters and a military office at the alliance's military command headquarters since 2002. The council normally consists of military and diplomatic representatives from Russia and all 26 NATO members, but if the occasion calls for it, higher-ranking officials — up to heads of government — can participate in meetings.

Since creation of the council, NATO and Russia have initiated a slew of wide-ranging bilateral programs, including improvements in military-to-military interoperability (designed to enable respective armed forces to work together in joint military operations), cooperation in submarine-crew search and rescue and Active Endeavour. The Russians have also cooperated with NATO on counternarcotics operations, such as anti-drug training for Central Asian and Afghan personnel.³

In the 1990s, an economically weak Russia had been in no position to effectively oppose the earlier enlargements, but by 2000, enriched and emboldened by oil and gas exports, Russia began to draw the line. President — more recently Prime Minister — Vladimir Putin has raised strong objections, and President Dmitry A. Medvedev told the *Financial Times*, “No state can be pleased about having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders.”⁴

Col.-Gen. Nikolai Pishchev, first deputy-chief of the Russian general staff, took the same approach in the military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda*: “How would the public and government of any self-respecting state react to the expansion in the immediate proximity of its borders of what is already the world's biggest politico-military alliance? I believe that both the leadership and the citizens of that country would be quite skeptical of any assurances of the purely peaceful character of such an alliance, and Russia in this sense is certainly no exception from the general rule.”⁵

The NATO-Russian relationship survived and developed “even though Moscow's foreign policy from 2003 onward became more independent and assertive, and Russian relations with NATO began to sour,” wrote Dmitri Trenin, senior associate at the Carnegie Institute for Peace in Moscow.⁶

But despite Russian protests, NATO continued to expand. In 2003 the three remaining Soviet satellites — Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia — and the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia joined NATO. The Bush administration was also pushing the candidacy of Georgia and Ukraine on Russia's southern border.

The Russians call their immediate neighbors the “near abroad” and consider them part of their sphere of influence. Indeed, Russia has been meddling in the politics of both Georgia and Ukraine ever since their independence in 1992. In the case of Georgia, Russia has backed militarily the separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Ukraine, Moscow backed candidates acceptable to the large Russian-speaking minority and even allegedly tried to fix the elections.

At a security conference in Munich in 2007, then-President Putin famously suggested that NATO's eastward expansion was directed against Russia. “NATO's expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance itself or ensuring security in Europe,” Putin told an audience of defense officials and specialists that included U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. “On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of natural trust. And we have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended?”⁷

NATO was divided over admitting Georgia, with Germany and France questioning the wisdom of accepting into the alliance a country with an unresolved territorial dispute. Then in August 2008 Russian troops invaded Georgia, sweeping aside the Georgian army and advancing across the country to the Black Sea port of Poti.⁸ The Russians said they were reacting to a pre-emptive strike by Georgia on South Ossetia — which Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili acknowledged in December. He said he had ordered the August attack in self-defense because of a build-up of Russian armor and troops on the Georgian border, which he believed could only mean that Moscow planned to invade his country.⁹

On Aug. 13, five days after Russian troops invaded, a ceasefire was brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, then president of the European Union. NATO denounced Russia's “disproportionate” incursion and declared that while it was not breaking off all contact with Russia, it would not be “business as usual” in the NATO-Russia council. In December 2008, NATO foreign ministers agreed to resume what Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called a “conditional and graduated re-engagement” with Russia.¹⁰

The Bush administration was not happy with the resumption of contact, but Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went along with it to avoid a confrontation. Moreover, NATO remained adamant about withholding fast-track membership for Georgia and Ukraine, which the United States had sought. The two former Soviet states would join “some day,” the alliance stated.¹¹

The decision on Georgia and Ukraine sends a message to incoming President Barack Obama, who has publicly supported NATO membership for the two nations. Obama will also have to deal with the other major divisive issue in the complex relationship between Moscow and NATO: Washington’s plan to deploy a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the Bush administration has insisted that the shield is intended to defend Europe from possible nuclear attack by Iran or North Korea, Russia is skeptical.

Russian officials say their country is the obvious target. “Since there aren’t and won’t be any [Iranian or North Korean] missiles, then against whom, against whom, is this [U.S.] system directed?” asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. “Only against us!”¹²

As a result of the planned U.S. missile deployment and Russia’s robust incursion into Georgia, Obama will inherit strained bilateral relations with Moscow. “Most analysts agree that relations between Washington and Moscow are not good,” the Voice of America reported in November. “Some experts use ‘poor,’ ‘tense,’ and ‘at a very low point,’ to describe the relationship.”¹³ The Bush administration is blamed for pushing the missile shield and a hard line on the Georgia conflict.

For example, in September the administration insisted NATO cancel participation of the Russian ship *Ladno* in the Operation Active Endeavour anti-terrorism patrol. The *Ladno* was already off the coast of Turkey when the cancellation was transmitted to the Russians. Washington also blocked a request by the Russians for an emergency meeting of the NATO-Russia council to discuss the situation.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s level of protest also has been criticized within Russia as being too strident. Alexander Khramchikhin of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow suggests the Kremlin is overstating the threat because the American ground-based interceptors “can hardly be said to exist, because many tests have failed. On top of that the bulky radar and launch pads are highly vulnerable to conventional tactical weapons.”¹⁵

President-elect Obama appears to share this skepticism: He has said a case can be made for deploying the missile shield — if it works.



AFP/Getty Images/Dmitry Kostyukov

Russian troops invade South Ossetia in August 2008, shortly after Georgian forces entered the breakaway province. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili later said he invaded the province because he feared a Russian invasion. NATO quickly denounced Russia’s “disproportionate” incursion.

sociation, May 1997, http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm.asp.

³ “NATO-Russia Relations,” Topics Web page, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Dec. 4, 2008, www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html.

⁴ Newser.com, “Medvedev warns against NATO plans,” March 28, 2008, www.newser.com/story/22487/medvedev-warns-against-nato-plans.html.

⁵ Col. Gen. Nikolai Pishchev, “NATO Myths and Reality,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Jan. 5, 2008, www.fas.org/man/nato/national/msg00006c.htm.

⁶ Dmitri Trenin, “Partnerships Old and New,” *NATO Review*, summer 2007, www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art1.html.

⁷ Yaroslav Butakov, “NATO against whom?” *Rpmonitor*, Feb. 12, 2007, www.rpmonitor.ru/en/en/detail.php?ID=3220.

⁸ “Russian troops to patrol Georgian port — Gen. Staff,” Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), Aug. 23, 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080823/116235138.html>.

⁹ Mikheil Saakashvili, “Georgia Acted in Self-Defense,” *The Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 2, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122817723737570713.html?mod=google-news_wsj.

¹⁰ Reuters, “NATO, Russia to resume high-level contacts Friday,” Dec 18, 2008, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKLI401387>.

¹¹ “NATO to resume Russian contacts,” *Sky News*, Dec. 2, 2008, <http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Nato-Agrees-To-Gradually-Resume-Contacts-With-Russia-In-Wake-Of-War-With-Georgia/Article/200812115171101?r=rs>.

¹² M. K. Bhadrakumar, “In the Trenches of the New Cold War,” *Asia Times*, April, 28, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/central_asia/ID28Ag01.html.

¹³ Andre De Nesnera, “Obama to face strained U.S.-Russian relations after taking office,” *VOAonline*, Nov. 20, 2008, www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-11/2008-11-20-voa61.cfm?CFID=82992383&CFTOKEN=88186048.

¹⁴ “NATO bars Russian ship from anti-terror patrol,” *Javno*, Sept. 3, 2008, www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=172085.


¹⁵ Alexander Khramchikhin, “Anti-ballistic missiles: menace or myth,” *Space War*; www.spacewar.com/reports/Mutual_Destruction_Danger_In_US_Anti_Missile_Plan_Says_Putin_999.html.

¹ “Russian ship to join NATO exercise,” *Eaglespeak*, May 19, 2006, www.eaglespeak.us/2006/05/russian-ship-to-join-nato-exercise.html.

² Jack Mendelsohn, “The NATO-Russian Founding Act,” *Arms Control As-*

Americans Suffer Most Casualties

Most of the 1,045 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan since 2001 have been American, British and Canadian, who are fully engaged in combat operations against Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents. Germany, France, Italy and other NATO governments only allow their soldiers to shoot at the enemy in self-defense, so their troops are not stationed in areas with heavy combat.



Continued from p. 12

Federation. In the event of hostilities, it was there on the broad, flat plain that a potential Soviet tank invasion was most likely.

In 1952, NATO members agreed to deploy 100 divisions within two years. But by 1954 it was obvious that the alliance didn't have the economic strength or the political will to achieve that target. In any case, by 1953 the United States had begun deploying strategic nuclear weapons at friendly bases in Europe, and Washington — and eventually NATO — opted for a strategy of massive retaliation in defense of Europe, which entailed the almost exclusive use of nuclear weapons regardless of the size and nature of the attack. By the late 1950s, Moscow also had developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, making the United States itself vulnerable to nuclear attack.³¹

It took NATO nearly a decade of debate to develop and adopt a new, more rational, defensive approach — so-called flexible response. President

John F. Kennedy outlined the strategy in 1962, but it didn't become official NATO policy until five years later. It relied on a sequence of three escalating responses: conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear. The first involved conventional defense against attack, also called direct defense. If that failed, tactical nuclear weapons (short-range missiles for use on the battlefield) were to be used to force the attacker to stop the conflict and withdraw from NATO territory. The third line of defense was a strategic nuclear response using intercontinental rockets, which shifted the focus of the conflict from the European battlefield to a direct U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation.

Flexible response worried Washington's European allies because it "decoupled" the United States from the conflict until the third option. They felt the United States would be prepared to brave Soviet retaliation as a last resort, after Europe had taken a lot of punishment. In fact, U.S.

strategists did envision a long conventional war before moving to the second option.³² Meanwhile, several efforts were made to integrate U.S. and European forces, such as the U.S.-proposed Multilateral Force of the early 1960s. The 25-ship seaborne force was to be equipped with 200 Polaris ballistic missiles, manned by European sailors from NATO powers under U.S. control. But NATO member states had no enthusiasm for mixed crews, and the project was quietly dropped.

France Pulls Out

In 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO's military command structure, complaining that France had been relegated to a secondary role in the alliance. At de Gaulle's insistence, NATO's headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels.

France's departure reflected internal uncertainties about NATO's continued role, especially given that the Soviets had never invaded. East-West tension began to relax, and the alliance began to broaden its political role. In 1967, NATO adopted recommendations from a report by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel that its future military posture combine defense and détente. In other words, defense programs were to be combined with efforts to establish better relations with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites.

The decision would greatly influence NATO in subsequent years.³³ At the time, some member states were improving their bilateral relations with Moscow. The Harmel Report helped reconcile the different diplomatic approaches of the American and European leaders in the face of the Soviet challenge. It also eventually led to NATO-Soviet negotiations beginning in 1973 to reduce ground forces in Central Europe — the Mutual and Balanced

Force Reduction talks, and to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

In the late 1970s the Soviet Union introduced the medium-range SS-20 missile, capable of carrying nuclear warheads to European cities. NATO responded in the early 1980s with a “dual track” strategy: plans to deploy 108 U.S.-supplied Pershing II missiles and 462 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe while pressuring Moscow to negotiate the mutual removal of medium-range arsenals from Europe.

What quickly became known as Euro-missiles stirred strong public opposition, with violent protests breaking out in West Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, Moscow worked hard to open a rift between the United States and its European allies. Ailing Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev flew to Bonn in an attempt to persuade Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to reject the American missiles. However, faced with a critical test of the alliance’s political resolve and cohesion, European governments stood firm.

Enlarging NATO

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO began expanding its membership to include former Soviet satellite countries, starting with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in March 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004.

Aspiring nations were required to show progress towards democratization and improve their military effectiveness. NATO enlargement thus became a catalyst for quick change in the former communist states, under close Western guidance. Eastern Europeans and the Baltic nations, still nervous about the intentions of their Russian neighbor, welcomed NATO’s (i.e. America’s) protective shield.



AP Photo/Michal Dolezal

“Yankees, Leave Your Radar At Home,” say Czech communists to protest a radar base the United States wants to build in the Czech Republic as part of a global missile defense shield against a potential threat from Iran or North Korea. NATO’s endorsement of the plan — which includes installing 10 interceptor missiles in neighboring Poland — has caused tension between the alliance and the Kremlin.

“What we’re doing here is hoping for the best and creating the conditions for the best but also being prepared for the possibility of Russia’s re-asserting itself,” President Bill Clinton told members of Congress on the day of the first NATO enlargement. “We’re walking a tightrope.”³⁴

As NATO’s borders edged closer to Russia, the alliance tried to reassure Moscow by establishing the NATO-Russia council, with permanent military representation in Brussels, and — as Clinton said — “holding open a place for Russia in some future, evolved version of NATO.”³⁵

But Moscow’s discomfort with NATO expansion grew as additional countries — including Croatia, Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine — stood in line to join the alliance. Since 2006, Putin — first as president and more recently as prime minister — has issued several strong protests against NATO’s continued enlargement into the “near abroad,” as Moscow calls its closest neighbors.

The latest threat to NATO’s survival, however, comes not from Russia but

from a wild, rugged country where — ironically — 20 years ago, the Russians themselves learned the lesson of bitter defeat. ■

CURRENT SITUATION

Slowing Expansion

The war in Afghanistan, however, is not the only challenge facing NATO today.

At a NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in April 2008 — in the first known instance of NATO turning down a personal request by a U.S. president — the alliance rebuffed Bush’s proposal that Georgia and Ukraine be given so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) status, a period of preparation designed to improve an aspiring member’s democratic credentials and

military effectiveness. The alliance put the plan on the back burner and then reaffirmed its decision in early December at a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Brussels. Faced with strong protests from Prime Minister Putin, Germany and France led other member states in a maneuver acknowledging that the two Caucasian nations would become NATO members eventually but stopping short of giving them MAPs, saying further negotiations would be necessary.

The decision came after months of tense confrontation and rhetoric over the issue. In what many saw as a quid pro quo, NATO backed the Bush administration's plan to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland linked to a missile defense radar system in the Czech Republic. The United States says the system is intended to defend Europe from possible ballistic missile attacks by rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, but Russia views it as a potential threat. Agreements on the deployment have since been signed with both NATO countries.

In retaliation, Moscow announced in November 2008 that it would begin installing its own intercontinental, nuclear-capable missiles within a year.³⁶ President Medvedev said newly developed RS24 missiles — with a range of 4,000 miles — would be sited in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave awkwardly perched between NATO members Poland and Lithuania.³⁷

The brief conflict between Russian and Georgian forces last August chilled relations between NATO and Russia. It also split the alliance, with the Bush administration continuing to champion Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili despite his rash attempt to annex the breakaway province of South Ossetia — which Washington officials say they repeatedly warned him not to try — and the Europeans' more measured inclination to give Moscow at least some benefit of the doubt.³⁸

The American position was complicated by the fact that a hotly contested presidential election was in full swing. Republican candidate Sen. John McCain of Arizona exploded in hawkish anti-Russian comments. Democratic candidate Sen. Obama of Illinois took a tough stance as well, saying Georgia's NATO aspirations should not be undermined by the August fighting.

South Ossetia (birthplace of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin) and the nearby region of Abkhazia have long sought to separate from Georgia and are supported by Russia.³⁹ Given the opportunity, the Russians retaliated in force, advancing across Georgia like a knife through butter as far as the Baltic port of Poti. NATO quickly censured Moscow's "disproportionate use of force" and expressed support for Tblisi, putting its relations with Moscow on hold. As Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer put it in August, there would be "no business as usual" in the NATO-Russia council for a while.⁴⁰

The "while" lasted three months. At its December meeting NATO announced it was resuming a "conditional and graduated re-engagement" with Russia, which it said did not signify approval of Russia's incursion into Georgian territory or its continued presence in, and recognition of, the breakaway province of South Ossetia.⁴¹ The decision represented a defeat for the tough line with Moscow that Washington wanted to maintain and a success for the European argument that NATO needed to engage the Russians rather than isolate them.

In fact, NATO support for either Georgian or Ukrainian membership has dwindled. "Even the position of friends of Georgia and Ukraine within the alliance has evolved," said Slawomir Debski, director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, who believes no decision is likely until after the 60th-anniversary summit in April.⁴² In Ukraine, he pointed out, the gov-

ernment had collapsed, and public opinion is deeply divided over NATO membership, with 60 percent of the population opposing joining the alliance.

"The political upheavals in Ukraine mean that there is no partner reliable enough to talk to," he said. "NATO should wait until the territorial conflict with Russia is resolved" before making a decision on Georgia's application. For instance, if Georgia had been able to invoke Article 5 as a NATO member in August, the alliance would have been pulled into war with Russia, he pointed out.

Extending NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia "borders on insanity," says Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow on security at Washington's Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. "These countries are security consumers, not producers, and can provide little military benefit to the alliance. Both countries come with pre-existing conflicts with their stronger neighbor, Russia. . . . If you designed a country to be an uncomfortable ally, it would look something like Georgia — a weak nation with a territorial conflict with a nuclear-armed neighbor, led by a leader with a demonstrated capacity for recklessness."

That view is increasingly shared even in Washington, which has backed away somewhat from its position earlier in the summer, when outgoing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proposed that NATO consider dropping the MAP requirement and fast-tracking Georgia's and Ukraine's membership.

By December, faced with alliance opposition to circumventing the system, Rice had backtracked: "There should be no shortcuts," she declared, admitting that membership was "a long road ahead" for both countries.

Continued on p. 20

Has NATO become irrelevant?



FYODOR LUKYANOV
EDITOR, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS
A MOSCOW-BASED FOREIGN-POLICY
QUARTERLY

WRITTEN FOR *CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER*, JANUARY 2009

it is difficult to find any institution besides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that would manifest such a wide gap between progress in form and lack of success in substance. Its public image is great: The alliance outlived its main enemy, the Warsaw Pact, and won the Cold War. The number of members has more than doubled, and other countries are queuing to join the most powerful and prestigious club in the world.

But this historic triumph brought a few existential challenges to which NATO can't respond — at least not yet. First, what, after all, is the new strategic mission of NATO? Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it is still unclear what kind of tasks this alliance should address: The Euro-Atlantic area doesn't need protection from a Soviet threat any more. Attempts to turn NATO into a global alliance and main international security institution — which would be a natural continuation of post-Cold War logic — haven't been realized. European allies are far from enthusiastic to fulfill missions in distant parts of the world, where they don't see their clear interests. Afghanistan is evidence enough.

Second, why is transatlantic unity still necessary in the 21st century? Tradition? Sure. Common values? Yes, but Europe and the United States differ on how those should be implemented. Common threats? Unlikely. Neither China nor international terrorism provides a consolidating threat, while Russia is simply unable to pose it. Strategic horizons? Not at all. The United States, as a global superpower and Europe as a regional entity with a unique political culture have different views on world affairs.

Third, is NATO still able to spread stability and security? In the 1990s the West could transform the security system according to its own ideas. Russia was unable and unwilling to resist; China was completely focused on internal development.

Now, however, in an effort to export security NATO expansion has become a catalyst for serious conflict, provoking Russia by intruding into its historical domain. Since NATO is rooted in the previous Cold War epoch, it is unrealistic to expect Moscow to change its attitude *vis-à-vis* enlargement.

Conceptually, NATO is obsolete and unfit to address real threats, but political and bureaucratic inertia will keep it going and provoking new strategic misunderstandings.



BASTIEN GIEGERICH
RESEARCH FELLOW ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
SECURITY STUDIES, LONDON

WRITTEN FOR *CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER*, JANUARY 2009

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has confounded regular predictions of its demise by demonstrating an impressive adaptive ability.

NATO's transformation is by no means complete, but it has mutated to reflect the myriad security threats posed in today's security environment, including international terrorism. Yet, at the same time, it has maintained its core capacity for collective defence, even though this latter capacity is no longer directed against a particular enemy.

The alliance provides a vital forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues. It is also an invaluable tool to influence third countries through cooperation — a quick browse through NATO's various partnership programmes underlines this point.

The degree of pre-crisis military coordination among its member states remains unrivalled: NATO's defence planning system, commonly agreed goals and efforts to standardize procedures and equipment mean NATO member forces are much more interoperable than they would be otherwise. When NATO does deploy forces, there is a functional multilateral framework for doing so in which its members understand each other's strengths and weaknesses.

Being a coalition of democracies makes it necessary to build and maintain political consensus as a prerequisite for action, which is always time-consuming and sometimes tedious. However, the upside provided by being a genuine coalition of democracies means that once consensus exists, the international legitimacy of NATO's actions is high.

NATO remains the most promising tool for the United States to influence the security and defence policies of European countries, and thus an important instrument of leadership.

The United States does not have the capacity to deal with global security threats on its own. In eight out of 10 cases her NATO allies will remain the most capable and most reliable partners around.

This is not an argument for nostalgia: NATO must continue to adapt to stay relevant. The last two decades suggest that it can do both.

Continued from p. 18

'A Beast with 100 Heads'

The past year has been the deadliest yet for NATO forces in Afghanistan since the U.S.-led invasion. Financed by a flourishing opium trade, Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda fighters have regrouped in Pakistan's lawless territories bordering Afghanistan, where fellow Pashtun tribes give them shelter and protection between their raids across the border.⁴³ The 294 allied military deaths in 2008 are the

ed for bin Laden — who is still at large — and his al Qaeda terrorists.

But terrorists are just one aspect of the challenge facing NATO forces. "We now have a country that's infested with everything from the Taliban and al Qaeda on the insurgency side, to bandits, warlords and narcotics traffickers," said former CIA officer Michael Scheuer in a recent PBS documentary. "We're really fighting a beast with 100 heads."⁴⁵

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called Afghanistan, "NATO's first ground war."⁴⁶ But that's not really true for troops from Germany, France

focus must be on transferring more power and responsibility to the Afghan authorities," says Shada Islam, senior program executive at the European Policy Centre think tank in Brussels. That's a tall order in a country where large areas have yet to be brought under the control of President Hamid Karzai's not-very-effective government.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, Islam points out, has said he does not believe there will be a "military solution in Afghanistan." Instead, he and many European leaders say efforts should be focused on helping to develop Afghanistan's armed forces so the country can ultimately provide its own security.

So far, the 70,000-man Afghan army has improved in combat capability, say NATO leaders. But it's a small force in a country with a population of more than 32 million, and current plans are to expand it to 134,000 over the next five years. By contrast, the Afghan police, who are also being trained by ISAF, remain largely inefficient and corrupt.⁴⁷

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) — another non-combat project, made up of NATO military personnel and civilian aid workers — have had an uneven record of success, according to a 2008 report by specialists from the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs in Washington.⁴⁸ The German PRT operating in the northern province of Kunduz is the largest and one of the more successful, but its role was typical, albeit on a larger scale than most. Working with the provincial authorities, the report says, the PRT helped to restore drinking water to 850,000 inhabitants, constructed hundreds of elementary schools and clinics, conducted training for teachers, police and judges and provided security. But it has failed to convince the Afghans that the state had contributed to the effort.

"Kabul's authority continues to be regarded as more or less nonexistent," the report says. "Citizens are disap-



Getty Images/Michael Kappeler

A German military policeman (left) trains Afghan police officers in northern Afghanistan in September 2008. Many Europeans contend that rather than seeking a military solution in Afghanistan, NATO should focus on helping Afghan police and armed forces provide the country's own security. The army has improved in combat capability under NATO's guidance, but the police reportedly remain largely inefficient and corrupt.

most ever in the seven years of the war. Reporters in Afghanistan say the conflict is "stalemated, at best."⁴⁴

All 26 NATO countries and 13 non-NATO allies — which have small contingents, such as Sweden (with 85 personnel) and Austria (3) — have contributed troops to NATO's 50,000-strong International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). The United States has 20,000 American troops serving under NATO command, plus another 12,000 in the U.S.-run Operation Enduring Freedom, which originally hunt-

and Italy, whose governments have imposed rules of engagement — so-called "caveats" — specifically prohibiting them from engaging in combat unless they come under attack.

The caveats are not just the result of domestic political pressure generated by the unpopularity of the Afghanistan mission. They also reflect differences in approach within NATO. While the United States plans to send in more troops for an Iraq-type "surge," the French attitude is more typical of the European position. France believes "the

pointed in the performance of the province's institutions." 49

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is planning to deploy another 20,000-30,000 troops in Afghanistan this year, and incoming President Obama is expected to ask the NATO partners to send additional troops. But "European governments are likely to ignore Obama's demands that they assume greater responsibility by sending more troops," says Islam, which is expected to cast a pall over Obama's first official dealings with his NATO allies next April.

Many Europeans question whether a troop surge will work in Afghanistan's rugged terrain, which makes a heavy ground war nearly impossible, and air strikes mean heightened civilian casualties. In 2007, 321 Afghan civilians were killed in U.S. and NATO air strikes — three times as many as in the previous year — which has corroded Afghan views of U.S. and NATO forces as "liberators."

As an American soldier put it in the PBS documentary, "I don't think that even the little kids like us." 50 ■

they need to start thinking about a new strategic concept," the former Marine commandant told *The New York Times* recently. "Unfortunately, NATO's mission is still rooted in the 20th-century, Cold War model of a defensive, static, reactive alliance instead of an agile, flexible and proactive 21st-century reality." 51

But Poland's Debski doubts that the alliance will be able to produce a new

Kremlin relations develop with Obama in the Oval Office.

Oil-rich Russia's new determination to reshape its place in world affairs makes NATO members that are former Soviet satellites nervous. They want reassurance that NATO's security blanket is more than just rhetoric. If, for example, Russia attacks Latvia, will NATO come to its rescue under Article 5?

"Today, three NATOs co-exist. There's the NATO of the Cold War, there's the exporter of stability to ex-Soviet countries and there's the NATO directed against new threats. . . . But which is the real NATO?"

It's hard to reconcile the three."

**— Henning Riecke, security specialist
German Foreign Policy Institute**

OUTLOOK

New Strategic Concept

The upcoming NATO summit in April to celebrate the alliance's 60th anniversary would seem an obvious platform to begin reshaping its future. The French city of Strasbourg was chosen as the summit venue to mark the return of France to NATO's military command 40 years after President de Gaulle's withdrawal.

Former NATO Supreme Commander Gen. James L. Jones, who has been tapped to head President Obama's National Security Council, pinpoints one pressing change. "Most [NATO nations] understand that for NATO to survive as an institution in the 21st century,

strategic concept at the April summit. "The thinking about a new strategic concept is in progress; the machinery of consultation is moving," he says. But the summit will probably not discuss it in any depth in order "to give the Obama administration time to elaborate its own strategy towards NATO.

"The summit will be Obama's first NATO meeting, and . . . such a postponement seems likely," Debski continues. "With a new president in the White House we are at a point of departure." With a former NATO commander as national security adviser, however, the Obama administration might be in a position to articulate an alliance policy sooner than Europeans expect.

Equally important, say observers, NATO will want to see how U.S.-

The 60th-anniversary summit is likely to reaffirm alliance guarantees because, as Giegerich of London's International Institute for Security Studies points out, "If there's an attack on a NATO member and the alliance doesn't respond to Article 5, then the alliance is dead." Debski calls the article "the essential fundament of the Alliance. If Article 5 is weakened, the whole institution may die very soon."

Developing NATO's role in protecting energy resources and transportation routes is also likely to be on the summit agenda. And it's not clear whether the new U.S. administration will continue President Bush's push for membership for Georgia and Ukraine. Giegerich foresees "a strategic pause" in the push for enlargement. "As long as

the situation in Georgia is unsettled, it's not in NATO's interest to admit it."

However, Albania and Croatia are expected to be admitted.

Despite its problems, the alliance keeps the United States engaged in European security affairs. NATO enlargement has helped to unify a continent divided by 60 years of conflict and ease the entry of Eastern and Central European countries into the European Union. NATO has brought peace to the Balkans — and maintains that peace by keeping troops there. Through its Partnership for Peace, the alliance has established links with countries in other regions, such as Central Asia. Military cooperation between the allies promotes military interoperability and develops professional bonds and habits of cooperation that endure beyond an immediate deployment.⁵²

Most observers say that if NATO is to remain an instrument for transatlantic security, it must be ready to take on more so-called out-of-area operations like the war in Afghanistan. But the alliance must establish parameters for such a commitment.

"In a world of 'globalized insecurity,' a regional Eurocentric approach simply no longer works," Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer declared recently. "We have to address security challenges where and when they emerge, or they will show up on our doorstep."⁵³ ■

Notes

¹ Suzanne Koelbl and Alexander Szander, "German Special Forces in Afghanistan Let

Taliban Commander Escape," *Spiegel Online*, May 19, 2008, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554033,00.html.

² See <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.

³ For background, see Robert Kiener, "Crisis in Pakistan," *CQ Global Researcher*, December 2008, pp. 321-324.

⁴ Howard De Franchi, "US vs. Europe: two views of terror," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 18, 2004, www.csmonitor.com/2004/0318/p01s01-usfp.html.

⁵ Tom Regan, "EU, U.S., differ on how to fight terrorism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 2, 2004, www.csmonitor.com/2004/0329/dailyUpdate.html?s=entt.

⁶ "Forecast International Inc. News — Category Defence: A Frugal Pax Europa," Aerospace and Defence Network, Nov. 12, 2008, www.asd-network.com/press_detail/18416/A_Frugal_Pax_Europa.htm.

⁷ Terence Hunt, "Bush, Putin at odds over NATO plans," *Oakland Tribune*, April 5, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_ai_n25144063.

⁸ Vanessa Gera, "Polish Support for Missile Deal Soars," *Topix*, Aug. 18, 2008, www.topix.com/forum/world/czech-republic/T1DPMN6G522MV45HV.

⁹ Doug Bandow, "The NATO Alliance: Dangerous Anachronism," *AntiWar.com*, Oct. 17, 2008, www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=13603.

¹⁰ Koelbl and Szander, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Saul Landau, "The NATO Axiom: 2+2=5," *ukwatch*, May 22, 2008, www.ukwatch.net/article/the_nato_axiom_2_2_5.

¹² Bandow, *op. cit.*

¹³ E. Wayne Meny, "Therapy's End: thinking beyond NATO," *The National Interest*, Winter 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/a_i_112411717/pg_8?tag=outBody;col4.

¹⁴ Steven Erlanger, "NATO Chief Defends Opening to Russia," *The New York Times*, Dec. 4, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/world/europe/04nato.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.

¹⁵ Jeff Gerth and Tom Weiner, "Arms Mak-

ers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion," *The New York Times*, June 29, 1999, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E4D81131F93AA15755C0A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2>; see also Tom Lipton, "With White House Push, U.S. Arms Sales Jump," *The New York Times*, Sept. 18, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/washington/14arms.html?pagewanted=1&r=1&hp.

¹⁶ Hendrik Enderlein, "Military Interoperability," *IP Internationale Politik*, www.ip-global.org/archiv/2002/winter2002/military-interoperability.html.

¹⁷ Congressional Research Service reports to Congress for 2006 and 2008, respectively, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34187.pdf; and www.scribd.com/doz/7788295/Arms-Sales-Transfers-2000-2007.

¹⁸ Federico Bordonaro, quoted from "Power and Interest News Report" in *ASAM Foreign Press Review*, May 19-20, 2005, www.avsam.org/fpr/rcs.htm, and Steve Clemons, "After Bucharest: Energy Security and Russia," *The Washington Note*, April 11, 2008, www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/04/after_bucharest/.

¹⁹ "NATO Forum on Energy Security Technology," Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Feb. 22, 2006, www.iags.org/natoforum.htm.

²⁰ Sohbet Karbuz, "NATO and energy security," *Energy Bulletin*, Nov. 3, 2007, www.energybulletin.net/node/36716.

²¹ Johannes Varwick, "NATO's Role in Energy Security," *SpiegelOnline*, Jan. 7, 2008, www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,563210,00.html.

²² "NATO and the fight against terrorism," NATO, www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html.

²³ Jose Maria Aznar, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," *Europe's World*, spring 2006, www.europesworld.org/EWSSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21005/Default.aspx.


²⁴ NATO, *op. cit.*

²⁵ See "Operation Active Endeavour," www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/practice.html.

²⁶ Alexander Kudasheff, "German NATO General: Most Afghans Back ISAF Mission," *Deutsche Welle*, Sept. 27, 2008, www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3675301,00.html.

²⁷ Tim Shipman, "US officials 'despair' at NATO allies' failings in Afghanistan," *Telegraph News*, June 22, 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/2170135/US-officials-%27despair%27-at-Nato-allies%27-failings-in-Afghanistan.html.

²⁸ Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan, "Don't Expand NATO: The Case Against Membership



About the Author

Roland Flamini is a Washington-based correspondent who writes a foreign-affairs column for *CQ Weekly*. Fluent in six languages, he was *Time* magazine's bureau chief in Rome, Bonn, Beirut, Jerusalem and the European Common Market and later served as international editor at United Press International. His last report for *CQ Global Researcher* was "The New Latin America."

for Georgia and Ukraine," Cato Institute, Oct. 22, 2008, www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9738. For background on the Marshall Plan, see "Marshall Plan Home Page," U.S. Agency for International Development, www.usaid.gov/multi-media/video/marshall/.

²⁹ Forrest P. Sherman, unpublished diary, Sept. 25, 1950 (quoted by permission of the Fitzpatrick family).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, March 4, 1951.

³¹ "NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response and the Twenty-first Century," GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1986/LLE.htm.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ For an analysis of the Harmel Report, see "NATO Strategy in 1967," www.db.niss.gov.ua/docs/nato/nato/sco32.html.

³⁴ Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (2002), p. 248.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ "Russia Slams U.S., threatens missile deployment," CNN.com, Nov. 5, 2008, www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/Europe/11/05/russia.missiles.

³⁷ "Russia to deploy missile to counter US missile shield next year," *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 28, 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/russia/3533320/Russia-to-deploy-missile-to-counter-US-missile-shield-next-year.html. For background on Kaliningrad, see Brian Beary, "A Sliver of Russia Trapped in Europe," pp. 194-195, in "The New Europe," *CQ Global Researcher*, August 2007.

³⁸ Lanny Davis, "Are we all Georgians? Not so fast," *Fox Forum*, Aug. 25, 2008, <http://foxforum.blogs.foxnews.com/2008/08/25/are-we-all-georgians-not-so-fast/>.

³⁹ For background, see Brian Beary, "Separatist Movements," *CQ Global Researcher*, April 2008, pp. 85-114.

⁴⁰ "NATO Agrees to Thaw in Contacts with Russia," *VOAnews*, Dec. 2, 2008, www.voanews.com/english/2008-12-02-voa58.cfm.

⁴¹ "NATO reopens talks with Russia, hold off on Ukraine and Georgia," *Deutsche Welle*, Dec. 2, 2008, www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3843756.00.html.

⁴² Judy Dempsey, "U.S. presses NATO on Georgia and Ukraine," *The New York Times*, Nov. 25, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/world/europe/26nato.html?_r=1&ref=world.

⁴³ See Kiener, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Michael Gordon, "Strategy Shift for Afghan War Poses Stiff Challenge for Obama," *The New York Times*, Dec. 2, 2008, p. A1.

⁴⁵ Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith, "Frontline: The War Briefing," PBS, Oct. 28, 2008,

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Atlantic Council of the United States, 1101 15th St., N.W., 11th Floor, Washington, DC 20005; (202) 463-7226; www.acus.org. Promotes constructive American leadership in helping the Atlantic community meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (202) 797-6000; www.brookings.edu. A think tank that studies how to strengthen U.S. democracy and promote a more cooperative international system.

Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20001; (202) 842-0200; www.cato.org. Seeks to increase understanding of public policies based on the libertarian principles of limited government, free markets, individual liberty and peace.

Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021; (212) 434-9400; www.cfr.org. Promotes a better understanding of the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other governments.

French Institute of International Affairs (IFRI), 27 rue des Processions, Paris 75740, France; 33(0)1 40.61.60.00; www.ifri@ifri.org. A leading European center for research, meetings and debates on international issues.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13-15 Arundel St. Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX, England; 44(0)20 7379-7676; www.iiss.org. Think tank focusing on international security with an emphasis on political-military conflict.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Blvd. Leopold III, 1110 Brussels, Belgium; 32(0)2 707-50-41; www.nato.int. Headquarters of the North American-European mutual defense alliance.

Polish Institute for International Affairs, 1a Warecka Slwe, P.O. Box 1010, 00-950 Warsaw, Poland. Established in 1996 to conduct research and provide unbiased expertise in international relations.

RAND Corporation, 1776 Main St., Santa Monica, CA 90401; (310) 393-0411; www.rand.org. Nonprofit organization that focuses on national security issues.

Russian Academy of Sciences, Leninskii Avenue, 14, Moscow, Russia 119991; (495) 938-0309; www.ras.ru. Nonprofit organization researching policies that promote economic, social, technological and cultural development in Russia.

Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund, Résidence Palace, Rue de la Loi 155 Wetstraat, Brussels, Belgium 1040; +32-2-238-5270; www.gmfus.org. Promotes a more integrated Europe and studies the impact on NATO.

www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warbriefing/view/.

⁴⁶ Carol Bowers, "NATO grows with Afghanistan experience," U.S. Dept of Defense, April 2, 2008, www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49433.

⁴⁷ Gordon, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ Nima Abbaszadeh, *et al.*, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations," January 2008, http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/www591b.pdf.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Gaviria and Smith, *op. cit.*

⁵¹ Helene Cooper and Scott L. Malcomson, "Welcome to My World, Barack," *The New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 16, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/magazine/16rice-t.html?ref=magazine&pagewanted=all.

⁵² Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Is NATO Dead or Alive?" *The Huffington Post*, April 1, 2008, www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-sherwood-randall/is-nato-dead-or-alive_b_94469.html.

⁵³ See NATO Online Library, April 4, 2005, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050401b.htm.

Bibliography

Selected Sources

Books

Asmus, Ronald D., *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, Columbia University Press, 2004.

The executive director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center provides an insider's account of the fierce divisions within the alliance over the Yugoslav wars and NATO enlargement.

Henricksen, Dag, *NATO'S Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999*, Naval Institute Press, 2007.

A Norwegian Air Force captain and military strategist who participated in NATO'S 78-day aerial-bombing campaign during the Kosovo conflict examines what happened.

Howorth, Jolyon, and John T. S. Keeler, (eds.), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

A professor of European politics at England's University of Bath (Howorth) and the dean of the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh (Keeler) have compiled a variety of commentaries on the complex relationship between NATO and the European Union.

Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2007.

In his fourth book on NATO, a Georgetown University history professor examines the often-contentious 1948 negotiations about whether the United States should join the proposed alliance.

Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, 2004.

A leading NATO historian explores persistent differences between the United States and its European partners that quickly re-emerged after NATO rushed to support the United States following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Articles

Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, spring, 2006.

A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (Daalder) and a professor of political science at The George Washington University (Goldgeier) argue that NATO must expand its membership beyond Europe in order to meet new security challenges.

Hulsman, John C., et al., "Can NATO Survive Europe?" *The National Interest*, March 22, 2004.

Four distinguished scholars debate whether NATO can co-exist with the European Union.

Myers, Stephen Lee, and Thom Shanker, "NATO Expansion and a Bush Legacy Are in Doubt," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2008.

Disparities of might and will exist among NATO members.

Reports and Studies

Archick, Kristin, "The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2005, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/41324.pdf>.

An analyst of European affairs offers options for improving U.S.-European relations.

Gordon, Philip H., "NATO and the War on Terrorism: A Changing Alliance," Brookings Institution, Dec. 12, 2008, www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/summer_globalgovernance_gordon.aspx.

A leading analyst wonders if NATO has an enduring role but says writing off NATO would be "perverse and mistaken."

Hunter, Robert E., Edward Gnehm and George Joulwan, "Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices," National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, 2008, www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2008/RAND_CF251.pdf.

A former U.S. ambassador to NATO (Hunter) leads a prestigious group of "senior practitioners" in developing a blueprint for post-conflict operations.

Hunter, Robert E., Sergei M. Rogov and Olga Oliker, "NATO and Russia: Bridge-building for the 21st century, Report of the Working Group on NATO," RAND Corporation, 2002, www.rand.org/pubs/white_papers/WP128/.

A former U.S. ambassador to NATO (Hunter) and director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences (Rogov) — a Moscow-based independent research organization — argue for closer cooperation between NATO and post-communist Russia.

Phillips, David, "Post-Conflict Georgia," The Atlantic Council of the United States, Oct. 3, 2008, www.acus.org/publication/post-conflict-georgia.

A visiting scholar at Columbia University's Center for the Study of Human Rights examines the impact of the Georgia conflict on U.S.-European relations within NATO.

Rupp, Richard E., "NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Decline," March 2006, www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/2/4/pages99241/p99241-1.php.

A Purdue University history professor argues that NATO is increasingly ineffective and cannot be reformed.

The Next Step:

Additional Articles from Current Periodicals

Afghanistan

“Parliament Demands That NATO Operations Should Be Conducted Under Government Supervision,” *Daily Afghanistan* (Afghanistan), April 19, 2007.

Afghan members of parliament are demanding that NATO work with the government in order to ensure coordination between foreign and local military forces.

“We Fear NATO May Suffer Warsaw’s Fate in Afghanistan,” *Arman-e Melli* (Afghanistan), Feb. 24, 2008.

Many NATO member countries do not want to send additional troops to Afghanistan because the war has yet to produce any desired results.

Shanker, Thom, “NATO Asked to Meet Promises Already Made to Afghanistan,” *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 2007, p. A9.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has asked NATO allies to send more troops to Afghanistan to fend off Taliban attacks.

Zaki, Hafizollah, “Afghanistan’s Future in Bucharest Summit’s Mirror,” *Mosharekat-e Melli* (Afghanistan), April 7, 2008.

NATO should contribute more foreign aid to Afghanistan instead of boosting military forces.

Future Prospects

“NATO Alliance ‘Best in World,’ ” *Kuwait Times*, Sept. 9, 2007.

Forming a relationship with NATO gives non-members access to 26 countries and different political viewpoints.

“Russia and NATO’s Identity Question,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 18, 2008, p. 8.

Newer NATO members — especially Baltic countries — are urging a renewed focus on the alliance’s traditional mission of territorial defense.

Goering, Laurie, “After 60 Years, NATO Struggles to Reinvent Mission,” *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 5, 2008, p. A19.

The war in Afghanistan and conflict between Russia and Georgia have caused serious divisions over the political direction of NATO.

Member Expansion

“Bush Backs NATO Membership for Albania, Croatia,” *Deseret Morning News* (Utah), Oct. 25, 2008.

President Bush has signed accession protocols that bring Albania and Croatia a step closer to membership in NATO.

“Macedonia ‘Fully Committed’ to NATO Membership, Ministers Say,” MIA news agency (Macedonia), July 2, 2008.

Macedonian foreign and defense ministers believe their country would be an ideal NATO member because it isn’t dependent on daily, internal political events in neighboring states.

Kivinen, Olli, “Severe Blow to Finland,” *Helsingin Sanomat* (Finland), April 8, 2008.

Increasing Russian influence means that NATO will no longer expand automatically.

Security Challenges

“NATO Cannot Do Without Russia,” ITAR-TASS news agency (Russia), Dec. 5, 2008.

NATO has realized that it cannot solve the major security challenges in the world without Russia’s help, according to a deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces.

“Putin Tries Surprise NATO Offensive,” *Moscow Times*, April 7, 2008.

Then-Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that a NATO military bloc along its borders would be regarded as a direct security threat.

Asmus, Ronald D., “Saying Yes to France,” *The Washington Post*, Oct. 29, 2007, p. A15.

Today’s security challenges warrant France’s return to full NATO participation.

Kasciunas, Laurynas, “Test of NATO’s Reliability,” *Veidas* (Lithuania), Aug. 9, 2007, p. 34.

Non-traditional threats to the international system — such as regional conflict and international terrorism — face NATO in the 21st century.

CITING CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER

Sample formats for citing these reports in a bibliography include the ones listed below. Preferred styles and formats vary, so please check with your instructor or professor.

MLA STYLE

Flamini, Roland. “Nuclear Proliferation.” *CQ Global Researcher* 1 Apr. 2007: 1-24.

APA STYLE

Flamini, R. (2007, April 1). Nuclear proliferation. *CQ Global Researcher*, 1, 1-24.

CHICAGO STYLE

Flamini, Roland. “Nuclear Proliferation.” *CQ Global Researcher*, April 1, 2007, 1-24.

Voices From Abroad:

SERGEY KARAGANOV Chairman, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia

A useless collaboration

“Russia-NATO collaboration in itself was mainly an exercise in diplomatic games and virtually useless. However, if NATO needs it for proving its own legitimacy and if NATO still wants to pretend that it is a constructive force in Europe, Russia is ready to play along with the alliance’s desire, provided NATO halts expansion.”

*Interfax news agency (Russia),
December 2008*

MARK JOHAN KRONER Dutch ambassador to the United States

Afghanistan: a must win

“If NATO does not succeed there, it will be a disaster not just for Afghanistan and the region but for NATO itself. It would certainly be a blow to the credibility of the West to deal with a crisis.”

*The Washington Times,
April 2007*

JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER Secretary General, NATO

Enlargement and Russia are key

“We will not choose between NATO enlargement and Russia, because we need both: We need a Europe where countries are free to

choose their own destiny and not have others determine it for them. This means that NATO will not retreat from its commitment to Georgia and Ukraine that they will one day be members of the Alliance.”

*Speech before Atlantic Treaty
Association, Berlin,
November 2008*

BRONISLAW KOMOROWSKI Vice-marshal of Sejm (lower chamber of Polish parliament), Poland

A missile defense shield is necessary

“I am very disturbed by statements made by Polish politicians who question the idea of building the system within the NATO framework. If a NATO missile defense shield was created, to which the U.S. shield could be tailored to fit, the Patriot missiles we would obtain from the United States could become part of the Allied system. . . . The absence of a NATO system is a serious shortcoming for everyone.”

*Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland),
April 2007*

NICHOLAS SARKOZY President, France

France’s necessity

“If France returns to its full role in NATO, the alliance will make more space for Europe. I want a more European alliance. Explain to me how you can make

a more European alliance without France?”

The Associated Press, June 2008

DOMINIQUE MOISI Professor of political science, College of Europe, Poland

Iraq is causing problems

“The war in Iraq has not only caused NATO to lose focus in Afghanistan; it has also undermined solidarity of purpose among allies. And, without confronting much more seriously the ‘sanctuary’ role unwillingly played by Pakistan, there is no solution ahead for NATO in Afghanistan.”

*New Straits Times (Malaysia),
July 2008*

GEN. DAVID RICHARDS British commander of NATO forces, Afghanistan

More troops necessary

“At no stage have I said anything other than NATO

needs more troops here. What we ought to do is win. This campaign is eminently winnable. What we need to do is a little bit more, a little bit longer.”

Chicago Tribune, January 2007

ALEKSANDAR SIMIC Adviser to then-Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica

Kosovo: NATO’s state

“NATO set up an international military presence that would strictly be made up of NATO-led forces, meaning that it would be under NATO command and political control. In any case, NATO, with the special powers and prerogatives that are not subject to any civil control, would remain in Kosovo for a ‘lengthy period.’ ”

*Vecernje (Serbia),
August 2007*

